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ABSTRACT 
Traditionally theories of cerebral organization have tended to focus on various broad 
functional dichotomies. However, whilst the identification of dichotomous 
dimensions distinguishing the hemispheres provides useful approximations of their 
functional properties, such dichotomies fail to account for the many diverse 
manifestations of hemispheric asymmetry. Recent research in cognitive psychology, 
however, indicates that mental faculties previously treated as undifferentiated 
phenomeno. are better described and understood as being composed of distinct 
processing units that perform specific operations. This evidence has led to the 
development of new computational models of functional cerebral lateralization. The 
phenomenon of visual mental imagery has achieved particular prominence in this 
respect as evidence has been produced in support of the claim that the generation 
component of the imagery system is lateralized to the left hemisphere (LH). Given 
these findings the question naturally arises as to whether other components of the 
imagery system are lateralized to the LH or whether both hemispheres are involved 
in different aspects of imagery performance. 
The thesis initially presents a review of the literature pertaining to the above, 
including methodological and theoretical issues related to the localization of function 
in the brain, models of hemispheric interaction, computational models of imagery 
developed within cognitive psychology, the relationship between imagery and 
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perception and the evidence in support of the LH image generation hypothesis. A 
series of experiments isý then reported which wLýýs designed to investigate the 
possible lateralization of additional imaginal components. The first rive experiments 
investigated the putative LH localization of the image scanning component of the 
imagery system. A further three experiments are then presented designed to 
investigate the possibility that the two hemispheres are specialized for the generation 
of different forms of visual images. The implications of these findings for specific 
models of cerebral lateralization of the imagery system are then discussed, as are the 
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1.1 HEMISPHERE SPECIALIZATION: THEORY AND NWTHOD 
1. LI Introducdon 
Asymmetries in hemispheric function were first documented in the nineteenth 
century by observers who noted the tendency for language disorders to occur 
following left hemisphere (LH) damage and visuo-spatial disorders to occur following 
right hemisphere (RH) damage (e. g. Broca, 1865; Jackson, 1874). In the ensuing 
years clinical investigators have reported additional consistent differences in the 
behavioural consequences of unilateral injuries, and it is now generally accepted that 
the cerebral hemispheres are functionally dissimilar. The optimum way of 
conceptualizing these differences, however, remains controversial, and there is as yet 
no fully articulated, general model of hemispheric specialization. 
For example, over the last thirty years investigators in the area of laterality research 
have periodically attempted to reduce the multiple specializations of each hemisphere 
to a single more encompassing function. Thus at various points in time the LH has 
been described as being specialized for such things as verbal, analytic and serial 
processing, whereas the RH has been characterized as being specialized for 
nonverbal, holistic and parallel processing. Moreover, these global processing 
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dichotomies have unfortunately paved the way for ever more abstract notions of the 
relationship between mental function and the hemispheres. The concept of 
hemisphericity, for instance, asserts that the two hemispheres are specialized for 
qualitatively different modes of thought, and in consequence individuals will exhibit 
a preferred left or right cognitive style depending on which hemisphere they tend to 
rely on. This notion has spawned many outlandish claims. For example, differential 
utilization of RH and LH modes of thought has been purported to account for the 
differences between Western and Oriental philosophies, our political ideologies, the 
generation gap and, perhaps most intriguingly, the supposed failure of the 
European-based educational system (e. g. Ornstein, 1970). 
Active investigators in the area of laterality research understandably dismiss these 
imaginative notions as totally unwarranted speculations which have no basis in fact. 
Indeed the very concept of hemisphericity has been called into question (Beaumont, 
Young and McManus, 1984). Cognitive styles, implying predominant activity by one 
or other hemisphere, do not appear to reliably characterize individuals any more 
than they reliably characterize particular populations or cultures. Nevertheless, it 
also has to be acknowledged that the more empirically based processing dichotomies 
have not fared particularly well either. Many of these global abstractions were 
derived from attempts to discern regularities across empirical observations following 
retrospective analyses of the literature. This form of post-hoc inductive reasoning, 
however, inevitably led to the identification of opposing conglomerates of only partly 
related attributes. Thus, while these global dichotomies may sometimes provide 
useful approximations of the respective competencies of the two hemispheres, they 
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have little predictive and explanatory power and consequently fail to account for the 
many diverse manifestations of hemispheric asymmetry. 
Moreover, it is questionable whether any new global processing dichotomy would be 
any more successful in integrating the mide variety of diverse functions attributed 
to each hemisphere. In recent years, for example, a number of studies have tested 
for such a dimension empirically. Various statistical techniques lend themselves to 
such an analysis, but one strategy which has been employed in this respect involves 
the investigation of the relationship between different cognitive tasks which are 
known to reliably produce similar laterality effects. If the observed hemispheric 
superiority occurs because both tasks tap into the same aspect of some fundamental 
dichotomy, then one would expect the asymmetries for the two tasks to be positively 
correlated. The multi-task studies which have been carried out, however, have 
found only weak or no relationships between the asymmetries for the tasks (e. g. 
Dagenbach, 1986; Hellige, Bloch and Taylor, 1988). It would, therefore, appear 
unlikely on empirical grounds that there is a single processing dimension which can 
account for all hemispheric asymmetries. Thus the complexity of the present picture 
may not, as has been suggested, be due to conceptual limitations, but may instead 
reflect the true multifactorial nature of the underlying processes. 
Considerations such as these have led many investigators to conclude that any 
attempt to subsume all the essential aspects of hemispheric functioning under some 
perfect dichotomy is an exercise in futility. Indeed some researchers have argued 
that the theoretical and epistemological problems which afflict this area are so great 
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that it is no longer a viable field of research (e. g. Efron, 1990). However, while the 
traditional dichotomous approach to hemispheric specialization is undoubtedly 
deficient, it is possible that new theoretical paradigms may yet provide insight into 
the nature of cerebral organization. 
In recent years, for example, there has been a continuing and highly productive 
interaction between the clinical neurological tradition and the functionalist 
information processing approach of contemporary cognitive psychology. In 
particular, the development of sophisticated cognitive theories of visual mental 
imagery have provided a theoretical foundation on which to base explicit questions 
about the neural distribution of the imagery system (e. g. Kosslyn, 1980). Moreover, 
this area has served as a testing ground for the formulation of new computational 
models of functional cerebral lateralization (Farah, 1984; Kosslyn, 1987). The 
recency of these developments is understandable, as it is only in the last two to three 
decades that mental imagery has been considered a bona ride subject of scientific 
investigation in cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, the prominence currently 
accorded to visual mental imagery in the area of laterality research is remarkable, 
given that prior to the early 1980s the issue of the cerebral localization of imagery 
was seldom explicitly discussed. 
Before discussing the implications of these developments, however, it is perhaps 
appropriate initially to briefly review the methodologies and theoretical assumptions 
that have traditionally characterized the area of laterality research. 
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1.1.2 Sources of Evidence 
Prior to the 1960s the primary source of evidence regarding hemisphere function 
came from observations of brain-damaged patients. Damage to one hemisphere 
leads to disabilities different from those arising from damage to the other 
hemisphere, and it is this relationship between the side of the lesion and the type of 
disorder which is thought to provide evidence regarding the functional specialization 
of the hemispheres. The straightforward nature of this definition, however, belies 
the true complexity underlying interpretations of these observations. In many cases 
the nature, locus and extent of the damage cannot be very accurately ascertained. 
Moreover, even if the precise site of damage can be established, the lesion may 
sometimes "disconnect" processes rather than impairing them per se. 
Additional problems arise if the injury was incurred early in life as research appears 
to indicate that the plasticity of cerebral organization diminishes with age. Clinical 
reports of cases where damage was sustained in childhood, for example, suggest that 
each hemisphere can assume at least some of the opposite hemisphere's functions 
(e. g. Milner, 1975; Dennis and Whitaker, 1976; Woods, 1980). This potential for 
cerebral reorganization, however, does not appear to be present in patients whose 
damage was sustained in adulthood. In cases where injury was incurred early in 
life, therefore, the observed deficits cannot be assumed to necessarily reflect normal 
brain organization. 
Furthermore, factors such as the time elapsed since the injury was incurred, the 
degree of recovery of function achieved, the age of the patient, the sex of the patient 
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and whether they are right- or left-handed all have to be taken into account. 
Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties, the clinical evidence has yielded a sizable 
body of information about hemispheric function. However, its limitations prevent 
definitive conclusions being drawn about cerebral organization, and it is therefore 
necessary to look for converging evidence from other sources. 
Split-brain patients first began to be studied extensively in the 1960s. These patients 
have undergone neurosurgery which involves complete sectioning of the corpus 
callosum, as well as several smaller forebrain commissures, so that the two 
hemispheres are disconnected. By testing their response capacities when sensory 
inputs have been limited to one hemisphere, it is assumed that it is possible to 
examine the functions of each hemisphere independently. In general, the data 
reported from such studies appear to be consistent with the picture of hemispheric 
differences that has emerged from studies of brain-damaged patients (Springer and 
Deutsch, 1989; Hellige, 1990). However, again there are limitations to such data. 
For example, as noted previously, the commissurotomy operation in its full form 
involves complete section of the forebrain commissures. The midbrain commissures, 
however, are not sectioned, and it is possible that some information may be 
transmitted from one hemisphere to the other via these remaining pathways. 
Furthermore, information may also be passed between the hemispheres via cross- 
cuing strategies, whereby subjects use bodily gestures and orienting responses to 
facilitate the lateral transfer of information (e. g. Gazzaniga and Hillyard, 1971). 
An additional and potentially more serious problem is that neurosurgical intervention 
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in these cases is necessitated by the presence of long-standing, intractable epilepsy, 
and this may have produced major changes in brain organization. For example, 
Whitaker and Ojemann (1977), in a review of the ten commissurotomized patients 
who have been the focus of research, observed that split-brain patients differed 
considerably from one another and from the general population in terms of both 
their performance and their neurological status. 
Furthermore, they also observed that the majority of these patients appeared to have 
sustained their lesions in infancy and childhood, and more recently Geschmind (1985) 
has claimed that some of the patients may even have sustained their lesions in utero. 
The significance of this claim is that such prenatal lesions have been shown to result 
in a reorganization of cerebral lateralization that differs from that which occurs 
following lesions in infancy or childhood. This could, therefore, go some way 
towards accounting for the variability in performance that is found between these 
patients. Moreover, it would also appear to suggest that patterns of cerebral 
lateralization demonstrated in commissurotomy patients may not easily generalize 
to the developmentally normal adult brain. Thus, while split-brain data can perhaps 
serve to strengthen evidence from other sources, the above considerations would 
appear to suggest that it is inappropriate to draw ifirm conclusions from these studies 
in isolation. 
Finally, studies of cerebral organization have not been limited to clinical populations. 
Indeed the popularity of hemispheric specialization as a research topic is probably 
due to a large extent to the development of techniques which facilitate the 
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investigation of cerebral organization in normal intact subjects. Reviews of this area 
generally conclude that the data from normal subjects are in overall broad 
agreement with the clinical and split-brain evidence (Springer and Deutsch, 1989; 
Hellige, 1990). Indeed it is this convergence of results from a wide variety of 
different sources which has led to the consensus that different cognitive processes are 
subserved by different hemispheres. 
It is, however, also ackno-, vledged that many of the asymmetries which are found in 
experiments with normal subjects appear to be extremely labile. There has, for 
example, been a disproportionately large number of failures to replicate reported 
experimental results (e. g. Boles, 1983,1984). Moreover, a -Aide range of individual 
performance differences have been observed on tasks that are supposed to be 
lateralized, even among populations thought to be relatively homogenous in terms 
of lateral organization. It also appears that seemingly trivial procedural differences 
between experimental paradigms can influence results. In fact the apparent ease 
with which relatively superficial changes in stimuli, instructions or other task 
parameters can eliminate or even reverse a performance asymmetry serves to 
illustrate the inherently unsatisfactory nature of much of the normative laterality 
literature. It would, therefore, appear to be appropriate to briefly consider some 
of the factors which may have contributed to this variability. 
1.1.3 Techniques 
It is possible that the labile nature of asymmetries found in experiments , iith normal 
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su ects may in part be due to lack of precision in the techniques of testing. These 
techniques generally involve channelling sensory inputs so that they are projected 
primarily to one or other hemisphere, and subsequent task performance is then 
analyzed in order to ascertain if accuracy or response latency vary as a function of 
the hemisphere of initial reception. For example, in dichotic listening tasks material 
presented to the left ear is thought to be projected primarily to the RH, whereas 
material presented to the right ear is thought to be projected primarily to the LH 
(Kimura, 1961). Tests of lateralized tactile presentations are based on a similar 
form of contralateral mapping for voluntary motor control. 
Alternatively, there are some more specialized techniques which attempt to provide 
more direct physiological measures of hemispheric activity. Electroencephalographic 
(EEG) studies, for example, involve recording electrical activity at certain sites in the 
brain while subjects engage in psychological tasks. Similarly, regional cerebral blood 
flow (rCBF) studies monitor the increased blood flow which occurs at certain regions 
within the brain during task engagement. 
By far the most popular technique employed to study cerebral organization in 
normals, however, is the divided visual field study, and as this is the procedure 
which is employed in the studies reported subsequently the methodological difficulties 
associated with this technique will be described in detail. It should perhaps be 
noted, however, that all of the alternative procedures have methodological and 
theoretical complications (Beaumont, 1982a; Bradshaw, 1989a), and none can be 
regarded as being inherently superior to the divided visual field technique. 
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The divided visual field procedure rests upon the fact that the anatomy of the visual 
pathways means that it is possible to direct information initially to a particular 
cerebral hemisPhere: if the subject maintains central fixation and a visual stimulus 
is presented briefly in the left visual field (LVF) then it is projected initially only to 
the RH, if presented briefly in the right visual field (RVF) it is projected initially 
only to the LH. When the technique is used to test commissurotornized patients the 
presented visual information is confined to the hemisphere of original reception. In 
normal individuals, however, the brain obviously functions as an integrated whole: 
information to one hemisphere being immediately transferred to the other via the 
corpus callosum. Nevertheless, it is possible to detect performance differences on 
certain tasks, depending on whether the stimulus was presented to the RVF or LVF, 
and these differences are thought to reflect functional asymmetry. 
It should perhaps be noted, however, that there are two alternative explanations of 
performance differences between the visual fields in lateralization studies with 
normals. For example, visual field performance asymmetries may arise because one 
cerebral hemisphere is relatively inefficient at processing the stimulus material 
presented. Alternatively, one hemisphere may be unable to fully process the 
information and it would, therefore, have to be transferred via the commissural 
fibres to the opposite hemisphere before processing could take place. Transmission 
across the corpus callosum necessitates some delay, during which the information is 
assumed to undergo some degree of transformation such that it arrives at the second 
hemisphere in a comparatively degraded state. Unfortunately experimental data do 
not normally allow discrimination between these alternatives. 
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It is clear from this brief description that the divided visual field technique is in 
principle simple and elegant. However, consideration of the methodological and 
theoretical bases of visual hemifield studies indicates that there are a number of 
procedural factors which, if not adequately controlled, can influence the outcome of 
such studies. For example, there is some evidence which appears to suggest that the 
retinal cells adjacent to the visual midline are bilaterally represented in the visual 
cortex (e. g. Stone, Leicester and Sherman, 1973; Koerner and Teuber, 1973). Not 
all investigators agree with this interpretation (Bradshaw, 1989a), but given the 
uncertainty surrounding this issue it is generally thought appropriate to avoid 
presenting stimuli in this area. Unfortunately the precise extent of the region has 
not been clearly established, but in practice it is thought prudent to avoid presenting 
stimuli in the central 3' of vision. Conversely, as acuity along the horizontal 
meridian of the visual field diminishes -Aith distance from fixation (Alpern, 1962), 
it is also thoughtwise to restrict the outer limit of stimulus presentation to 5' from 
the fixation point. 
A further factor which needs to be carefully controlled is stimulus presentation time. 
After stimulus onset eye movements may bring a laterally presented stimulus into 
foveal vision and exposure durations, therefore, should be limited to a time less than 
the latency of such movements. Estimates of the time taken to initiate eye 
movements vary between 180 ms and 200 ms (Cohen, 1983). These are, however, 
mean latency times, and as the standard deviations are mostly of the order of 20 ms 
to 25 ms it is generally recommended that a more conservative estimate of 150 ms 
be adopted (Young, 1982; Bradshaw, 1989a). However, Young (1982) also observes 
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that the saccadic movements themselves will take some 20 ms to 30 ms to execute, 
and there may then have to be some adjustments in convergence and 
accommodation. Furthermore, perceptual sensitivity is apparently substantially 
reduced for some 40 ms to 50 ms after the movement is initiated (Volkmann, Schick 
and Riggs, 1968). For these reasons, therefore, Young feels that stimulus exposure 
durations of up to 200 ms can be acceptable. 
The divided visual field technique obviously also relies on accurate control of fixation 
in order to ensure that the stimuli are presented in the required retinal positions. 
Unfortunately, there is no commonly agreed method for ensuring that fixation is 
maintained. Some investigators have used video or electro-oculographic monitoring 
of eye movements in order to control fixation (Young, Bion and Ellis, 1980; Dimond 
and Beaumont, 1972), but the technical investment involved in such procedures has 
prevented their widespread use. AlternativelY, McKeever and Huling (1971) 
developed a technique whereby subjects had to report a neutral stimulus presented 
centrally prior to the presentation of the lateralized stimulus. The procedure has the 
advantage of not requiring complex and expensive equipment, but concern has been 
expressed regarding the possibility that the central stimulus might influence the 
subsequent perception of the lateralized stimulus (e. g. Hines, 1972). In consequence, 
the popularity of the procedure has declined. 
More recently, some investigators have advocated random presentation of both 
central and purely peripheral trials (e. g. Kosslyn, Koenig, Barrett and Cave, 1989), 
and it is possible that such a procedure might help to ensure that central fixation is 
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maintained. However, this method may not easily generalize to all experimental 
designs. The majority of investigators, therefore, rely on instructing subjects to 
fixate centrally, and guard against the loss of central fixation by presenting stimuli 
unilaterally and in a random sequence. It has to be acknowledged, however, that 
the reliability of such a procedure can be questioned. Although this concern can 
perhaps be mitigated to a certain extent by emphasizing to subjects the importance 
of maintaining central fixation not only in the initial instructions but throughout the 
trials themselves. 
It has also been claimed in recent years that factors which influence the sensory 
quality of the lateralized stimulus may bias performance in visual-hemifield studies. 
For example, there is evidence which appears to indicate that the RH makes more 
effective use of lower quality information than the LH (Sergent and Hellige, 1986; 
Christman, 1987). Specifically, the RH appears to be at an advantage with highly 
degraded stimuli, brief exposure durations, large eccentricities and reduced levels 
of stimulus luminance. An observed performance asymmetry, therefore, may 
perhaps be due to the particular viewing conditions prevailing in an experiment 
rather than to the respective competencies of the cerebral hemispheres at carrying 
out the task under consideration. It should perhaps be noted in this respect, that 
a number of investigators have claimed that lateralization is not characteristic of 
peripheral sensory processes (e. g. Moscovitch, 1986). Nevertheless, given the above 
evidence it would seem prudent to attempt to control for these factors if at all 
possible. 
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Finally, it should perhaps be noted that Sergent (1983) has also argued that the 
effects of certain stimulus parameters may vary as a function of task demands. The 
precise nature of this relationship, however, has not been clearly specified. 
Moreover, irrespective of any interactive component, the evidence relating to the 
influence of factors imposed by task demands, such as familiarity, practice, set size, 
etc., is rather inconsistent, and it is not possible therefore to draw any general 
conclusions with respect to this issue. 
It is clear from the above brief review that there are methodological problems 
associated with this technique, and inadequate control of these factors could 
obviously influence results. It is possible, therefore, that the somewhat confused 
findings which have emerged from this area may in part be due to methodological 
laxity. Beaumont (1983a, p. 184), for example, suggested that inconsistencies in the 
normative literature may have arisen "partly because of the indifferent scientific 
quality of many of the studies". Similarly, Bradshaw (1989b, p. 74) claimed that the 
contradictions in the literature often stemmed from "inadequacies of experimental 
control". Nevertheless, it is important to note that Beaumont (1983a) also maintains 
that there is sufficient consistency overall to suggest that despite its limitations the 
technique is robust and generally reliable. Indeed it does appear to be widely 
accepted as a valid method of investigating cerebral organization in normals. 
1.1.4 Individual Differences 
An additional factor which may have contributed to the variability in performance 
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asymmetries often found in experiments with normal subjects is individual 
differences in cerebral organization. There are, of course, a 'Aide range of factors 
which could potentially be of relevance to this issue, but two particular 
characteristics have been the focus of extensive research: handedness and sex. 
An overwhelming majority of individuals perform skilled actions preferentially with 
the right hand. Cross-cultural surveys, for instance, suggest that in the majority of 
contemporary cultures only about 10% of the population are left-handed, and a 
variety of indirect evidence suggests that this may even have been the case in 
prehistoric times (e. g. Porac and Coren, 1981). Numerous theories have been 
postulated regarding the origins of left handedness (e. g. Levy and Nagylaki, 1972; 
Bakan, 1977; Annett, 1985), but ever since asymmetries in the nervous system were 
first documented it has been assumed that cerebral organization is directly related 
to hand preference. One of the earliest accounts, for example, regarding this 
relationship was provided by the contralateral rule (e. g. Wernicke, 1874). In essence 
this view states that speech dominance is always located in the hemisphere 
contralateral to the preferred hand. Right-handed individuals should, therefore, 
show LH dominance for language, whereas left-handed individuals should show the 
opposite pattern. For the vast majority of right-handers this "rule" undoubtedly 
applies, but evidence would appear to suggest that left-handers do not conform to 
this general principle. 
Data relating to this issue have emerged from studies utilizing the Wada technique 
and electro-convulsive therapy (ECT). The Wada technique is a procedure in which 
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sodium amytal is introduced into the carotid artery, so interrupting functions in the 
hemisphere on the same side as the injection for a brief period. Using this 
technique, Rasmussen and Milner (1975) provided data showing that of the left- 
handers studied about 70% had LH speech, 15% RH speech and 15% bilateral 
representation. Similarly, studies investigating the effects of unilateral ECT also 
suggest that left-sided speech is to be found in about 70% of left-handers 
(Warrington and Pratt, 1973). Furthermore, the results obtained using these 
techniques are in good agreement with a number of reviews which have investigated 
the incidence of aphasia in right- and left-handers following unilateral lesions 
(Segalowitz and Bryden, 1983; Kimura, 1983). It should perhaps be noted, however, 
that the data are not wholly consistent. For example, in a review of the frequency 
and severity of aphasia follo-Aing unilateral lesions, Carter, Hoheneggar and Satz 
(1980) produced estimates suggesting that 24% of left-handers have left-sided speech, 
none right-sided speech and 76% bilateral speech. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this 
ambiguity, all of the evidence clearly supports the view that there is a higher 
incidence of RH and bilateral language organization in sinistrals. 
The situation regarding the relationship between handedness and cerebral 
lateralization of visuo-spatial abilities is unfortunately less clear. It has, for 
example, frequently been suggested that the dominance relationship between the two 
hemispheres is one of causal complementarity. That is, the localization of language 
representation in the LH is thought to usurp some of the neural space that would 
otherwise be dedicated to visuo-spatial processing, thus creating a RH bias for this 
ability (e. g. Corballis, 1983). However, there often fails to be a good negative 
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correlation between laterality effects for verbal and spatial processing, and this lack 
of association has led some investigators to conclude that the LH specialization for 
language functions and the RH specialization for visuo-spatial functions are causally 
independent of each other (e. g. Bryden, Hecaen and DeAgostini, 1983). It cannot 
be assumed, therefore, that the pattern of cerebral organization for visuo-spatial 
abilities in sinistrals and dextrals mill simply be the inverse of that found for 
language functions. 
More recently, however, Bryden and MacDonald (1989) have reviewed the evidence 
relating to this issue and they concluded that left-handers do display greater 
heterogeneity of cerebral lateralization for visuo-spatial abilities than right-handers. 
For example, they estimated that approximately 68% of right-handers are RH 
dominant for visuo-spatial abilities whereas 32% are LH dominant. In contrast, they 
suggest that onlY 38% of left-handers have right-sided dominance, 30% have left- 
sided dominance and 32% have bilateral representation. Thus the evidence would 
again appear to support the view that sinistrals are a less homogenous group than 
dextrals with respect to cerebral organization. 
The greater variability observed among left-handers has led to the search for 
additional variables that might indicate which left-handers show the pattern of 
hemispheric asymmetry characteristic of right-handers and which do not. Levy and 
Reid (1976), for example, claimed that the pattern of brain lateralization in left- 
handers could be reliably inferred from hand posture in writing. Similarly, it has 
been suggested that the variability between left-handers may be accounted for by 
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determining whether there is a history of familial sinistrality (Hecaen and Sauget, 
1971). Unfortunately neither of these variables have proved to be a reliable 
indicator of brain organization. Thus, as there is as yet no simple method for 
assessing cerebral organization in sinistrals, it is generally accepted that only right- 
handed subjects should be used in studies in which handedness is not included as a 
variable. 
The evidence relating to sex differences in cerebral organization, however, is 
somewhat more problematic. Gender is, of course, one of the most obvious sources 
of individual variation in behaviour, and the question of whether there are any 
differences in cognitive behaviour between males and females has been investigated 
extensively. In general, the evidence regarding this issue has pointed to a male 
superiority for spatial and mechanical skills, and a female superiority for verbal 
skills (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974). Obviously identifying sex differences such as 
these does not necessarily reveal anything about the origins of the differences. 
Nevertheless, there have been several attempts to relate these differences in cognitive 
ability to differences in the pattern of cerebral organization. In particular, in recent 
years it has been argued that male brains are more lateralized, both for language 
and visuo-spatial ability, than female brains. 
Evidence consistent -Arith this interpretation emerged from a series of clinical lesion 
studies carried out by McGlone (1980). The results of this research indicated that 
the incidence of aphasia after LH damage was three times higher in males than in 
females. Furthermore, there appeared to be a double dissociation of the effects of 
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LH and RH lesions in males on the performance of the verbal and nonverbal 
subtests of the WAIS. Specifically, LH lesions were associated with a decline in 
verbal IQ, whereas RH lesions were correlated with a decline in nonverbal IQ. In 
contrast, verbal and nonverbal IQ scores in females did not appear to vary as a 
function of the side of the lesion. These data, therefore, would appear to support 
the view that both language and spatial abilities are represented more bilaterally in 
females than in males, and in consequence it has frequently been recommended that 
studies in which sex differences are not included as a variable should only use male 
subjects. 
McGlone's hypothesis, however, has been challenged. For example, Inglis and 
Lawson (1982) in a review of the literature that reported the effects of unilateral 
lesions on the subscales of the WAIS, found an equivalent effect for males and 
females of LH lesions on verbal IQ scores. It also appears that, aside from 
performance IQ, there is little evidence of a decreased incidence in females relative 
to males of nonverbal deficits commonly associated with RH damage (Hier, 
Mondlock and Caplan, 1983). Such a difference, however, might be expected if 
female brains were less lateralized. Furthermore, reviews of the evidence relating 
to this issue suggest that support for the hypothesis from studies using neurologically 
normal individuals is, at best, equivocal (Fairweather, 1982; Bradshaw and 
Nettleton, 1983). 
Finally, Kimura (1987) has recently argued that LH lesions may be more likely to 
produce aphasia in males than in females because of intrahemispheric sex differences 
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in the location of the language areas, rather than because of sex differences in 
language laterality. She claims that females are more likely to experience language 
impairment and apraxia after damage to the anterior region of the LH. Males, on 
the other hand, are likely to experience aphasia and apraxia after either anterior or 
posterior lesions of the LH. Consequently, Kimura argues that in females speech 
and manual praxis are more focally represented in the anterior regions of the LH. 
Since vascular accidents causing restricted damage tend to affect posterior regions 
more than anterior, this could account for the higher incidence of aphasia in males 
than in females. 
Kimura's data await replication by others, and it is therefore difficult to dram, any 
firm conclusions from the above evidence regarding cerebral organization in males 
and females. Moreover, the picture is complicated further by the possibility of 
complex interactions between sex and handedness. Geschwind and Galaburda 
(1985), for example, have formulated a far-reaching theory of lateralization which 
attempts to account for, among other things, the positive correlation between left- 
handedness, being male, spatial superiority and disorders of the immune system. 
In essence, the theory proposes that fetal testosterone delays the maturation of 
regions of the LH, and this consequently enhances growth of corresponding regions 
in the RH. Males, who are exposed to higher levels of fetal testosterone than 
females, mill therefore show a greater degree of shift to RH participation in 
handedness and language and are more likely to have superior RH skills. 
Furthermore, as testosterone is also known to retard the growth of the thymus gland 
and other structures of the immune system, it will also contribute to a greater 
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vulnerability in males to a variety of disorders. 
GeschN, Ond and Galaburda's hypothesis is a provocative one. There is some indirect 
evidence in support of this view (Thatcher, Walker and Giudice, 1987; Benbow, 
1987,1988), but there have also been detailed critiques of particular aspects of the 
theory (e. g. Bishop, 1990). Moreover, McManus and Bryden (1991) have recently 
observed that the richness and complexity of the theory has to date prevented any 
serious attempt to evaluate the model as a whole. On the basis of the evidence 
considered thus far, therefore, it would appear that there is as yet insufficient 
evidence to merit exclusion of either sex from experimental participation. 
1.1.5 Models of Hemispheric Specializalion 
A final potential source of variability, and one which has enjoyed increasing 
attention in the last decade, concerns the theoretical paradigm within which 
researchers are working. Data and interpretation are inevitably constrained by 
theory and in evaluating previous research it is therefore essential to take into 
account the part that theoretical assumptions have played in determining these 
findings. Reviews in this area have typically focused on the disposing factors, such 
as language, handedness, sex, etc., presumed responsible for cerebral organization. 
Less emphasis, however, has been placed on the precise nature of the underlying 
organizational principles of hemispheric functioning postulated by the various 
models. 
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In recent years, however, there has been a growing awareness of the need to pay 
greater attention to what the hemispheres are actually presumed to be doing, 
irrespective of the factors thought to be responsible for the basic configuration. 
Moreover, by de-emphasizing the exact role of the disposing factors and 
concentrating upon the underlying hemispheric organization some progress appears 
to have been made towards developing a more general theoretical account of the 
nature of hemispheric specialization. For example, in an insightful discussion of this 
issue Allen (1983) observed that in the majority of theoretical formulations regarding 
cerebral organization the basic unit of analysis was the hemisphere. He, however, 
presented cogent arguments for a reformulation of the concept of hemispheric 
specialization in terms of smaller neural processing entities. 
Support for Allen's suggestion comes from research in cognitive psychology 
indicating that mental faculties previously treated as undifferentiated phenomena are 
better described and understood as being composed of distinct processing units or 
modules (e. g. Marr, 1982; Fodor, 1983), each of which are thought to perform 
specific operations and whose separate activation is required for the realization of 
such functions. This new perspective has led to the elaboration of numerous 
computational models of information processing that specify the various steps 
necessary to carry out a particular task. Traditionally these computational models 
have not been concerned with neural "hardware", but in line with Allen's proposals 
it is clear that computational models of cerebral lateralization can be formulated in 
which the processing modules are differentially lateralized to one or other 
hemisphere. 
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This perspective can perhaps go some way towards accounting for the labile nature 
of the asymmetries which have been found in experiments with normal subjects. For 
instance, according to this view even simple tasks will involve a number of different 
processing subsystems, and there is no reason to expect that the hemisphere that is 
superior for one of the subsystems will be superior for all of them. The functional 
superiority of any one hemisphere for a particular task, therefore, mill depend upon 
a set of variables whose effects summate to determine the observable asymmetry. 
Consequently, studies with normals may have frequently generated contradictory 
findings because of a diversity of subtly varying procedures and tasks which called 
upon different mixes of differentiallY lateralized subprocessors. 
The perspective is also consistent with reviews that have addressed the issue of 
whether the degree of specialization is absolute or relative. Absolute models of 
hemispheric specialization imply that the cerebral structures subserving particular 
functions are completely lateralized to one or other of the cerebral hemispheres, 
whereas relative specialization implies that both hemispheres are capable of 
performing most functions but at different levels of efficiency. In a review of this 
area Cohen (1982) concluded that in general the evidence was more supportive of 
relative than absolute specialization, and the computational perspective is consistent 
with this view to the extent that the processing modules involved in a particular 
function are presumed to be localized in both hemispheres. 
However, while there may be relative specialization at the macro level, this does not 
entirely solve the problem of relative versus absolute specialization. Rather it merely 
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succeeds in shifting the issue to a different level of the model. That is, it is necessary 
to consider if there is absolute or relative specialization at the subprocessor level, 
and one way of attempting to evaluate these two opposing ideas is to consider how 
the two hemispheres might interact. Traditionally theories of hemispheric 
interaction have been formulated using the hemisphere as the basic unit of analysis. 
However, since a hemisphere may be viewed as a collection or set of subprocessors, 
there is no particular conceptual barrier to moving from a hemisphere level of 
analYsis to a subprocessor level. 
Although numerous models of hemispheric interaction have been put forward over 
the years, Allen (1983) observed that it was possible to group all the various theories 
into a small number of categories defined by the nature of hemispheric interaction 
proposed. First, a number of cooperative interaction models have been formulated 
which propose that the two hemispheres perform exactly the same function 
simultaneously (e. g. Ellenberg and Sperry, 1980). Overall performance of the given 
task is some form of interactive vector of the two hemisphere's activity, with the 
necessary communication taking place via the commissural fibres. Each hemisphere, 
however, is not thought to make an equal contribution since one may lead or 
predominate and, therefore, contribute more to overall performance. A somewhat 
more extreme version of this approach is provided by the parallel processing model 
(Moscovitch, Scullion and Christie, 1976). Here both hemispheres are operating 
simultaneously but independently of each other. Overall performance, therefore, 
does not reflect an interactive vector but is dependent, presumably, on speed of 
output. A third general approach to relative specialization is provided by the 
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allocation model (e. g. Levy, 1974). Here it is assumed that both hemispheres are in 
principle capable of performing a given task, but in practice only one does so at a 
time. In essence, tasks are thought to be allocated on the basis of some form of 
analysis to the appropriate hemisphere. 
Unfortunately there are problems with all of these approaches. The allocation 
model, for instance, relies on some form of sorting mechanism in order to determine 
whether or not information is to be transferred to the opposite hemisphere. The 
proposed mechanisms in such accounts, however, are often rather vague and little 
evidence is cited in support of the various postulates. The cooperative interaction 
model and the parallel processing model, on the other hand, seem implausible and 
wasteful. In either case one hemisphere is presumed to duplicate what is already 
happening in the other hemisphere, implying a very inefficient use of processing 
space. 
There are, however, two further models of hemispheric interaction which to a 
certain extent avoid these problems. According to the subprocessor view, while there 
is relative specialization at the macro level, there is absolute specialization at the 
subprocessor level. Each subprocessor is thought to accept particular information 
as input, perform some specialized operation on it, and then pass the transformed 
information along to other subprocessors. Unfortunately it is not clear how the 
subprocessors are to be sequenced and coordinated. Although it should perhaps be 
noted that this issue is not without its precursor in the traditional approach, as no 
solution to hemispheric integration was forthcoming when the unit of analysis was 
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the hemisphere. Nevertheless, it is apparent that specifying the subprocessors 
involved in a task can onlY be regarded as a first step. 
An alternative model which has been put forward does propose some form of 
bilateral representation at the subprocessor level. According to this perspective both 
hemispheres have the capacity to perform a given function but they inhibit or 
suppress each other's activity via the commissural fibres. Such an approach has, of 
course, been suggested in the past, most notably by Kinsbourne (1974). All previous 
inhibitory models, however, have suggested a gross "switching off " of whole cognitive 
systems in the other hemisphere. In contrast, according to Cook (1984,1986), this 
inhibition occurs between the subprocessors in a complementary fashion. He 
observed that the corpus callosum connected largely homotopic regions in the 
association cortex on each side, and in accordance %ith this basic fact he suggested 
that activation of a group of cells in one hemisphere suppresses the exact same 
neural pattern of activity in the other hemisphere. At the same time, however, this 
allows activity to develop in surrounding neurons which represent complementary 
aspects of information. Thus, for example, excitation of a pattern of cortical cells 
which mean "cat" in the LH would imply inhibition of "cat" in the RH, together 
with excitation in the RH of peripheral cat-related information, such as kitten, purr, 
and so on. 
Bradshaw (1989b) has suggested that we should perhaps not regard the subprocessor 
model and the negative inhibition model as necessarily incompatible. He argues that 
a composite model is most attractive. According to this view there is a finite number 
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of uniquely specialized subprocessors. In addition, however, there is also mirror- 
image negative connectivity, with subprocessors in each hemisphere taking major 
responsibility for different aspects of complementary information. It should perhaps 
be noted in this respect, however, that many researchers argue strongly against the 
notion of bilateral representation (e. g. McCarthy and Warrington, 1990). Clinical 
investigators in particular note that unilateral injuries may often produce devastating 
effects upon higher cognitive functions, and they therefore tend to stress the absolute 
nature of hemispheric specialization. 
It would appear, therefore, that as yet no firm conclusions can be drawn with 
respect to models of subprocessor interaction. Nevertheless, notNvithstanding this 
ambiguity, the computational perspective has provided a much needed analytic focus 
to research in hemisphere specialization. It is also clear, however, that the 
successful application of this approach rests ultimately on the validity of the cognitive 
model from which it is partly derived. It would appear appropriate, therefore, to 
next consider in detail the theoretical formulations of visual imagery which have 
been advanced over the years in cognitive psychology. 
1.2 COGNITIVE THEORIES OF VISUAL MENTAL IMAGERY 
1.2.1 Introduction 
Imagery phenomena first became the focus of psychological research over one 
hundred years ago when Galton (1883) carried out a survey on the vividness of 
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imagery and reported that there were substantial individual differences. Indeed 
some subjects claimed that they had no conscious mental imagery at all. 
Nevertheless, despite this early research interest, visual mental imagery was then 
almost totally neglected as a topic for study during the first half-century or more of 
experimental psychology. 
This neglect was primarily due to the fact that from the 1920s until the early 1960s 
behaviourism was the major influence on psychological theorizing. The approach 
forbade any mention whatsoever of inner mental processes and insisted on dealing 
only with externally observable events. Mental phenomena, therefore, were reduced 
to the behavioural evidence from which they were inferred, and investigators were 
expected to remain close to the data and to spurn abstract mentalistic theory. In 
consequence, imagery came to be regarded as "a mental luxury (even if it really 
exists) without any functional significance whatever" (Watson, 1913, p. 174). 
However, to every such dogma there comes in time an equal and opposite reaction, 
and mith the rise of the information processing approach in cognitive psychology the 
study of mental phenomena once again came to be regarded as an appropriate topic 
for scientific investigation. For example, in 1964 in an article entitled "Imagery: the 
return of the ostracized" Holt reviewed some of the historical reasons why the study 
of mental imagery was long ignored in psychology. He also urged investigators to 
return to the study of imagery, and shortly after the publication of this article the 
topic became a fashionable area of cognitive research. Moreover, much of its 
increase in popularity during this early period was attributable to the work of Allen 
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Paivio, who attempted to formulate a theory describing how imaginal representations 
were related to other forms of knowledge representation in the cognitive system. 
LZ2 Dual Coding Theory 
According to Paivio's dual coding hypothesis cognition is served by two functionally 
independent but partially interconnected symbolic systems, verbal and imaginal, 
operating in parallel (Paivio, 1969,1971,1986). The imaginal system is said to be 
specialized for processing nonverbal objects and events, whereas the verbal system 
is said to be specialized for processing linguistic information. Paivio, however, 
claims that this symbolic distinction is conceptually orthogonal to distinctions in 
sensory modality. Thus, nonverbal imagery can involve vision, audition, taste, smell 
and haptic components, and verbal processes can include both visual and haptic 
aspects along with a primary auditory-motor component. Both symbolic systems, 
therefore, are thought to be composed of a number of modality-speciric sensorimotor 
subsystems. 
Furthermore, -Aithin each subsystem are basic representational units, termed 
logogens in the verbal system and imagens in the nonverbal system, which can be 
activated by relevant stimuli. The term logogen was originally formulated by 
Morton (1969,1979) and refers to the verbal representational units in long-term 
memory. The parallel term, imagen, refers to the imaginal representations that 
correspond to objects or their parts in long-term memory. Finally, each symbolic 
system is thought to be able to activate the other through associative connections 
between imagens and logogens. 
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There would appear to be some evidence in support of Paivio's proposal that there 
are two separate but interdependent symbolic systems. For example, Paivio's dual 
coding hypothesis helps to explain why pictures as a rule are much easier to 
remember than words (Shepard, 1967; Standing, 1973). Pictures are said to be more 
likely than words to be processed both verbally and imaginally, and consequently 
recall is thought to be improved by the availability of two alternative traces (Paivio 
and Csapo, 1973). The hypothesis is also supported by studies reviewed by 
Richardson (1980) in which memory for pictures was compared when subjects either 
were or were not explicitly instructed to verbally label the objects represented in the 
pictures during the learning phase. The results indicated that verbal labelling 
instructions typically enhanced retrieval, suggesting that a combination of imaginal 
and verbal processing improves long-term retention. 
It has also been claimed that dual coding theory can account for the finding that 
concrete words are typically more easily retrieved during recall than abstract words 
(e. g. Paivio, Yuille and Madigan, 1968). The greater image-evoking quality of 
concrete words is thought to increase the probability of the item being encoded both 
verbally and imaginally. A number of researchers, however, have observed that this 
is not the only possible explanation of these results since concrete and abstract words 
do not differ only in image-evoking potential. For example, some abstract words are 
more lexically complex in terms of derivation and morphemic structure, and some 
evidence suggests that this increased complexity may make them harder to learn 
(Kintsch, 1972). Similarly, abstract words are typically acquired at a later stage of 
development than concrete words, and it has been suggested that the earlier a word 
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is acquired the more easily it mill be retained (Carroll and White, 1973). Because 
of these additional confounding factors, therefore, it is not possible to conclude 
unequivocally that the better recall of concrete material is due to imagery. 
Moreover, the results of studies which have attempted to test for a causal 
relationship would also appear to pose some difficulties for dual coding theory. For 
example, when subjects either are or are not explicitly instructed to imagine 
interactions among pairs of objects, the interactive imagery instructions are typically 
found to enhance recall of concrete but not abstract words (Richardson, 1980). A 
similar effect, however, is obtained when subjects are instructed to use verbal 
mediation strategies, and Bower (1970,1972) has provided evidence which suggests 
that these effects occur because both mnemonic strategies lead to an increase in the 
cohesiveness and organization of the material. For example, he established that 
recall of pairs of concrete words was much better when subjects were told to imagine 
the two objects interacting than when they were told to form separate images of the 
objects or simply to use rote rehearsal. This suggests, therefore, that the effect is 
due to enhanced relational organization rather than to the image-evoking quality of 
concrete words. 
These findings undoubtedly pose some problems for Paivio's dual coding theory, and 
alternative theoretical accounts of how imaginal representations might be related to 
other forms of knowledge representation in the cognitive system have been 
formulated (e. g. Marschark, Richman, Yuille and Hunt, 1987). Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that Paivio (1986) has modified his theory by incorporating 
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additional organizational assumptions mrithin each symbolic system in order to 
attempt to accommodate the above results. The debate on the role of imagery in the 
recall of concrete and abstract words, therefore, cannot be regarded as being fully 
resolved. Moreover, notmithstanding the controversy surrounding this particular 
area of research, the theory does seem to account for picture-word differences found 
in free recall studies. Thus, there is some evidence in support of the view that 
verbal and visual or imaginal memory codes can be distinguished in studies of long- 
term memory. 
However, a further and perhaps more important criticism which is commonly 
advanced against Paivio's dual coding theory is that it pays insufficient attention to 
the properties of images. The internal workings of the proposed representational 
units, for example, are not clearly specified, since no consideration is given to 
precisely how images are represented and what sort of processes operate upon them. 
In order to establish that images makes an independent and distinctive contribution 
to cognition, however, it is necessary to demonstrate that images possess special 
properties which distinguish them from other modes of conscious thought. In 
consequence, a number of investigators have concentrated their research efforts on 
the nature of visual imagery, and have attempted to specify its properties and infer 
its functions from these properties. 
1.2.3.7he Nature of Imagery 
Before discussing the empirical literature, however, it is necessary to consider some 
problems concerning the definition of visual mental imagery. The informal meaning 
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of the word "image" relies heavily on the notion of a picture in the mind, and given 
the overwhelming introspective evidence the existence of such images has never been 
questioned. However, while the existence of mental imagery has never been in 
doubt, its theoretical status remained equivocal until relatively recently. Indeed the 
tumultuous history of the concept of imagery in both philosophy and psychology 
attests to the difficulties this issue has raised. In particular, what is problematical 
is the ultimate nature of images as mental representations. Clearly they cannot 
simply be "pictures in the mind", since if an image is an entity to be perceived then 
a "mind's eye" or homonculus is required. This then introduces an infinite regress 
as it is then necessary to account for the form of representation in the "mind's eye's 
mind", and so on. However, if one adopts a computational approach, whereby 
cognition is characterized as computations over data structures or representations, 
then this problem disappears since there is no more of a conceptual problem in 
positing mechanistic operations that could access imaginal representations than there 
is in positing mechanistic operations that could access other forms of mental 
representation. Nevertheless, this still leaves open the question as to the precise 
nature of images as mental representations, and in this respect psychologists have 
tended to divide into two opposing schools of thought. 
During the 1970s, for example, a number of theorists, in a similar vein to Watson, 
claimed that visual images had no independent functional role and no status as an 
explanatory concept. Pylyshyn (1973), for instance, asserted that an adequate 
characterization of human knowledge required an emphasis on the importance of 
abstract mental structures to which there was no conscious access and which were 
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language-like in nature, as opposed to pictorial and sensory. Therefore, according 
to this view, all information, visual and verbal, was thought to be represented 
internally by means of propositions, i. e. abstract, language-like representations that 
assert facts about the world. The structure of these representations, therefore, was 
not thought to be analogous to the structure of the objects they represented. 
Moreover, visual cognition was thought to constitute activation and manipulation of 
these propositional representations, and mental images were held to be merely 
epiphenomena of this process. 
In contrast, imagery theorists claimed that images had a functional role in cognition 
and were subserved by representational codes that differed in important ways from 
codes underlying other types of information. Specifically, it was claimed that mental 
imagery involved the use of representations and processes that were ordinarily 
dedicated to visual perception, rather than abstract conceptual structures subserving 
thought in general. Moreover, while the majority of imagery theorists explicitly 
disavowed the picture metaphor, images were still endowed with many pictorial 
qualities. Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith and Schwartz (1979), for instance, proposed that 
images were quasi-pictorial representations which occurred in a spatial medium. 
Furthermore, they observed that if an image depicts an object in this way, as 
opposed to describing information discursively, then the size, orientation, and 
location of an object must be instantiated in the image because these properties are 
inextricably linked in the quasi-pictorial format. Thus, it is possible to hypothesize 
that if images do have a functional role in cognition then spatial properties should 
affect information processing when images are used. 
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Evidence which is consistent with this position appears to have been provided by 
experiments investigating spatial transformations of visual images, as these studies 
appear to demonstrate that when people operate on mental images they go through 
a process analogous to actually operating on a physical object. 
1.2.3.1 Spatial nansfonnations 
The most widelY cited evidence in support of the view that mental images can be 
transformed in ways that are parallel to the kinds of transformations that occur in 
their physical counterparts has arisen from studies investigating mental rotation. 
Shepard and Metzler (1971), for example, found that the time taken to judge 
whether two objects seen at different orientations were identical was linearly related 
to the angular distance between them. This appeared to indicate that the image of 
one object was mentally rotated until it was in a corresponding orientation to the 
other. A subsequent study by Cooper and Shepard (1973) which explored the use 
of mental rotation in identifying rotated letters and numbers produced similar 
results. Moreover, in one condition in this study the subjects were given advance 
information about the test character to be presented and its degree of rotation, and 
in this instance the subjects' reaction time functions were essentially flat suggesting 
that they had been able to complete the imagined rotations before the character 
appeared. These findings have subsequently been replicated in a number of 
experiments using a variety of different objects, and it has also been demonstrated 
that rotation can occur through the depth plane as well as the surface plane (e. g. 
Cooper and Shepard, 1975; Carpenter and Just, 1978; see Finke and Shepard, 1986, 
for a review). It would appear, therefore, that mental rotation resembles the actual 
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rotation of concrete objects or patterns. 
Furthermore, the proposal that imagined transformations and their physical 
counterparts are governed by the same laws of motion leads to a number of 
predictions that have been tested using the mental rotation paradigm. For example, 
physical rotations do not slow up or break down because of the visual complexity of 
the object or pattern. Thus, by analogy, the same should be true of mental 
rotations. Similarly, imagined rotations should be of the whole form as opposed to 
being carried out in a fragmented fashion whereby specific portions are rotated. 
Finally, mental transformations should be continuous. That is, imagined rotations, 
like physical rotations, should pass through all the intermediate points along the 
transformational path. Evidence which is consistent with all of these predictions has 
been obtained (Cooper, 1975; Cooper and Podgorny, 1976; Cooper, 1976), and it 
would appear, therefore, that studies carried out within the mental rotation 
paradigm provide strong support for the claims of imagery theorists. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there is some evidence which conflicts with this 
interpretation. Pylyshyn (1979), for example, found that complexity did influence 
speed of rotation when the subjects' task was to judge whether a rotated figure 
comprised a part of a complex initial stimulus. However, as Shepard and Cooper 
(1982) observed, mental rotation mill be influenced by complexity when perceptual 
learning of the particular objects has not progressed to the point where the subjects 
can readily imagine them transformed as a whole. Cooper (1975) and Cooper and 
Podgorny (1976), who found that mental rotation rates were independent of the 
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visual complexity of the patterns, used extensive training procedures. In Pylyshyn's 
study, on the other hand, the stimuli used were unfamiliar to the subjects. 
Furthermore, recently Bethell-Fox and Shepard (1988) have demonstrated that the 
effect of pattern complexity does decrease with the amount of experience the subjects 
have with the particular forms used. 
A further issue which has been raised relates to the large range in reported rates of 
mental rotation. Shepard and Metzler (1971), for example, estimated rates of the 
order of 60" per second, whereas Cooper and Podgorny (1976) estimated rates of the 
order of 500' per second. Pylyshyn (1978,1981) has claimed that this inconsistency 
casts doubt on the conventional interpretation of mental rotation experiments. 
However, more recently Shepard and Metzler (1988) have provided evidence that the 
inconsistency is simply due to differences in procedure, i. e. simultaneous versus 
successive presentations of the stimuli to be compared. 
Given the above evidence, therefore, it would appear that the findings favour an 
analogue view of visual mental imagery, rather than a propositional account. 
Furthermore, the results of other investigations suggest that individuals can imagine 
additional, nonrotational, transformations. For example, mental transformations 
appear to be used to compare objects that are presented at different sizes, different 
shapes and even different colours (e. g. Bundesen and Larsen, 1975; Shepard and 
Feng, 1972; Dixon and Just, 1978). 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is possible to provide a propositional account 
48 
of mental rotation by assuming that a series of stepwise transformations are carried 
out, converting the propositional representation successively to each intermediate 
state until it reaches the upright form. As Eysenck and Keane (1990) observe, 
however, this explanation is somewhat ad hoc and seems far less plausible and 
parsimonious than one stemming from imagery theory. Thus, at this point, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that in general the evidence arising from studies investigating 
spatial transformations of images appears to favour the imagery account rather than 
the propositional perspective. 
1.2.3.2 Image Scanning 
Further evidence in support of the notion that there is a close correspondence 
between the processes of perceiving and imagining arises from the phenomena of 
mental image scanning which has occupied a central position in the empirical and 
theoretical study of imagery for many years. In a comprehensive series of 
experiments, for example, Kosslyn and his colleagues have shown that when people 
are asked to scan mentally between the remembered locations of objects on imagined 
displays, the time required to do so increases linearly %ith increasing distance 
between the objects (Kosslyn, 1973; Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser, 1978). Furthermore, 
this relationship between scanning distance and reaction time has been found with 
both two and three dimensional arrays, indicating that the effect operates within the 
depth plane as well as the picture plane Winker, 1980). Interestingly, Pinker and 
Kosslyn (1978) also found that the reaction times for mental scanning in depth were 
still proportional to the three dimensional separation distances even after subjects 
were instructed to imagine moving one or more of the objects in the initial 
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configuration. This suggests, therefore, that images can preserve information about 
relative three dimensional distances even after the subjects have mentally rearranged 
the objects. 
A related effect to mental scanning is demonstrated by findings indicating that 
reaction times to report on the presence of a named property vary inversely with the 
size of the image. Thus, for example, it takes longer to verify whether a rabbit has 
whiskers if the animal has been imaged next to an elephant than if it has been 
imaged next to a fly (Kosslyn, 1975). Kosslyn argued that this effect is due to a 
"grain" limitation, because when a rabbit is imagined next to an elephant it is 
depicted as being relatively smaller and its features are therefore harder to resolve. 
Furthermore, he also observed that the subjects' introspective reports suggested that 
they were "zooming in" in order to clearly see the specified properties of the smaller 
images. 
Findings such as these have been interpreted as evidence that mental images preserve 
information about the spatial and perspective properties of objects and visual scenes, 
and that subjects operate upon them in much the same way as they would operate 
upon an external sensory stimulus. However, it should be noted that a propositional 
account of both of the above effects can be formulated. For example, 
propositionalists can explain the findings regarding the effect of distance by 
proposing that the arrays are represented by a network of propositions in which 
distance is symbolized by degrees of relatedness. Similarly the effects of size can be 
accounted for by proposing that subjects activate fewer propositions when asked to 
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construct small images, so that detailed information is not readily available 
(Anderson, 1978). There would, however, appear to be evidence which casts doubt 
on both of these interpretations. 
For example, Kosslyn (1976) compared the effect of varying the size of the parts of 
imagined animals with the effect of varying the association strength between the 
animals and their specified properties. The results indicated that when subjects were 
not instructed to use imagery verification times varied as a function of conjoint 
frequency. With imagery instructions, on the other hand, verification times were 
governed by size and not by strength of association. Similarly, Kosslyn (1980) 
demonstrated that if subjects were not explicitly instructed to perform imagined 
scanning then verification times were not related to distance. Thus it would appear 
that the effects only occur when subjects are operating upon images. Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that the fact that the effects appear only to be apparent when 
subjects are explicitly instructed to form images, renders the imagery account 
vulnerable to certain other criticisms. 
1.2.4 7he imagery-Proposidonal Debate 
Notwithstanding the evidence arising from studies investigating mental rotation and 
image scanning, the question of whether images have an independent functional role 
in cognition continued to be the object of spirited debate throughout the 1970s and 
early 1980s. Numerous criticisms of the imagists' position were advanced, but some 
of these now appear to be somewhat ill-conceived. For example, Pylyshyn (1973) 
claimed that as individuals can easily translate information from a verbal to a 
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nonverbal code, and vice versa, there must be some common format or interlingua, 
which is propositional in nature, to intervene between the two different codes. 
However, as Anderson (1978) observed, this argument leads to an infinite regress, 
since it therefore seems necessary to assume that there is also another code which 
intervenes between the verbal code and the propositional code, and so on. There 
are, however, two further criticisms which have been advanced which warrant 
greater consideration, as they appear to provide alternative explanations of the 
apparent relationship between mental imagery and perceptual representations 
revealed in mental rotation and mental scanning experiments. 
First, Intons-Peterson has contended that the experimental paradigms used to study 
the visual properties of imagery are sufficiently vulnerable to experimenter 
expectancy that much, if not all, of the data showing visual properties of images 
could be artifactual (Intons-Peterson and White, 1981; Intons-Peterson, 1983). In 
support of this claim she manipulated the expectations of research assistants 
regarding the outcome of a series of experiments on the relation of imagery to 
perception and found that this systematically affected the results of the experiments. 
Second, Pylyshyn (1979,198 1) views image-percept equivalence as a form of demand 
characteristic. He proposes that subjects of imagery experiments may interpret 
instructions to use imagery as meaning that they should simulate the use of their 
visual systems. Several studies have shown that naive experimental subjects are 
quite capable of predicting the linear relationship between distance and reaction time 
(e. g. Mitchell and Richman, 1980). It is, therefore, not unreasonable to think that 
when subjects are told that their primary task is to form and to scan mental images 
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they would simply try to alter their response times according to their knowledge 
about distances between the imagined objects. As Pylyshyn (1981) observed, such 
tendencies need not be of conscious origin but could be based on tacit knowledge of 
relationships between physical distance and scanning time. 
There is, however, evidence which casts doubt on these alternative explanations. 
With respect to the findings regarding experimenter expectancy effects, for example, 
it is important to note that the results reported by Intons-Peterson consisted of 
simple increases or decreases of imagery performance relative to perceptual 
performance. What has not been demonstrated, however, is that experimenter bias 
can influence the form of an imagery function, and there is in fact evidence to 
suggest that the form of such functions may be impervious to these influences. For 
example, Jolicoeur and Kosslyn (1985) replicated the Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser 
scanning experiment, except that the experimenters were led to expect that the 
relation between reaction time and distance should resemble a U-shaped function 
instead of a linear function. Despite having these misleading expectations the 
experimenters obtained the usual linear increase in reaction time mith increasing 
scanning distance. This would appear to suggest, therefore, that experimenter bias 
is not a crucial factor in determining the general outcome of these experiments. 
Similarly, uith respect to demand characteristics, Finke and Pinker (1982) carried 
out an image scanning experiment using a task which required no explicit 
instructions to form or to scan mental images. Subjects were presented with simple 
dot patterns and allowed to inspect them. The patterns were then removed and an 
53 
arrow was presented at an unpredictable location. Subjects were required to 
respond as quickly and as accurately as possible as to whether or not the arrow 
pointed to a location previously occupied by a dot. The results indicated that 
reaction times were directly proportional to the distances separating the dots and 
the arrows. Furthermore, most of the subjects reported that they formed images of 
the patterns and scanned along these images in the direction indicated by the arrow 
in order to make their judgements. Thus the experiment demonstrates that mental 
images are formed and scanned spontaneously in the absence of any instructions to 
that effect. Further, because the arrom's were always presented at unexpected 
locations, the subjects would not have known in advance the proper scanning 
distances and thus could not have planned to delay their response times by 
proportional amounts in accordance with their tacit knowledge. 
These findings were replicated and extended in another series of experiments in 
which whether or not subjects were given advance information about where the 
arrow would appear was manipulated (Finke and Pinker, 1983). The results 
indicated that when subjects were uncertain about the arrow's location their reaction 
times increased with increasing distance. In contrast, when they were given advance 
information about the arrow's location their reaction times were not significantly 
related to the arrow-dot distance. This suggests, therefore, that the observed effects 
of image scanning are not dependent on whether or not subjects are explicitly 
instructed to use imagery. Rather image scanning appears to be the strategy of 
choice when individuals have to judge directions among items whose relative 
positions have not been explicitly encoded. 
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Nevertheless, while this series of studies strongly suggests that image scanning is not 
an artifact of explicit demand characteristics, the effects of implicit task demands 
cannot be ruled out. Pylyshyn (1979,1980,1981), for example, has argued that 
people may mentally simulate physical events when solving geometric problems even 
when task instructions do not explicitly state that such simulation is called for. 
According to this argument, individuals simply simulate physical events out of sheer 
"habit" in response to the implicit demands of the experiment. 
Furthermore, it has to be acknowledged that there was a complication in the results 
of Finke and Pinker (1983) in that the error data revealed a departure from 
linearity, with subjects making far more errors for the shortest arrow-dot distances 
than for the other distances. Finke and Pinker explained this apparent anomaly by 
arguing that dot positions are unlikely to be recorded in memory with perfect 
accuracy. Therefore, each imagined dot mill fall into a circular region of 
uncertainty. Given a constant angular range within which the scanning process is 
directed, it is more likely that the imagined dot mill fall outside of the critical sector 
the closer it is to the arrow. Evidence which was consistent with this interpretation 
was provided by Pinker, Choate and Finke (1984). They reasoned that if Finke and 
Pinker's explanation of the elevated error rate for the shortest arrow-dot distance 
was a consequence of inaccuracy in remembered dot location, then any manipulation 
that served to increase that uncertainty, such as increasing the retention level, should 
enhance the effect. As predicted, the results revealed that when the retention 
interval was very long and the arrow-dot distance was small there was an increase 
in both reaction times and errors resulting in a departure from the othermise linear 
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trend. 
More interestingly, however, Pinker and his colleagues also found that this effect was 
not predicted by control subjects who were given a description of the task and were 
instructed to estimate how the response times and errors would vary with distance. 
Similarly, in an experiment carried out by Reed, Hock and Lockhead (1983) the scan 
path consisted of diagonal lines, curved spirals and bent spirals of varying length. 
When asked to predict the scanning times, control subjects correctly guessed that 
times would increase with increasing distance, but they could not guess the more 
subtle effects of the shape of the path on the scanning times. This discrepancy 
between estimated and actual data patterns casts doubt on the tacit knowledge 
hypothesis, as do the results of the preceding experiments given that there is no 
obvious type of physical movement whose duration is a linear function for all 
distances except small ones and whose duration is independent of distance when the 
source of thejourney is known beforehand. 
There is, however, one final argument which has been put forward by Pylyshyn 
(1981,1984) in support of the view that images are mere epiphenomena. 
Specifically, he has proposed that according to the assumptions underlying cognitive 
science, the primitive processing modules comprising the mental architecture should 
have the property of what he calls "cognitive impenetrability". That is, they should 
always operate in the same way and therefore the phenomena they yield should not 
be influenced by beliefs, goals or any other high-level aspects of cognition. 
According to Pylyshyn, if images operate in a special medium then they must be part 
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of the functional architecture of the mind and therefore they should not be modified 
by high level beliefs and goals because primitive architecture can only be sensitive 
to the syntactic form of representations not their content. There is evidence, 
however, which indicates that in certain instances high-level aspects of cognition can 
influence imaginal processing. 
Intons-Peterson and Roskos-Ewoldsen (1988), for example, found that their subjects 
took longer to imagine traversing a familiar route when told they were carrying a 
cannonball than when told they were carrying a balloon. Similarly, Hinton and 
Parsons (1981) provided evidence which appeared to demonstrate that people's 
capacity to imagine objects can sometimes depend on an erroneous structural 
description of an object that they have implicitly adopted in accordance with their 
beliefs. This sensitivity to the contents of beliefs is put forward by Pylyshyn as 
evidence in support of the view that the process in question cannot represent a 
primitive component of the cognitive architecture. It must, therefore, be a 
manifestation of whatever mechanisms manipulate the representations underlying 
knowledge in general. 
There are, however, a number of counter-arguments which can be advanced against 
this objection. First, Johnson-Laird (1988) observes that beliefs, goals and other 
high-level aspects of cognition must themselves depend on mental architecture and, 
by definition, they are cognitively penetrable, although presumably Pylyshyn would 
not regard them as mere epiphenomena. Second, Pinker (1984) observes that the 
penetrability criterion pertains to information processing components, but 
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researchers can only gather direct evidence that beliefs are penetrating individual 
tasks involving many components. Thus, if a person's beliefs do influence an 
imagery task, it could simply be due to the fact that the executive has access to 
certain parameters which can be set prior to the operation of a particular 
component, such as rotation or scanning. 
It would appear from the above brief review of the imagery-propositional debate that 
there are no particularly compelling arguments in support of the view that images 
have no explanatory value in psychological theorizing. Indeed there appears to be 
a consensus among contemporary researchers that the whole debate was not only 
overly protracted, but also meaningless. Some investigators, for example, have 
claimed that the issue cannot be decided on behavioural evidence alone. Anderson 
(1978), for instance, has argued that it is impossible to resolve the debate empirically 
because propositional representations and pictorial representations do not have 
distinct properties from which distinct behavioural consequences can be predicted. 
Not all investigators, however, agree with this conclusion. For instance, Johnson- 
Laird (1985) observes that a propositional representation can handle both 
determinate and indeterminate spatial relations, such as "next to", with equal ease. 
In contrast, we cannot imagine two objects side by side without the relation being 
either to the "left of" or to the "right of". Similarly, we cannot imagine a shape 
whose orientation, location and size are indeterminate, since each image must make 
commitments to particular values of these parameters. Thus, according to this 
reasoning, images and propositions are functionally and structurally distinguishable 
from one another. 
58 
Moreover, these constraints contrast with the optionality of other properties in 
imagery. For example, properties such as surface texture, colour, and so on, are 
often reported as being totally unspecified in images. Interestingly, however, the 
constraints on which geometric properties are optional in images and which are 
obligatory are not predictable from physical and geometric constraints on objects in 
the world, since just as an object must have an orientation when viewed it must also 
have a certain colour and texture. Pinker (1984), therefore, argues that as the 
constraints on images are notjust constraints on which properties are defined in the 
world, then this can be regarded as evidence in support of the view that imagery is 
represented by special mechanisms since if imagery was nothing more than the use 
of tacit knowledge then the only constraints on what images could represent would 
stem from what we know can or cannot occur in the world. 
Considerations such as these have resulted in recent years in a shift in emphasis in 
research away from attempting to prove that images are a vacuous representational 
construct. Rather there now appears to be a growing consensus that different 
representational constructs are needed to characterize the richness of human 
cognition. Boden (1988) and Johnson-Laird (1983), for example, have both argued 
that even the dichotomy between imaginal and propositional representations is too 
simplistic. Rather they claim that it is more correct to posit a three-fold division 
between propositions, analogue representations and mental models. Johnson-Laird 
defines mental models as representations which can be wholly analogical, or partly 
analogical and partly propositional. According to this view, mental models are 
thought to correspond to structural analogues of the world and images are the 
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perceptual correlates of models from a particular point of view. 
It is important to note that the distinction between the three types of representation 
is a high level one. As Johnson-Laird (1988) observes, there is a trivial sense in 
which Pylyshyn is bound to be right in his belief that everything can be reduced to 
a uniform code in the language of the brain. However, he claims that such a level 
of description is not one which serves any useful role in cognition. Rather it is 
proposed that the functional organization of these primitive symbols may make 
explicit high-level relations, such as the three-dimensional structure of an object or 
its visual appearance from a particular point of view. What is important, therefore, 
is not what the representations really are but what functions they serve. Such a 
perspective, therefore, makes it perfectly legitimate to investigate the functional 
properties of such representations and how they are accessed and generated. 
LZ5 Kosslyn's 7heory of Visual Mental Imagery 
While in many ways the imagery-propositional debate was prolonged and infertile 
one positive aspect of the controversy was that it spurred imagery theorists to clarify 
the concept of imagery in a far more rigorous way, and consequently a number of 
investigators attempted to formulate detailed and precise theoretical accounts of the 
structures and processes involved in imaginal processing (e. g. Shepard, 1981; 
Hinton, 1979). By far the most important contribution, however, both theoretically 
and empirically, was Kosslyn's computational model of visual mental imagery 
(Kosslyn 1980,1981,1983). 
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Kosslyn's theory proposes that imagery uses representations and processes that are 
ordinarily dedicated to visual perception, rather than abstract structures subserving 
thought in general. For example, according to this account the experience of an 
image corresponds to a pattern of activation in an array-like structure known as the 
visual buffer which is used in both imaging and perceiving. This array consists of 
units or cells, and the position of cells within the array corresponds to position 
within the visual field. Cells, when activated, represent patches of the surface of a 
represented shape, so that the pattern of activation within the buffer is isomorphic 
to the shape of the visible surfaces of the object. It is also posited that the 
characteristics of the visual buffer are innately determined and fixed, and 
consequently these characteristics will influence all representations, both imaginal 
and perceptual, that occur within it. For example, the visual buffer is said to have 
a limited extent and specific shape and hence can only support representations 
depicting a limited visual are. It is also claimed to have a limited resolution which 
is highest in the centre but falls off towards the periphery. Finally, representations 
within the buffer are said to be transient and begin to fade as soon as they are 
activated, so complexity is also limited because parts of a complex image may decay 
before other parts have been activated. 
According to the model the representation in the visual buffer can be activated in 
two ways. First, cells can be activated by information arriving from the visual 
system during perceptual processing. Second, during imaginal processing a "surface 
image" in the visual buffer can be generated from "deep representations" stored in 
long-term memory. Kosslyn assumes that there are at least two distinct kinds of 
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deep representation. Abstract propositional representations, for example, are 
thought to store information regarding the properties of an object, including 
descriptions about the locations of parts of an object. Literal encodings, on the 
other hand, are said to depict the actual appearance of an object. Specifically, every 
object is thought to be represented by a "skeletal encoding" which represents the 
global shape or central part, and detailed parts of the object may also be stored as 
additional separate literal encodings. 
The theory of the properties of the long-term memory structures emerges directly 
from Kosslyn's theoretical postulates regarding the various processes that use this 
information as input. Image generation, for example, is said to be accomplished by 
three subprocessing components, PICTURE, PUT and FIND, which are coordinated 
by an executive IMAGE processing component. The PICTURE processing module 
activates the stored literal encodings of parts of an object, creating a pattern in the 
visual buffer. The PUT processing module coordinates these separate encodings such 
that they form a single composite image. This is achieved by using the description 
of the locations of parts of an object encoded in the propositional representations to 
set the PICTURE module so that the parts are imaged in the correct relative 
positions. This process is sequential and, therefore a FIND module is also invoked 
by the PUT module to locate the "foundation part" where a new part should be 
added to previously imaged material. Finally, the theory also proposes that once an 
image is formed in the visual buffer it can be used in various kinds of processing. 
For example, to maintain images a REGENERATE processing module, which 
purportedly refreshes units one at a time, is used. Alternatively a set of specific 
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modules are posited, such as ZOOM, PAN, ROTATE and SCAN, which enable the 
images to be insPected and transformed in various ways. 
Kosslyn's model represented a major contribution to the study of imagery. The 
detailed specifications of representations and processes enabled predictions to be 
tested and consequences examined, and many of the theoretical postulates are 
supported by empirical evidence. Moreover, the model reconciled many conflicting 
experimental results by allowing a functional role to abstract propositional 
representations as well as to quasi-pictorial images. Nevertheless, notwithstanding 
Kosslyn's efforts, the progress that had been made to this point was almost entirely 
within the theoretical confines of the information processing paradigm, which 
eschews all concerns with neural "hardware". However, in recent years some of the 
most interesting findings in imagery research have arisen from studies which have 
attempted to form a bridge between the theoretical constructs of cognitive theories 
of imagery and neurological phenomena. Before reviewing this evidence, however, 
it would appear appropriate initially to consider the traditional view of the neural 
basis of imagery which prevailed prior to the early 1980s. 
1.3 THE CEREBRAL LOCUS OF VISUAL MENTAL INUGERY: 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
1.3.1 Introducdon 
The issue of the cerebral locus of visual mental imagery was rarely explicitly 
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discussed prior to the mid 1980s. Reviews of hemispheric specialization, for 
example, typically did not discuss the lateralization of imagery in great detail (e. g. 
Bradshaw and Nettleton, 1981; Springer and Deutsch, 1981; Beaton, 1985), and 
studies specifically intended to study differential hemispheric involvement in imaginal 
processes were relatively infrequent. Paradoxically, however, despite the relative 
absence of explicit statements regarding this issue, there appeared to be a widespread 
implicit assumption pervading much of the literature that imagery was a RH 
function. Ehrlichman and Barrett (1983), for example, in a review of this area cited 
numerous statements by various authors which indicated an a priori assumption of 
RH superiority. The proposed relationship between the RH and imagery, however, 
appeared to be largely inferential as typically no studies were cited to justify this 
assumption. Nevertheless, the notion of RH superiority was so deeply ingrained that 
a left visual field advantage on an imagery task was often viewed as proof of the 
validity of the paradigm (e. g. Bradshaw and Nettleton, 1983, p. 90). 
Consideration of the historical evidence relating to the neuropsychological 
mechanisms underlying imagery, however, would appear to suggest that such a view 
was inappropriate as none of the findings can be described as unequivocally 
supporting the RH hypothesis. Moreover, it appears that some of the studies 
directly contradicted such a formulation. 
1.3.2 Clinical Evidence 
Published reports of loss of imagery are relatively rare compared with reports of 
other cognitive disabilities, although whether this is because such loss is uncommon 
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or whether it is because it evades detection is difficult to judge. Nevertheless, 
periodically cases have appeared in the literature. For example, in the nineteenth 
century Charcot (1883) described the case of a male patient who had no visual 
memory of shapes and colours. He apparently knew, for instance, that certain 
colours were associated with certain objects, but could not visualize these colours. 
Wilbrand (1887) also described a similar case in which a female patient was unable 
to image familiar objects and scenes. He reported, for example, that the patient 
could not "visualize the streets of Hamburg where she had been born and brought 
up; nor even her own house" (translated by Critchley, 1953). 
Reports such as this led to the formulation of the term " Charcot-Wil brand 
syndrome" which Critchley (1953) defined as the loss of the ability to conjure up 
visual images or memories. It should be noted, however, that in both of these cases 
the imaginal deficit occurred in the context of other quite widespread recognition 
impairments. Indeed reports in the literature of loss of imagery independent of 
visual agnosia have been relatively rare. Nevertheless, this did not prevent certain 
authors from attempting to generalize about the critical lesion site. 
For example, Nielsen (1946) observed that occipital lobe damage was associated with 
loss of what he termed "visual reminiscence" and claimed that, although both 
hemispheres were implicated, the dominant area was usually located in the 
hemisphere specialized for language. However, he also noted that lateralization 
tended to be slight and variable, and in a later report he asserted that individual 
variation was in fact so great that the critical area could be lateralized to either the 
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LH, the RH or, alternatively, be bilaterally represented (Nielsen, 1955). 
This view was echoed to some extent by Humphrey and Zangwill (1951) who 
described three patients with loss of both dreaming and waking imagery. One case 
had a right posterior parietal lesion, the second a bilateral parieto-occipital lesion 
, with predominant damage on the left, and the third, who was left-handed, a right 
posterior parietal lesion. The authors therefore concluded that deficits of visual 
imagery appeared liable to follow lesions on either side. Critchley (1953) also voiced 
a similar opinion, arguing that imaginal impairments were associated with both RH 
and LH lesions. On the other hand, Luria (1973) described two types of disrupted 
ability to form visual images independently of perceptual difficulties which he 
claimed generally resulted from damage to the hemisphere specialized for language. 
Over the next few years additional case reports were published but they failed to 
clarify the position. Indeed at various times parietal lobe, occipital lobe and 
temporal lobe damage have all been associated with loss or severe deficit of visual 
imagery and both hemispheres have been implicated. It would appear, therefore, 
that no firm conclusions regarding the cerebral locus of visual mental imagery could 
be drawn from the above evidence. 
Furthermore, systematic studies of patients grouped according to locus of brain 
lesion appear to have been equally indeterminate. Many of these studies were 
carried out within the theoretical framework provided by the dual coding hypothesis 
(Paivio, 1969). As noted earlier, this theory postulates two interconnected memory 
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systems, verbal and imaginal, operating in parallel. Given the wealth of evidence 
implicating the LH and RH respectively in certain aspects of verbal and visual 
processing, it was hypothesized that the verbal system might be lateralized to the LH 
and the imaginal system lateralized to the RH. If this was the case, then it should 
be possible to demonstrate an impairment in RH damaged patients on tasks that 
fostered the use of imagery. The results of these studies, however, provided no 
unambiguous support for the RH hypothesis. 
For example, Jones (1974) compared the effectiveness of imagery mnemonics for 
paired-associate learning of lists of concrete and abstract words in patients with 
either left or right temporal lobe lesions. The lists were learned using either no 
mnemonic strategy or relational imagery for the concrete word pairs. The results 
indicated that left temporal lobe subjects were generally inferior to normal controls 
and patients with right temporal lobe lesions. In fact the latter two groups 
performed virtually equivalently. All of the groups, however, benefited to some 
extent from the use of imagery mnemonics. Since LH damaged patients are almost 
certain to show poor performance on such a task due to verbal-linguistic deficits, it 
would appear that the most parsimonious conclusion is that imagery effects were 
unqualified by the locus of damage. 
Subsequent studies, however, did demonstrate a RH deficit. For example, Jones- 
Gotman and Milner (1978), using a slightly more difficult version of the task 
employed by Jones (1974), produced evidence that right temporal lobectomy patients 
were significantly impaired in the use of imagery mnemonics relative to normal 
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controls. Moreover, Jones-Gotman (1979) showed a similar selective impairment of 
visual imagery in right temporal patients in a study testing incidental learning of 
image-mediated or pronounced words. However, while in both of these studies RH 
damaged patients performed significantly worse than normal controls, they also still 
performed significantly better than patients with LH damage. Of course, the deficit 
of the left-lesioned patients might exclusively reflect their verbal impairment, but the 
possibility that imaginal impairments also exist cannot be ruled out. These studies, 
therefore, merely serve to illustrate the inherent ambiguity that is inevitably 
introduced when verbal tasks are used to study imagery. 
There is one study, however, which purports to show a specific imaginal deficit in 
RH damaged patients. Whitehouse (1981, exp. 2) compared the effects of pictorial 
distractors on a picture recognition task in patients with left and right anterior 
damage. The distractors were either verbally similar or visually similar to the target 
picture. Whitehouse reasoned that if the imaginal system was lateralized to the RH 
then right-lesioned patients would tend to rely primarily on the verbal system and 
should, therefore, be relatively unaffected by the visually similar distractors. 
Conversely, left-lesioned patients would tend to rely on the imaginal system and 
should, therefore, be less affected by the verbally similar distractors. The predicted 
interaction was significant and Whitehouse interpreted this as supporting the 
hypothesis that the verbal and imaginal systems were differentially lateralized. 
There are, however, reasons to question this conclusion. No simple effects analysis 
was carried out on the significant interaction, and consideration of the reported data 
suggests that the variation between the two groups was predominantly concentrated 
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in the verbal similarity condition. It is not clear, therefore, whether the effect of 
visual similarity varied significantly as a function of side of lesion. 
Clearly none of the systematic studies of groups of brain-damaged patients 
unequivocally supports the hypothesis of RH specialization for visual mental 
imagery. Indeed on the basis of the clinical evidence reviewed thus far it would 
appear that no firm conclusions could be drawn regarding the neural locus of the 
imagery system. 
1.3.3 Commissurolomized Padents 
Studies of commissurotomized patients have been an important source of information 
regarding hemispheric function. However, prior to the early 1980s there was 
relatively little systematic investigation of imaginal processing in this area. 
Nevertheless, there were some reports in the literature which appeared to be 
incompatible with the RH hypothesis. For example, Hoppe (1977) conducted 
retrospective interviews with twelve split-brain patients concerning their recollections 
of dreams. Eight of the patients could not recall any postsurgical dreams, but four 
could. Similarly, Greenwood, Wilson and Gazzaniga (1977) reported that one 
completely commissurotomized patient reported dreams from two out of four rapid 
eye movement (REM) awakenings and none from four non-REM awakenings. Of 
course, in the absence of baseline data collected prior to surgery for comparison, 
these dream reports are difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, as patients with 
complete commissurotomies cannot report RH experiences, these studies would 
appear to suggest that in some instances the LH can independently generate and 
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experience visual mental imagery. 
Moreover, commissurotomized patients are apparently also capable of reporting 
waking as well as dreaming imagery. Gazzaniga and Le Doux (1978), for example, 
described an investigation in which a split-brain patient was asked to form a mental 
image of a visually obscured object placed in their right hand. The patient reported 
that they were able to form the image, and this therefore would again appear to 
suggest that imagery is not the exclusive province of the RH. Nevertheless, as noted 
in Section 1.1.2, the possibility of atypical patterns of neurological organization in 
these patients suggests that any inferences drawn regarding patterns of normal 
lateralization require converging support from other populations. 
1.3.4 Studies with Normal Subjects 
Studies designed to investigate differential hemispheric involvement in imaginal 
processes were not limited to clinical populations. Indeed during the 1970s and early 
1980s a number of relevant investigations were carried out with normal subjects. 
The results of these experiments, however, failed to clarify the position. For 
example, a number of tachistoscopic and dichotic listening studies have demonstrated 
that perceptual asymmetries in word recognition may be qualified by the 
concreteness-abstractness and imageability of the stimuli. Although the results are 
not wholly consistent (Bradshaw and Gates, 1978; Gross, 1972; Schmuller and 
Goodman, 1979; Young and Ellis, 1980; Boles, 1983; Lambert and Beaumont, 1981, 
1982), it appears that the usual right visual field superiority for word recognition can 
be reduced or absent when high imagery concrete words are used (e. g. Ellis and 
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Shepard, 1974; Day, 1977; Hines, 1976; Kelly and Orton, 1979; McFarland, 
McFarland, Bain and Ashton, 1978). These findings, therefore, have been 
interpreted as indicating a RH superiority for imaginal processing. 
Unfortunately, however, demonstrating that the RH is better able to process high 
imagery concrete words than low imagery abstract words is not evidence of a RH 
specialization for imagery. In order to demonstrate RH superiority it would be 
necessary to show that the RH performed better than the LH when stimuli were high 
imagery words, and no such evidence appears to exist. Moreover, it is questionable 
whether the results of these studies are actually indicative of asymmetries in imaginal 
processing. For example, the differential asymmetry for high and low imagery 
words could simply reflect differential availability of lexical representations in the 
two hemispheres rather than imagery processes per se. 
There is, however, one further tachistoscopic study which appears to provide support 
for the claim that the RH mediates imagery. Seamon and Gazzaniga (1973) 
instructed subjects to remember a set of words by rehearsing each individually or 
by generating a relational image of objects represented in the word set. A 
lateralized picture probe was then presented and subjects were required to indicate 
whether or not the picture corresponded with an object in the word set. The results 
indicated that the verbally rehearsed items were more quickly recognized in right 
visual field presentations, whereas the imaginally encoded items were more quickly 
recognized in left visual field presentations. 
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However, although these results are consistent with the RH hypothesis, there is an 
alternative explanation for these findings. As Seamon and Gazzaniga noted, the RH 
may simply have been faster than the LH at carrying out a comparison between two 
"visual stimuli". It is not possible, therefore, to unequivocally attribute the left 
visual field advantage to imaginal processing. Moreover, it should be noted that 
attempts to replicate these results have not always been successful (Longoni, 
Zoccolatti and Speranza, 1980), and it is therefore not clear how robust these 
findings are. 
One final source of evidence regarding the cerebral lateralization of imagery 
concerns the findings of EEG studies with normal subjects. Robbins and McAdam 
(1974), for example, produced evidence for greater LH involvement during verbal 
subvocalization and greater RH involvement during visual imagery. Similarly, 
Ehrlichman and Wiener (1980) found that ratings of verbal and imaginal activity 
were positively correlated respectively with relatively greater LH and RH activation. 
However, as Ehrlichman and Wiener observed, such a pattern could be interpreted 
as reflecting changes only in verbal activity. That is, if LH activation is proportional 
to the amount of verbal activity then the apparent increase in RH activation may 
simply be due to a relative decrease in verbal activity, and hence LH involvement, 
during imagery. Studies which attempted to control for this potential confound by 
holding verbal activity constant and varying the degree of imagery required found 
no evidence which was consistent with the RH hypothesis (Haynes and Moore, 1981; 
Barrett and Ehrlichman, 1982). 
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Clearly none of the above findings provide unambiguous support for the claim that 
the RH is specialized for imagery. Given this evidence, therefore, it is perhaps 
somewhat surprising that the notion of RH superiority was so deeply ingrained at 
the beginning of the 1980s. This apparent paradox, however, becomes somewhat 
more understandable if one considers that at this time theories of cerebral 
organization focused almost exclusively on broad functional dichotomies. In 
consequence, the visual, non-verbal nature of imagery suggested greater involvement 
of the RH, given its specialization in visuo-spatial functions. As is clear from the 
findings described in the preceding pages, however, this view was based more on the 
properties of imagery than empirical evidence, and gradually the assumption began 
to be challenged. 
Doubts regarding the validity of the hypothesis were first expressed by Paivio and 
te Linde (1982). They reviewed the evidence pertaining to the brain mechanisms 
underlying episodic and semantic memory functions of nonverbal imagery and 
observed that, contrary to received wisdom, the LH appeared to be implicated in 
certain aspects of image generation. The full extent of the tenuous nature of the RH 
hypothesis, however, was finally fully exposed by Ehrlichman and Barrett (1983) 
who in a review of much of the evidence described in the preceding pages concluded 
that there was clearly an insufficient empirical basis for considering imagery a RH 
function. 
1.3.5 Farah's Compuladonal Model 
Whilst attempts to localize the imagery system as an undifferentiated whole to one 
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neural locus have not been successful, a computational approach to the 
understanding of cerebral organization has been more fruitful. As noted in Section 
1.1.5, computational models of cerebral lateralization propose that the processing 
modules involved in a particular function may be differentially lateralized to one or 
other hemisphere. A consistent picture, therefore, mill only emerge if investigators 
look for the brain areas associated mith each component individually. 
Farah (1984) applied this reasoning to a review of single-case studies of brain- 
damaged patients displaying loss of visual imagery. In accordance with Kosslyn's 
(1980) theory she proposed that mental imagery involves a number of separate 
modules, some of which are shared with perception and some of which are specific 
to imaginal processes. Given this analysis of the imagery system, Farah reasoned 
that one would expect to rind cases of loss of imagery that corresponded to losses of 
different processing components of im. agery. In order to identify which component 
or components of the imagery system must have been damaged Farah produced an 
analysis of the cognitive processing required to carry out a series of complementary 
imaginal and perceptual tasks. If the literature indicated that a patient could 
perform a task then it was inferred that all of the cognitive components required by 
that task were intact. It was possible, therefore, to infer that a component was 
damaged if it was the only component in the task analysis of a failed task that did 
not also occur in the task analysis of a successfully performed task. 
Thirty-seven cases describing loss of imagery were initially included in the analysis. 
Five of these cases, however, involved patients who had extensive bilateral damage 
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and their performance on virtually all of the tasks was impaired. In consequence, 
there were very few components that could be ruled out by virtue of occurring in a 
successfully performed task. Details of these cases are summarized in Table 1.3.1. 
Table 1.3.1: Cases with extensive damage categorized by pfimary topic of case report, 
etiology and anatomical site qf cortical damage. 
Case Primary Topic Etiology Lesion Site 
Adler (1944) Visual agnosia Anoxia Diffuse 
Brain (1941) Visual agnosia Infection Diffuse 
Brown (1972) Visual agnosia Anoxia Diffuse 
Case 13 




Nielsen (1946) Simultanagnosia Cerebrovascular Bilateral 
P. 188 accident parietal and 
I I I occipital --J1 
The remaining cases fell into two distinct groups. First, thirteen patients were 
unable to carry out visual recognition tasks or to answer questions requiring 
imagery. Moreover, when the recognition deficit was content-specific it was 
paralleled by a content-specific imagery deficit. Farah therefore suggested that this 
implied damage to one of the representational components of long-term visual 
memory. These cases are summarized in Table 1.3.2, and consideration of the area 
of cortical damage listed for each case appears to indicate that there is no clear trend 
either in laterality or in region within the posterior lobes. It should be noted, 
however, that this lack of anatomical regularity may reflect the need for a more fine 
grained componential analysis in relation to long-term visual memory 
representations. 
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Table L 3.2. - Cases displaying long-term visual memory deficit categorized by primary 
topic of case report, edology and anatomical site of cortical damage. 
Case Topic Etiology Lesion site 
Albert et al Visual agnosia Cerebrovascular Right anterior, 
(1975) accident bilateral 
posterior 
Basso et al Loss of imagery Cerebrovascular Left temporal 
(1980) accident and occipital 
Beyn and Prosopagnosia Cerebrovascular Bilateral 
Knyazeva (1962) and agnosia accident posterior 
Boyle and Visual agnosia Neoplasm and Bilateral 
Nielsen (1954) surgical trauma occipital 
Epstein (1979) Loss of dreaming Cerebrovascular Left posterior 
Case I accident (left-handed) 
Humphrey and Loss of dreaming Penetrating Right parietal 
Zangwill (1951) head wound 
Case I 
Macrae and Visual agnosia Head injury Bilateral 
Trolle (1956) temporal and 
parietal 
Nielsen (1946) Visual agnosia Cerebrovascular Right occipital, 
p. 176 accident left temporal and 
parietal 
Ratcliff and Visual agnosia Cerebrovascular Bilateral 
Newcombe (1982) accident occipital, 
parietal, 
temporal 
Shuttleworth et Prosopagnosia Head injury Bilateral 
al (1982) Case 2 posterior 
Taylor and Visual agnosia Cortical atrophy Diffuse 
Warrington 
(1971) 
Wapner, Judd Visual agnosia Cerebrovascular Left temporal, 
and Gardner accident bilateral 
(1978) occipital 
Wilbrand (1887, Visual agnosia Cerebrovascular Bilateral 
translated accident posterior 
Critchley, 1953) 
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Table 1.3.3 details a further four cases in which patients were also reported as 
experiencing agnosia and imagery deficits. In these cases, however, the original 
reports contained insufficient evidence relating to the behavioural deficits to enable 
full task analyses to be carried out. These cases, therefore, had to be excluded from 
the main analysis. 
Table 1.3.3. - Cases repordng both agnosic and intgginal impairments which were 
excludedfrom the main analysis. 77se cases are categorized according to the primary 
topic of the case report, the edology and the anatomical area of cortical damage. 
Case Topic Etiology Lesion Site 
Brown (1972) Apperceptive Anoxia Bilateral 
Case II visual agnosia posterior 
Brown (1972) Apperceptive Cerebrovascular Bilateral 
Case 12 visual agnosia accident posterior 
Holmes (1944) Colour agnosia Cerebrovascular Left occipital 
p. 359 accident 
N elsen (1946) Visual agnosia Cerebrovascular Right occipital 
p. 203 accident 
Finally, and most importantly, the analysis identified a group of eight patients who 
were unable to answer questions requiring imagery but were able to answer similar 
questions about visible stimuli and carry out visual recognition tasks (see Table 
1.3.4). Farah reported that the only component in the failed tasks that did not occur 
in the successful tasks was the image generation process. Moreover, she also 
observed that consideration of the lesion sites in this group indicated that six of the 
eight cases had damage predominantly or exclusively in the posterior regions of the 
hemisphere dominant for language. In contrast, therefore, to the prevailing implicit 
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assumption that imagery was a RH function, Farah claimed that a region of the 
posterior LH was critical for the image generation process. 
Table 1.3.4. - Cases displojing an image generation process deficit categorized by 
primary topic of case report, etiology and anatomical area of cortical damage. 
Case Topic Etiology Lesion Site 
Brain (1954) Loss of imagery Head injury Left posterior 
Case 1 
Brain (1954) Loss of imagery Head injury Unspecified 
Case 2 
Brownell et al Loss of imagery Cerebrovascular Bilateral 
(1984) accident parietal, left 
frontal 
Humphrey and Loss of dreaming Penetrating Right posterior 
Zang, will (1951) head wound parietal (left- 
Case 3 handed and 
aphasic) 
Lyman et al Alexia and Neoplasm Left parieto- 
(1938) agraphia occipital 
Nielsen (1946) Topographic Cerebrovascular Left posterior 
p. 200 disorientation accident 
Nielsen 0 946) Gerstmann's Neoplasm Left parietal and 
p. 227 syndrome occipital 
Spalding and Loss of "number Penetrating Bilateral, 
Zang, Aill (1950) form" head wound greatest in left 
I I parieto-occipital 
Furthermore, Farah identified a further six cases in which the authors had again 
reported the occurrence of imaginal deficits independently of visual agnosia. These 
patients all had left posterior damage, but it was not possible to include them in the 
main analysis as insufficient evidence regarding the behavioural deficits had been 
reported to enable full task analyses to be carried out. Details of these cases are 
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summarized in Table 1.3.5. 
Table 1.3.5. - Further cases excludedftom the analysis categorized according to the 
primary topic of the case report, the edoloU and the anatomical area of coifical 
dvna, -e. 
Case Topic Etiology Lesion Site 
Arbuse (1947) Gertstmann's Neoplasm Left parieto- 
syndrome occipital 
Nielsen (1946) Gerstmann's Cerebrovascular Left parieto- 
p. 230 syndrome accident occipital 
Nielsen (1955) Loss of imagery Neoplasm Left occipital 
Case 7 
Nielsen (1955) Loss of imagery Neoplasm Left occipital 
postscript Case I and dreaming 
Nielsen (1955) Loss of imagery Neoplasm Left occipital 
postscript Case 2 and dreaming 
Wilbrand (1887) Loss of imagery Cerebrovascular Left posterior 
described by accident 
Nielsen, 1955.1 
1 
For the sake of completeness it should be noted that it was not possible to allocate 
one final case unequivocally to either the long-term memory group or the image 
generation process group. The case investigated loss of dreaming in a patient uith 
parieto-occipital damage, predominantly on the left, following a penetrating head 
wound (Humphrey and Zangwill, 1951, Case 2). No reference was made in the 
report to recognition difficulties, but there was mention of a visual memory loss. 
UnfortunatelY it is not clear whether this statement referred to a deficit of 
recognition memory or an inability to recall visual information. Nevertheless, 
notmithstanding this ambiguity, it is clear that Farah's evidence directly challenged 
the prevailing view that imagery was linked to the right hemisphere. 
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Farah's work, perhaps partly because of the apparently heretical nature of this 
claim, had an enormous impact and served as the primary impetus for a surge of 
research activity in this area. This activity, which will be reviewed in the next two 
sections, has focused on three main questions. First, what is the nature of the 
relationship between imagery and perception and do they share common underlying 
structures? Second, does image generation constitute a separable process within the 
imagery system, and third, what are the respective roles of the two cerebral 
hemispheres in this process? 
1.4 IMAGERY AND PERCEPTION: FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE 
1.4.1 Introducdon 
It is clear from the previous discussion that one of the fundamental assumptions 
underlying Farah's approach is that the representations and processes underlying 
visual perception are in many instances the same as those underlying visual imagery. 
This idea has a long history and can be traced from the philosophical writings of 
Hume (1739/1969), through theoretical discussions of perception at the 
neurophysiological level (e. g. Hebb, 1968), to the more recent information processing 
approaches. However, theorists seem to have favoured the assumption of a single 
representational system well in advance of any convincing objective empirical data. 
Indeed in some instances the assumption appears to have been based on little more 
than the introspective impression that perception and imagination are experientially 
similar. In the last two decades, however, research has attempted to clarify the 
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relationship between imagery and perception, and in consequence our theoretical 
understanding of imagery has been considerably advanced. 
Before discussing the empirical evidence relating to this issue, however, it is worth 
noting explicitly that this evidence has no direct implications for the debate relating 
to the format of mental images which was discussed in Section 1.2.4. As Block 
(1983) observes, it has often been assumed that demonstrations of equivalence 
between imaginal and perceptual representations imply that imagery is pictorial as 
opposed to descriptive. This assumption appears to stem from the fact that many 
people appear to rind it difficult to understand the possibility that the representations 
of visual perception might not be pictorial. As noted previously, however, many 
investigators are committed to the view that the representations underlYing visual 
perception are descriptive. Therefore, the claim that the representations of imagery 
and perception are of the same format is irrelevant to the imagery-propositional 
controversy since both might be descriptive or, alternatively, both might be pictorial. 
1.4.2 Research in Cognidve Psychology 
The findings arising from mental rotation and mental scanning experiments indicate 
an analogous operational process between visual percepts and mental images, but the 
issue of how close the similarity is between a mental image and a visual percept is 
left open. In recent years, however, several research programmes within cognitive 
psychology have investigated this issue and have gathered evidence in support of the 
view that mental images and visual percepts share certain characteristics in common. 
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Only a few representative examples of this large literature will be presented here, 
but a comprehensive review of this work may be found in Finke (1985). 
A typical example of studies in this area is provided by an experiment carried out 
by Finke and Kosslyn (1980). Subjects were presented with dots six, twelve and 
eighteen millimetres apart and were then instructed to indicate how far out into the 
visual periphery the dots could move until it was no longer possible to tell that the 
dots were separate. The findings indicated that there was a strong similarity 
between the field of resolution in imagery and perception. Similarly, Finke (1979) 
found that mental images functioned equivalently to visual percepts in producing 
visual motor adaptation. Pennington and KosslYn (reported in Kosslyn, 1980) also 
provided evidence indicating that images show the visual "oblique effect", whereby 
lines in bar gratings are more difficult to resolve when they are oriented diagonally 
than when they are oriented horizontally or vertically. Finally, Podgorny and 
Shepard (1978) demonstrated the functional equivalence of mental images and visual 
percepts in a dot localization task. In this study subjects were presented with a grid 
in which they either imagined or were briefly presented with a block letter. A dot 
was then presented in one of the squares and the subjects had to report whether or 
not it fell on or off the letter. The results indicated that latencies were unaffected 
by whether the letter was real or imagined, and Podgorny and Shepard therefore 
concluded that the representations arising out of images and visual percepts were 
functionally equivalent. 
However, while the above findings would appear to demonstrate some equivalence 
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between images and percepts it is perhaps important to note that our own experience 
indicates that there are also differences. Percepts are usually more detailed and 
vivid and, as they depend heavily on the current stimulus situation, are typically less 
susceptible to internal control than are images. Moreover, there is evidence which 
suggests that the equivalences between imagery and perception do not extend to the 
earliest stages of information processing in the visual system. For example, in a 
review of this area Finke (1980) concluded that whilst mental images and physical 
objects can be functionally equivalent at levels of the visual system where pattern 
information is processed, such equivalences do not extend to the retinal or 
precortical levels which are primarily responsible for chromatic after-effects. Thus, 
even if it is accepted that the above evidence supports the principle of perceptual 
equivalence, there are clearly limitations. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the evidence is not wholly consistent. There 
have, for example, been failures to replicate some of the findings relating to 
functional equivalence (Broerse and Crassini, 1980,1981,1984; Intons-Peterson and 
White, 1981). Moreover, evidence which appears to suggest that visual information 
is not an essential aspect of imagery has arisen from studies investigating modality- 
specific interference. It has been demonstrated on numerous occasions, for instance, 
that the formation and retention of visual images is disrupted by a concurrent visual 
perception task (e. g. Segal and Fusella, 1970), thereby suggesting that certain 
mechanisms are involved in both vision and visual imagery. Baddeley and 
Lieberman (1980), however, provided evidence in support of the claim that the 
conflict in these interference experiments was spatial not visual per se, and in 
83 
consequence a number of investigators have claimed that images are not tied to the 
visual modality (e. g. Anderson, 1985). Rather they are viewed as abstract, amodal 
representations which depict spatial and continuously varying information. 
This claim appears to be supported by a number of experiments which have 
compared the imagery processes of sighted and congenitally blind subjects. Marmor 
and Zabeck (1976), for example, gave a mental rotation task to congenitally blind 
subjects using normal and mirror-reversed patterns that were presented at different 
orientations on a raised surface, and found that the linear relationship of reaction 
time to angular displacement was still evident. Carpenter and Eisenberg (1978) also 
reported a similar finding using haptically presented letters. Further studies 
investigating mental scanning tasks, imagery mnemonic tasks and semantic 
information retrieval under imagery instructions have all produced evidence 
suggesting that congenitally blind subjects are able to perform these tasks, and that 
their patterns of response time are qualitatively similar to those of sighted subjects 
(Kerr, 1983; Jonides, Kahn and Rozin, 1975; Zimler and Keenan, 1983). 
The above evidence clearly suggests that visual information is not an essential aspect 
of imagery and it perhaps seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the findings 
in sighted subjects are also due to the use of nonvisual spatial representations. 
Moreover, evidence which is consistent with the notion that images are spatial and 
not visual has arisen from studies concerned with colour effects in imagery. Colour 
effects would provide a clear case for visual rather than nonvisual spatial 
representations, given that this property can only be encoded visually. However, as 
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noted previously, a number of studies have failed to rind such effects. Finke and 
Schmidt (1977,1978), for example, provided evidence of image-percept equivalence 
for an orientation-specific colour adaptation known as the McCollough effect. 
However, the imagery induced effect was only obtained for imaged lines on a real 
colour background, not for imaged colour on a real black and white grating. 
In contrast, it should perhaps be noted that Intons-Peterson (1987) found that 
subjects require less time to form an image when the colour of the image matches 
the colour of the perceptual surface on which the image is projected. Similarly, 
Kerr (1983) in an attempt to replicate Kosslyn's (1975) image inspection task, found 
that congenitally blind subjects were unable to answer animal body-part imagery 
questions, but could perform the task when asked to image familiar household 
objects either next to a car or next to a paper clip. She attributed the failure on the 
animal body-part questions to the fact that such information was unlikely to have 
been encoded any other way than visually. Such evidence suggests, therefore, that 
sighted individuals are not exclusively reliant on nonvisual spatial representations, 
and it could perhaps be taken as implying that normal subjects may have a choice 
of using visual or nonvisual spatial representations for performing imagery tasks. 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the above evidence, it has to be acknowledged that the 
findings reviewed thus far do not provide compelling support for the view that 
imagery and perception share some common underlying components. Moreover, it 
is important to note that the research of imagery theorists in this area is ultimately 
based on the inference that we would not expect imagery and perception to function 
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in highly similar ways if they did not share some processing components. It is in 
fact possible, however, to formulate a relatively plausible argument in support of the 
view of image-percept equivalence mithout invoking the concept of shared 
representational mechanisms. If we hypothesize, for example, that the imagery 
system evolved partly as a means of planning behaviour through simulation of 
anticipated events, then it is reasonable to expect that the imagery system -Aill mimic 
input from the visual system. Thus, similarities would be expected irrespective of 
whether or not imagery and perception share a common system. The existence of 
similarities does not therefore imply, in any strict sense, that imagery and perception 
necessarily share components. 
Given the above considerations, it would appear that it is not possible to draw any 
firm conclusions regarding the relation between imagery and perception. However, 
a somewhat different perspective on this issue arises if consideration is not limited 
exclusively to research carried out mithin cognitive psychology. 
1.4.3 Neuropsychological Findings 
Despite the long-standing interest of psychologists in the question of the relation 
between imagery and perception, it is only relatively recently that a coherent attempt 
has been made to review the empirical findings from neuropsychology that are 
directly relevant to this issue. The importance of this evidence was first highlighted 
in an article by Farah (1988), and the following discussion owes a great deal to this 
insightful review. 
86 
1.4.3.1 Psychophysiological Studies 
One source of information about the neural structures that subserve imagery 
representation arises from studies utilizing brain imaging techniques with normal 
subjects. For example, Roland and Friberg (1985) examined regional cerebral blood 
flow during three types of cognitive processes: verbal rehearsal of a familiar jingle, 
mental arithmetic in which subjects subtracted threes starting at fifty and a visual 
imagery task in which subjects were required to visualize themselves walking 
through a familiar location. The results indicated that the pattern of regional blood 
flow for the imagery task differed from those of the other tasks. Specifically, the 
imagery task produced a massive increase in blood flow in the occipital lobes and the 
posterior superior parietal and posterior inferior temporal areas. Given that these 
are precisely the same areas that have been found to show increased activation 
during visual perceptual processing (e. g. Roland, 1982), the results support the claim 
that the visual cortex participates in visual imagery. 
A similar pattern of results has also been reported in two studies carried out by 
Goldenberg and his colleagues. In the first study normal subjects were required to 
learn auditorily presented lists of concrete words (Goldenberg, Podreka, Steiner and 
Willmes, 1987). One group of subjects was instructed to use imagery and the other 
was not, and the results revealed that there was relatively more blood flow to the 
occipital lobes during the imagery condition than during the non-imagery condition. 
Similarly, in the second study Goldenberg, Podreka, Steiner, Willmes, Suess and 
Deecke 0 989) required subjects to verify the truth of auditorily presented sentences, 
originally constructed by Eddy and Glass (1981), that either required or did not 
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require the use of visual imagery. Once again a greater occipital blood flow was 
found for the imagery than for the non-imagery condition. Moreover, activity of this 
region was found to be positively correlated with self-ratings of the vividness of the 
images. 
Further evidence which is consistent with the notion that mental imagery evokes 
visual sensory activity has arisen from electrophysiological studies. For example, 
when subjects' eyes are closed a pattern of electrical activity known as the alpha 
rhythm occurs in the visual areas of the brain, and it has been well established that 
this rhythm can be attenuated when subjects open their eyes or form visual images 
(e. g. Brown, 1966). In an elegant extension of this basic finding, Davidson and 
Schwartz (1977) measured EEG alpha rhythm simultaneously over the occipital and 
parietal areas of the brain under three conditions: during visual imagery (imagining 
a flashing light), tactile imagery (imagining a regular tap on the arm) and combined 
visual and tactile imagery (imagining the flashing light and the arm tap together). 
It was found that imaging the light suppressed the rhythm in the occipital lobe and 
imaging touch inhibited activity in the parietal lobe. The combined condition, on the 
other hand, was found to produce attenuated activity in both areas. 
More recently event-related potential techniques have also been used to examine 
regional brain activity during imagery. Farah, Peronnet, Weisberg and Perrin 
(1987), for example, studied the responses evoked by visually presenting words which 
the subjects were instructed either simply to read or to read and form a visual image 
of the meaning of the word. In the imagery condition there was a highly localized 
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increase in the occipital ERP relative to the non-imagery condition. In order to 
ensure that the effect was not simply due to greater cognitive load, a further study 
was also carried out in which the reading-only of correctly spelled words was 
compared with the detection of misspelled words. The misspelling detection 
condition was found to produce an ERP that was different in both polarity and 
pattern from that evoked by the imagery instructions. 
In a second study Farah, Peronnet, Gonon and Giard (1988) examined the effects 
of imagery on the ERP to visual stimuli. This study was based on an experiment 
originally carried out by Farah (1985) in which subjects were shown the letters H or 
T after being instructed to form a mental image of one of them. The results 
indicated that a matching image led to better detection than a non-matching image, 
and Farah therefore concluded that the interaction between imagery and perception 
implied a common locus of activity. Moreover, the content-specific nature of the 
interaction suggested that the common locus consisted of representational structures. 
Farah et al. (1988) repeated this experiment while recording ERPs to stimuli, and 
the results indicated that imagery had a content-specific effect on the visual evoked 
potential which was maximal at the occipital recording sites. The authors concluded, 
therefore, that the finding supported the claim that imagery and perception share 
representations in the occipital lobe. 
Finally, researchers have recently employed electrophysiological techniques to 
investigate the cerebral correlates of different types of visual images. Uhl, 
Goldenberg, Lang, Lindinger, Steiner and Deecke (1990), for example, measured 
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cortical potential (DC) shifts while subjects imagined either single colours completely 
filling the visual field, static achromatic images of faces or the shape of contours 
between two points on previously memorized patterns. These images were classified 
respectively as low-information visual images, high-information visual images and 
spatial images, and the results revealed maximal parietal (DC) shifts during 
performance of the contour task. This finding, therefore, appears to imply that the 
parietal regions are involved in spatial imagery. 
To summarize, the psychophysiological evidence, whether from blood flow studies, 
EEG or ERP experiments, is consistent in suggesting that instructions to image give 
rise to increased activity in the occipital lobes and in posterior parietal and temporal 
areas associated with visual perception. As such, the findings would appear to 
favour the claim that there is a single representational system underlying visual 
imagery and visual perception. Furthermore, there is also some support for the view 
that different areas subserve different types of visual images. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are some difficulties associated with some 
of the studies that have been discussed. For example, the Goldenberg, Podreka, 
Steiner and Wilmes (1987) study used a between-subjects design, such that the 
resting, imagery and non-imagery condition were performed by different groups of 
subjects, and this greatly limits the inferences which can be drawn from the 
comparisons between conditions. Moreover, a further possible confound in relation 
to this evidence is that the increased activity in the visual cortex during the imagery 
tasks may merely have reflected greater cognitive effort on the part of the subjects. 
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Farah rejected this explanation on the grounds that the imagery task in the 
Goldenberg, Podreka, Steiner, Willmes, Suess and Deecke (1989) study produced a 
lower error rate than the non-imagery task. However, it is possible to argue that 
greater cognitive effort would be expected to produce a lower rather than a higher 
error rate. Nevertheless, it should perhaps be noted that previous research findings 
suggest that task effortfulness is usually associated with blood flow changes to the 
frontal lobes not the occipital lobes (e. g. Lassen, Ingvar and Skinhoj, 1978). 
A further difficulty arises from the fact that Goldenberg and his colleagues used 
multi-dimensional scaling to analyze the patterns of cerebral blood flow. As this 
procedure is descriptive rather than statistical, the reliability of the findings await 
support through replication. Finally, it is also appropriate to note that while the 
Uhl, Goldenberg, Lang, Lindinger, Steiner and Deecke (1990) study appeared to 
provide evidence of the involvement of the parietal regions in spatial images, a 
regional cerebral blood flow study by Goldenberg, Podreka, Uhl, Steiner, Willmes 
and Deecke (1989) using exactly the same tasks found no differences in the patterns 
of activation between the colour and the contour task. Furthermore, it is likely that 
some investigators would object to the classification of the face task in these studies 
as a visual rather than a spatial task. 
In addition to difficulties mith specific studies, it is also necessary to consider the 
methodological limitations of psychophysiological techniques. For instance, the 
temporal correlation of increased blood flow with psychological events is somewhat 
crude, as the radioactive elements which facilitate detection of increased activity take 
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some time to pass through the head. Similarly, inferences from scalp topography 
to brain locations are necessarily indirect and therefore subject to error. The 
greatest difficulty, however, arises from the fact that the indirect nature of these 
techniques means that it is not possible to refute unequivocally the possibility that 
the observed activity in the visual areas of the brain is epiphenomenal mith respect 
to the functions of imagery. According to this account, visual images are not visual 
representations, they are merely accompanied by occipital activity but such activity 
is not necessary for the processing of images to occur. However, while the 
psychophysiological evidence does not allow us to distinguish between a functional 
and epiphenomenal role for the visual system in imagery, the clinical evidence does. 
1.4.3.2 Lesion Studies 
If visual imagery and visual perception are subserved by the same representational 
machinery then lesions should produce parallel impairments in imagery and 
perception, and there is in fact a great deal of evidence indicating that perceptual 
and imaginal deficits frequently co-occur following brain damage. For example, 
since Farah's initial review further single-case studies of patients with imagery 
deficits associated with disorders of visual recognition have been reported (Davidoff 
and Wilson, 1985; Gomori and Hawryluk, 1984; Benke, 1988; Goldenberg, 1992; 
Trojano and Grossi, 1992). What is perhaps of more interest, however, is that in 
a number of cases selective disturbances of single aspects of visual recognition have 
been associated mith an equally selective imagery deficit. 
It has been known for many years, for example, that damage to the occipital lobes 
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may result in colour blindness (see Cowey, 1982; Meadows, 1974), and research 
suggests that such patients also lose the capacity to form colour images (e. g. Stengel, 
1948; Beauvois and Saillant, 1985, case 2; Sacks and Wasserman, 1987). 
Humphreys and Riddoch (1987), for instance, provide a detailed account of the 
patient HJA who, in addition to various other problems, had impaired colour vision 
and was also extremely poor at imaging colour information about objects. When 
questioned about the colour of animals, for example, he stated that an elephant was 
green and that a polar bear was grey. More recently De Vreese (1991, case 2) has 
reported a similar pattern of deficits in the patient MA. Furthermore, equivalent 
evidence has also arisen from group studies. DeRenzi and Spirmler (1967), for 
instance, tested a large group of patients mith colour-related perceptual deficits and 
found that colour vision impairment was significantly correlated with colour imagery 
impairment. Findings such as these, therefore, would appear to suggest that the 
colour of mental images is represented in the same neural substrates as the colour 
of visual percepts. 
Further evidence which is consistent with this claim arises from a case reported by 
Beauvois and Saillant (1985, case 1). The visual areas of the brain were intact in 
this patient, but there appeared to have been a neuroanatomical disconnection 
between her language and vision areas following a stroke. Thus, while she 
performed normally on colour tasks that were purely visual, she performed 
extremely poorly on tests which required coordination of visual and verbal 
information. She could not, for example, name a visually presented colour although 
she was able to sort objects on the basis of colour. What is of interest, however, is 
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that the patient displayed a parallel impairment on various colour memory tasks. 
Thus, she could distinguish between correctly and incorrectly coloured drawings of 
objects, but was unable to answer questions such as "What colour is a gherkin? ". 
A parallel pattern of deficits was observed in a case described by De Vreese (1991, 
case 1). In terms of interactions with visual and verbal task components, therefore, 
visual images and visual percepts were equivalent in these cases, supporting the 
claim that colour perception and colour imagery depend upon the same neural 
substrates of colour representation. 
Evidence of parallel deficits in imagery and perception has also emerged from 
investigations concerned with two distinct aspects of the visual system. It has been 
found in primates, for example, that there is a marked contrast between the effects 
of parietal and temporal lesions on visual discrimination tasks (e. g. Pohl, 1973; Iwai 
and Mishkin, 1968; Brody and Pribram, 1978). Specifically, monkeys with lesions 
to the inferior temporal lobe appear to be impaired at learning to discriminate 
between different forms and patterns, whereas monkeys with lesions to the parietal 
lobe appear to be grossly impaired on tasks requiring assessment of spatial relations 
between objects. Moreover, a similar pattern has arisen from data from single 
neuron recordings. Temporal recordings, for instance, have revealed that neurons 
selectively respond to variations in shape, colour or texture (e. g. Desimone, Albright, 
Gross and Bruce, 1984). Parietal recordings, on the other hand, suggest more 
sensitivity to the motion of a stimulus and its position relative to eye fixation (e. g. 
Sakata, Shibutani and Kawano, 1983). 
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Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982) attempted to summarize this evidence by coining the 
term "two cortical systems" to capture the distinction between two functionally and 
anatomically distinct systems of visual representation of stimuli in perception. They 
argued that the temporal system appeared to be concerned mith the visual 
appearance of stimuli, whereas the parietal system appeared to be concerned with 
the spatial location of stimuli. Consequently they called the system that represents 
object properties the "what" system, and the system that represents spatial location 
the "where" system, and it is relevant to note that this dissociation between what and 
where has also been found in humans following damage to different areas of the 
brain. 
Patients mith bilateral parieto-occipital damage, for example, often have difficulty 
locating objects in the visual field, but are quite capable of recognizing them 
(DeRenzi, 1982). On the other hand, the converse pattern of visual processing 
deficit also occurs in which patients with bilateral temporo-occipital damage are 
able to localize an object accurately, but are not able to recognize it (e. g. Bauer and 
Rubens, 1985). Thus there exists evidence from both animals and humans that the 
visual appearance of objects and their spatial relations are represented separately 
and independently by two different perceptual systems. What is of more interest, 
however, is that recent evidence suggests that the same distinction exists in mental 
imagery. 
Levine, Warach and Farah (1985), for example, described two patients with 
impaired visual perception. The first had recognition difficulties folloming bilateral 
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ternporo-occipital damage, and the second had localizational difficulties following a 
parieto-occipital lesion. A series of tests revealed that the first patient was unable 
to draw or describe objects from memory, but showed good retention of the capacity 
to locate items in space from memory. In contrast, the second patient was unable 
to perform tasks requiring the coding of relative spatial locations in images, but 
could give detailed descriptions from memory of the appearances of objects. Levine 
and his colleagues also reviewed similar cases of perceptual deficits which had been 
previously reported in the literature, and found that when the appropriate imagery 
abilities had been tested they showed parallel patterns of impairment. 
More recently Farah, Hammond, Levine and Calvanio (1988) have described a 
patient who, following bilateral temporo-occipital and right temporal and right 
frontal damage, was unable to perform visual imagery tasks which involved 
information retrieval and image generation, but was able to perform spatial imagery 
tasks which involved image maintenance and manipulation. As the patient also 
displayed some impairment on perceptual analogues of the visual imagery tasks 
Farah and her colleagues concluded that the dissociation between visual and spatial 
imagery tasks could not have been due to differential image generation demands of 
the two types of task. They therefore argued that different kinds of mental imagery 
tasks called upon different kinds of imagery representations, some of which are 
visual and some of which are spatial. 
The above evidence supports the view that the functional and anatomical distinction 
between what and where in the perceptual system also exists in the imagery system. 
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Furthermore, there appears to be a parallel dissociation in perception and imagery 
between object recognition abilities within the "what" system. It has been known for 
many years, for example, that visual agnosia can be category-specific, and Farah 
(1984) in her initial review observed that within the group of agnosic patients 
reported to have accompanying imagery deficits the particular stimulus categories 
that were difficult for patients to recognize were also more likely to be difficult to 
image. Moreover, further evidence of category-specific parallelism has been 
reported in more recent cases. 
For example, one frequently reported finding is that individuals often experience 
difficulty in recognizing living, animate objects but have preserved recognition of 
inanimate objects (McCarthy and Warrington, 1990). It is of interest to note, 
therefore, that Farah, Hammond, Mehta and Ratcliff (1989) reported that a visually 
agnosic patient with this type of category-specific deficit was significantly more 
impaired at recalling the appearances of living than non-living objects from memory. 
In contrast, his ability to recall nonvisual information was normal for both animate 
and inanimate objects. Similar findings of recognition difficulties accompanied by 
imagery deficits restricted to the same classes of visual entities have been reported 
by Shuttleworth, Syring and Allen (1982, case 2), Sartori and Job (1988) and Mehta 
Newcombe and De Haan (1992). Furthermore, it is perhaps worth noting a previous 
report in the literature in which Beyn and Knyazeva (1962), in an item by item 
comparison, found that an agnosic patient could recognize thirteen out of sixteen 
objects that he claimed he could image. In contrast, he only recognized three out 
of sixteen objects that he claimed he could not image. Again, therefore, the findings 
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appear to imply that visual imagery depends on structures that normally subserve 
object recognition. 
There is also a recent report which suggests that the parallelism between imagery 
and perception may exist at the level of feature-integration. Visual integrative 
agnosia was first documented by Riddoch and Humphreys (1987) and refers to the 
inability to integrate elementary features in object representations. Their patient, 
therefore, was reported to resort to a piecemeal strategy in matching and copying, 
and to focus on details when attempting to visually identify objects. More recently 
Grailet, Seron, Bruyer, Coyette and Frederix (1990) have documented a similar 
pattern of impairments in the patient HG. However, in contrast to the patient 
described by Riddoch and Humphreys, HG also performed poorly on imagery tasks 
and spontaneous drawings of objects, suggesting that his knowledge for entire objects 
was also impaired. Grailet and his colleagues therefore proposed that the evidence 
favoured a common integration process for both visual perception and imagery, 
damage of which resulted in the inability to derive correct percepts or images of 
whole objects. 
One final area of potentially relevant neuropsychological evidence considered by 
Farah (1988) relates to research on the hemispatial neglect syndrome. Patients with 
visual neglect fail to detect stimuli presented in the half of space opposite their lesion 
(e. g. Heilman, Watson and Valenstein, 1985), and research indicates that neglect for 
mental images appears to accompany visual neglect (Bisiach, Capitani, Luzzatti and 
Perani, 1981; Bisiach and Luzzatti, 1978; Bisiach, Luzzatti and Perani, 1979; 
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Meador, Loring, Bowers and Heilman, 1987; Barbut and Gazzaniga, 1987). 
However, while this evidence constitutes a strong demonstration of common 
mechanisms underlying imagery and perception, it is a moot point which particular 
component of imagery and perception this evidence implies is shared. 
Bisiach, for example, interprets these findings in terms of the loss of half of a 
spatially mapped representational schema. However, it is also possible that the locus 
of the common imaginal and perceptual deficit is not impaired representational 
structures, but rather impaired attentional processes, and indeed more recent 
evidence gathered by Ogden (1985) is somewhat more compatible with this 
interpretation than the representational account. Nevertheless, the evidence does 
suggest that the two sides of the image depend on the same attentional resources as 
the two sides of perceptual space. Furthermore, it is perhaps appropriate to note 
that recently Farah, Soso and Dasheiff (1992), using a technique developed by 
Kosslyn (1978), reported that the visual angle of the "mind's eye" was reduced 
following unilateral occipital lobectomy in much the same way as the visual angle of 
visual perception is reduced. Such evidence is consistent Aith the claim that imagery 
occurs in a spatially mapped representational medium dependent on occipital cortex. 
1.4.4 Summary 
To summarize, the neuropsychological evidence appears to demonstrate visual 
cortical involvement in imagery, and is consistent Aith the old and intuitively 
appealing idea, first expressed by Hume, that mental images are reactivations of 
perceptual experiences. Nevertheless, while this parallelism suggests a relationship 
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between the neural structures involved in perception and imagery, it is obvious that 
the two systems cannot be identical. If they were, seeing and imaging would be 
indistinguishable. 
Moreover, it is important to stress that selective disturbances of single aspects of 
visual recognition do not always associate with an equally selective imagery deficit. 
For example, the patient suffering from visual integrative agnosia described by 
Riddoch and Humphreys (1987) was extensively tested but showed no imagery 
problems. Similarly, Grossi, Angelini, Pecchinenda and Pizzamiglio (1993) found 
that ten hemineglect patients showed poor performance in left hemispace on an 
imaginal task, but showed no left neglect on a perceptual control task. 
Conversely, close parallelism has not been verified in all cases in which imagery and 
perceptual deficits co-occur. For example, a case report of an associative visual 
agnosic patient by Goldenberg (1992) documented a discrepancy between his 
knowledge about the shapes of objects as manifested by recognition and his ability 
to imagine these objects as assessed by drawing or verbal description from memory. 
Similarly, Trojano and Grossi (1992) observed that the patient NIP was unable to 
draw from memory objects which he could recognize and define semantically. This 
impairment could not, however, be attributed to an image generation deficit, as the 
patient was able to perform imagery tasks not requiring visual mental images of 
objects (e. g. letter imaginal tasks). 
Findings such as these are, of course, inconsistent mith Farah's (1984) claim that 
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impairment in these cases is due to the loss of long-term visual memory 
representations common to both imagery and perception. Indeed evidence such as 
this has led Goldenberg (1992) to suggest that the representations activated in mental 
imagery are not the same as those involved in visual perceptual recognition. 
However, as noted by Trojano and Grossi (1994) in a review of this area, it is of 
course possible that these apparent inconsistencies merely reflect functionally 
heterogeneous imagery impairments. Moreover, although imagery deficits cannot 
be predicted on the sole basis of recognition problems, the relatively high frequency 
of such an association suggests that it is not unreasonable to assume that certain 
neural structures are shared in common. 
Furthermore, it is worth reiterating that the findings also appear to suggest that 
imaginal representation, like perceptual representation, is not an undifferentiated 
faculty, but rather consists of at least two independent sets of representational 
abilities, visual and spatial. Indeed in a recent review of research relating to this 
issue Logie and Baddeley (1990) concluded that the evidence suggests that imagery 
has related but separable visual and spatial components. Such a conclusion clearly 
goes some way toward accounting for the imaginal abilities observed in peripherally 
blind subjects which were documented in Section 1.4.2. 
Of course, the difficulties associated with draming inferences regarding normal 
functioning from studies of brain-damaged patients should not be underestimated. 
Nevertheless, the consistency of the findings about the neural substrates of visual 
imagery across a range of different methods and subjects strengthens the evidence 
101 
both qualitatively and quantitatively, and therefore provides strong support for the 
view that some of the representations and processes underlying visual perception are 
the same as those underlying visual imagery. 
1.5 TnE CEREBRAL LOCUS OF VISUAL MENTAL IMAGERY: 
CONTEMPORARY OVERVIEW 
1.5.1 Introducdon 
It would appear from the previous section that a great deal of progress has been 
made in providing evidence in support of the assumption underlying Farah's 
approach that imagery and perception share representations and processes in 
common. Farah's claim that the LH is specialized for the generation of visual 
mental images, however, has been somewhat more contentious, and a number of 
authors have expressed reservations as to how well founded this view is (Sergent, 
1990; Goldenberg, 1989; Paivio, 1989). It would appear necessary, therefore, to 
evaluate the evidence and criticisms relating to this issue in greater detail. 
1.5.2 7he Laterality of Image Generation 
1.5.2.1 Single-Case Studies 
Whilst Farah's initial review article was enormously influential it must be 
acknowledged that it was not without problems. Sergent (1990), for example, in a 
review of the evidence bearing on the cerebral lateralization of the image generation 
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process provided a detailed critical review of Farah's interpretation of the localizing 
evidence reported in the cases identified as being consistent with her hypothesis. 
Indeed Sergent claimed that out of the fourteen cases presented by Farah in support 
of LH specialization for image generation, only one, described by Nielsen (1946, pp. 
227-230), appeared to be relevant if "stringent scientific criteria" were applied 
(Sergent, 1990, p. 103). Similar concerns were voiced by Goldenberg (1989), 
although according to his inclusion criteria the only relevant cases were the ones 
described by Brain (1954). 
These criticisms are in fact difficult to refute categorically as Farah herself observed 
that there were some difficulties with the quality of the information regarding the 
precise location of the lesion site in some of the cases that she cited. Moreover, there 
are undoubtedlY problems associated with interpreting data in this post hoc fashion. 
Any retrospective analysis of published case studies, for example, is obviously limited 
by the information reported by the original authors, and loss of visual imagery was 
often not the major focus of the initial investigations. It is, therefore, unclear how 
extensively or systematically the original investigators explored this particular deficit. 
However, since Farah's initial review further single-case studies of patients with 
unilateral brain damage have provided evidence of a loss of imagery following LH 
damage. Trojano and Grossi (1994), for example, in a review of this area identified 
a further three cases of patients who displayed relatively "pure" imagery deficits. 
Grossi and his colleagues, for instance, described a patient (AP) vvith a left occipital 
lesion who was unable to carry out a number of imaginal tasks (Grossi, Orsini, 
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Modafferi and Liotti, 1986; Grossi, Modafferi, Polosi and Trojano, 1989). He 
displayed, for example, an inability to describe familiar places from memory and he 
also produced unrecognizable freehand drawings of objects. On the other hand, he 
displayed no impairment in copying pictures or in recognizing visually presented 
objects, although he did experience some difficulty in describing complex pictures. 
Similarly, he displayed an inability to judge the angle formed by the hands of a clock 
which had to be imaged after being told a given time verbally, but performed the 
task correctly in a perceptual condition. 
Given that AP was unable to perform tasks requiring imagery but was able to 
perform similar tasks on visible stimuli, Grossi and his colleagues concluded that he 
was impaired in constructing adequate mental images. One possible criticism of this 
conclusion, however, was raised by Sergent (1990) who noted that AP had a severe 
memory deficit. She claimed, therefore, that the imagery tasks may simply have 
been too difficult for this patient. It is not possible to refute this suggestion 
categorically, but it is perhaps worth noting in this respect that AP's memory span 
was within normal limits. 
Farah, Levine and Calvanio (1988) described a further patient (RM) with a left 
occipital and medial temporal infarct who displayed a similar pattern of selective 
imagery deficits. He was, for instance, deficient at generating images of objects and 
colours and was also impaired at verifying high imagery sentences and completing 
pictures. Moreover, Farah and her colleagues used this case to investigate a further 
criticism which had been put forward by Sergent (1990). In her review of this area 
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Sergent had observed that failure by LH damaged patients to verbally report 
subjective experience of visual imagery was not necessarily indicative of an inability 
to generate images, given that such patients are susceptible to verbal comprehension 
and/or production deficits. Sergent suggested, therefore, that loss of imagery in such 
cases might simply reflect a functional disconnection that isolates imagery processes 
from language. 
In order to investigate this issue Farah and her colleagues tested RM on two imagery 
tasks, a colouring task and a drawing completion task, in which neither the stimuli 
nor the response were verbal. The patient was also tested on perceptual analogues 
of the two tasks. Unfortunately the results of the draNving tasks were inconclusive 
as, although RM's performance in the imagery condition was extremely poor, he 
refused to complete more than two items on the perceptual control task. 
Nevertheless, on the colouring tasks his performance was significantly worse in the 
imagery condition than in the perceptual condition, and this suggests that the 
underlying deficit in this patient was an impairment of imagery ability and not 
merely a disconnection of imagery processes from language. It should perhaps be 
noted that this conclusion was challenged by Sergent (1990) as no formal test of 
colour perception and discrimination was administered. Nevertheless, the patient 
was reported to name seven out of eight colours correctly at the end of research 
testing. 
More recently a third case has been reported by Riddoch (1990). This patient (DW) 
had a left temporo-parietal lesion and showed poor performance on a number of 
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imaginal tasks. He was, for example, unable to decide whether or not the uppercase 
version of a verbally presented letter contained any curved segments, whereas he 
performed perfectly on a perceptual analogue of this task in which the letter was 
presented visually. One possible confound in relation to this finding is that the 
failure on the imagery task may simply have reflected an inability to link letter shape 
with the sound of the letter. However, DW was also impaired on a task which 
required him to judge whether the visually presented incomplete (without a tail) 
body of an animal had a short or long tail in relation to its body. On the other 
hand, he could make this judgement when presented with complete line drawings of 
the animals. Riddoch therefore concluded that DW's overall performance was 
consistent Nifth an image generation deficit resulting from a lesion in the posterior 
regions of the LH. 
For the sake of completeness there are two further single-case studies which warrant 
consideration. Botez, Olivier, Vezina, Botez and Kaufman (1985) described the case 
of a left-handed teacher with congenital damage which had resulted in hypoplasia 
of the RH and flattening of the posterior third of the corpus callosum. The patient 
showed poor performance on a number of imaginal tasks and Botez and his 
colleagues interpreted these findings in terms of the componential model of imagery, 
concluding that there was a deficit in the image generation component. However, 
as Trojano and Grossi (1994) observe, it is questionable how useful these findings are 
for localization purposes given that the subject was left handed and had inborn 
disorders. 
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Finally, another case of loss of visual imagery in a patient with a left tempero- 
occipital infarct was reported by Pena-Casanova, Roig-Rovira, Bermudez and 
Tolosa-Sarro (1985). This patient failed to perform adequately on a number of 
image generation tasks, and consequently Farah (1989) cited the case as evidence in 
support of the LH hypothesis. However, Sergent (1990) observed that while this 
patient did indeed perform poorly on image generation tasks he also showed 
associated deficits pointing to visuo-verbal and visuo-gestural disconnection. Thus, 
although the authors' description was highly suggestive of an image generation 
deficit, it is questionable whether in this case the imagery deficits were sufficiently 
it pure" to enable failure on the tasks to be unequivocally attributed to the image 
generation component. 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding these latter two cases and the various criticisms raised 
by Sergent (1990), it would appear that overall the findings of the more recent 
reports are consistent mith Farah's claims. Moreover, it should be noted that 
Sergent's approach can also in turn be criticized. By applying very stringent criteria 
Sergent was in effect considering and criticizing each case in isolation. However, 
as Tippett (1992) observed in a review of this area, while it is undoubtedly important 
to be critical, this sort of case-by-case deconstruction of a trend observed across a 
widely dispersed literature can itself be questioned. A full picture can sometimes 
provide more information than looking stringently at the individual parts of which 
the evidence is composed. Furthermore, Tippett (1992) also noted that what was 
striking about the area was the pervasiveness of findings that seemed to implicate the 
LH in the image generation process. Indeed on the basis of such findings lippett 
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concluded that the LH had a direct role of some kind in the generation of visual 
images. 
Trojano and Grossi (1994) reached a broadly similar conclusion follouring their 
review of this area, although they added two important provisos. First, whilst they 
acknowledged that the neuroanatomical data pointed to the posterior regions of the 
LH as the critical area for loss of imagery, they suggested that on the basis of the 
evidence it was inappropriate to attribute an exclusive role in this respect to the 
occipital lobe. Second, they observed that if damage to a single specific component 
was responsible for the behavioural deficits displayed by these patients then one 
would expect homogenous findings across the cases. However, while the subjects had 
some features in common there were also qualitative differences in their performance 
in other respects. For example, AP's freehand dramings from memory contained all 
the appropriate elements of the objects he had been asked to depict, but the spatial 
relations between the various elements were incorrect. RM and DW, on the other 
hand, displayed a different pattern of drawing production deficits. 
As Trojano and Grossi observe, these inconsistencies could reflect additional 
cognitive damage attributable to the different anatomical lesions of these patients. 
Conversely, they could also be accounted for by assuming deployment of different 
compensatory strategies on the part of the patients. However, it is also possible that 
the image generation component may be further subdivided and that these 
inconsistencies reflect damage to different subcomponents. If this is the case then 
a more fine-grained componential model of the imagery system is clearly required. 
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This last point will be discussed in further detail in Section 1.6, but suffice to say for 
now that overall it would appear that the evidence from single-case studies is in 
broad agreement with Farah's claims. The situation with regard to group studies 
of brain-damaged patients, however, is somewhat more equivocal. 
1.5.2.2 Group Studies of Brain-Damaged Patients 
Since the initial review of Ehrlichman and Barrett (1983) a number of group studies 
have been cited in the literature in relation to this issue, but unfortunately none of 
these have produced definitive findings Nvith respect to the contribution of the 
cerebral hemispheres to the image generation process. For example, Read (1981) 
compared the performance of right and left temporal lobectomY patients and normal 
control subjects on their capacity to solve three-term series problems (e. g. A is taller 
than B, B is taller than C. Which one is the tallest? ). The left temporal lobectomy 
patients produced a significantly poorer overall performance than right lobectomy 
patients and control subjects. Indeed the latter two groups performed virtually 
equivalently. Given that it has been claimed that visual imagery is used in the 
solution of such logical problems Read suggested that the results might reflect a 
deficit in image generation, an inference which was supported by the normal 
performance of these patients on the Token Test and IQ tests. Nevertheless, the 
subjects were not tested on a control task without imagery and it is not therefore 
possible to unequivocally attribute the deficit to the image generation processing 
component. 
Some group studies, however, have incorporated perceptual control tasks into the 
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design. For example, Morrow, Ratcliff and Johnston (1985) compared the 
performance of RH stroke patients and controls on tasks which required the 
estimation of distances between pairs of cities from either perceived or imagined 
maps of the United States. The results indicated that the RH group was significantly 
worse than the controls in the imagery condition but not in the perceptual condition. 
Unfortunately, however, Morrow and his colleagues did not test LH damaged 
patients, and it is of course possible that they may have been even more impaired 
than the RH group. It is not possible, therefore, to draw any firm conclusions from 
these results. 
Findings from group studies which have used drawing from memory to evaluate 
imaginal abilities have also proved to be somewhat equivocal. Gainotti, Silveri, Villa 
and Caltagirone (1983), for example, found that aphasic LH damaged patients were 
significantly more impaired in producing freehand drawings from memory than non- 
aphasic LH damaged patients, RH damaged patients and controls. On the other 
hand, Grossman (1988) reported that RH damaged patients produced freehand 
drawings that were less recognizable than those produced by LH damaged patients, 
both aphasic and non-aphasic, and controls. However, Grossman also observed that 
the only patient who consistently drew unrecognizable objects was an aphasic with 
LH damage, and he suggested that the impairment displayed by this patient could 
be construed as implying an image generation deficit. Once again, however, there 
were no perceptual control tasks, and therefore it is not possible to determine 
precisely what deficits underpinned performance in these groups. 
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A further attempt to specify the role of the cerebral hemispheres in visual image 
generation was made by Goldenberg (1989), who investigated the ability of patients 
mith unilateral brain damage, patients with Parkinsons disease and normal controls 
to form visual images. The subjects' performance on verbal and visuo-spatial 
imagery tasks was compared with their performance on perceptual control tasks in 
the same modality, and the results provided no evidence to support the view that the 
capacity to form mental images varied as a function of lesion site. Furthermore, 
Goldenberg also used multidimensional scaling in order to assess the structure of 
correlations between test scores, and this failed to reveal any separation between 
imagery and non-imagery tasks. There was, however, a separation of the verbal 
tasks from the visuo-spatial tasks, and in addition visuo-spatial imagery tasks were 
separated from visuo-spatial perceptual tasks. On the basis of these findings, 
therefore, Goldenberg suggested that the separations pointed towards different 
underlying operations in verbal and visuo-spatial imagery tasks. Moreover, as these 
distinctions obtained irrespective of the site of the lesion, he suggested that this 
implied that neither hemisphere made an exclusive contribution to image generation. 
The question of whether the qualitative nature of the information in images might 
determine the involvement of different processing components is an interesting one 
and will subsequently be discussed in greater detail. However, contrary to 
Goldenberg's suggestions, it is questionable whether this evidence can also be 
interpreted as supporting the view that neither hemisphere makes an exclusive 
contribution to image generation. This is because the subjects in the study who had 
localized brain damage showed great diversity of lesion site. Indeed of the seventy- 
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four patients with focal damage only rive, four LH patients and one RH patient, had 
damage in the occipito-temporal region. If this area is critical to the image 
generation process then it follows that the majority of data in the analysis came from 
patients in whom this region was intact, and this obviously limits any inferences that 
can be drawn from the findings. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth noting that the 
four patients who had left occipito-temporal lesions appeared to be selectively 
impaired in their capacity to use imagery to enhance verbal memory. In contrast, 
the patient who had a right temporo-occipital lesion performed poorly on the visuo- 
spatial imagery tasks. 
A further study comparing patients with RH and LH damage was carried out by 
Bowers, Blonder, Feinberg and Heilman (1991). This investigation was concerned 
with exploring the capacity of these patients to identify and image objects and facial 
expressions of emotions. The findings indicated that RH damaged patients were 
more impaired in the identification and imaging of facial expressions, whereas LH 
damaged patients performed more poorly on tasks requiring the identification and 
imaging of objects. Furthermore, Bowers and his colleagues observed that whereas 
the RH patients generally displayed parallel impairments on the imagery and 
perceptual facial expression tasks, there was one RH patient who was selectively 
impaired at imaging emotional expressions and another who was selectively impaired 
at identifying emotional expressions. This pattern suggested the possibility of a 
double dissociation and Bowers and his colleagues therefore claimed that this could 
perhaps imply a RH contribution to the generation of images of emotional 
expressions. However, as Trojano and Grossi (1994) observed, what is perhaps also 
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worthy of note is that two patients with LH damage showed a global imagery deficit 
for both objects and emotional expressions, in the absence of any perceptual 
difficulties. Thus, while the evidence could perhaps be regarded as implying a 
relationship between right posterior lesions and emotion-related visual imagery 
deficits, it is questionable whether it is appropriate to link these deficits specifically 
to the image generation component. 
One final group study which is of relevance to the issue of the laterality of image 
generation was carried out by Goldenberg and Artner (1991). They compared the 
performance of patients with left posterior lesions, patients with right posterior 
lesions and control subjects on the verification of high and low imagery sentences 
and the verification of pictorial representations of the predicates of the high-imagery 
sentences. The results indicated that patients with left posterior lesions performed 
poorly on the high imagery sentences. The size and reliability of this effect, 
however, was not particularly compelling and was in fact only evident when the high 
and low imagery sentences were analyzed separately. Moreover, while the LH 
patients performed relatively poorly on the imagery task, they performed even more 
poorly on the pictorial verification task. The performance of patients i&ith right 
posterior lesions, on the other hand, did not differ significantly from that of the 
control subjects. Goldenberg and Artner, therefore, concluded that the most 
parsimonious explanation for this pattern of results was that the patients with left 
posterior lesions had impoverished knowledge about visual properties of objects. 
Their ability to convert visual knowledge into mental images, however, was said to 
be unimpaired. 
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There are, however, a number of points which need to be considered in relation to 
these conclusions. First, the pictorial perceptual control task used in this study 
required subjects to decide which of two visually presented figures was the more 
typical version of an item, and Trojano and Grossi suggest that this task may 
actually require the generation of visual images. Second, Uppett observes that as 
subjects were selected solely on the basis of lesion sites it is possible that none of the 
subjects had a severe deficit in visual image generation. 
Thus, given these concerns, it again does not appear possible to draw definitive 
conclusions from these findings. Indeed, in contrast to the findings of single-case 
reports, the evidence arising from group studies of brain-damaged patients provides 
little unequivocal support either for or against Farah's claiMs regarding the LH's 
role in image generation. 
1.5.2.3 Split-Brain Patients 
As noted in Section 1.3.3, prior to the early 1980s there was relatively little 
systematic investigation of imaginal processing in commissurotomized patients. 
However, once Farah's initial review had been completed she attempted to obtain 
confirmation of her findings mith split-brain patients. With her colleagues she 
carried out a divided visual field study mith the split-brain patient JW (Farah, 
Gazzaniga, Holtzman and Kosslyn, 1985). The task used was one in which JW was 
presented with an uppercase version of a letter. He then had to decide whether or 
not the lowercase version of the letter was relatively small, as with the lowercase 
version of the letter "a", or relatively tall, as with the lowercase version of the letter 
114 
"t". A perceptual analogue of the task in which the lowercase letter was presented 
directly was also incorporated into the design. The results indicated that JW's 
hemispheres performed equivalently on the perceptual task. On the imagery task, 
however, JW's RH was unable to make the decision and performed at chance level, 
whereas his LH had no difficulty carrying out the task. 
A further more detailed study of JW was also carried out by Kosslyn, Holtzman, 
Farah and Gazzaniga (1985). The results of this investigation mill be described in 
greater detail in Section 1.6.2, but suffice to say for now that the findings again 
appeared to imply that JW was unable to perform tasks that required him to 
generate detailed images of letters and animals in his RH. The evidence, therefore, 
appeared to support the view of an exclusive contribution of the LH to the 
generation of images. 
However, further investigations with other commissurotomized patients have 
produced conflicting findings to those detailed above. Kosslyn, Holtzman, Gazzaniga 
and Farah (1985), for example, tested a second split-brain patient (VP) and found 
that while she displayed an initial deficit on the image generation letter classification 
task, she was subsequently able to perform the task when information was presented 
to her RH. Similarly, Corballis and Sergent (1988) tested the commissurotomized 
patient LB on the same task and found that both hemispheres performed 
significantly above chance, with the RH being faster but less accurate than the LH. 
Unfortunately no perceptual control tasks were incorporated into this design, but in 
a follow-up study with LB in which both perceptual and imagery tasks were used it 
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was found that both hemispheres could perform at above chance level and with equal 
accuracy in the imagery condition (Sergent and Corballis, 1990). 
These conflicting results serve to illustrate the well documented idiosyncrasies of 
commissurotomized patients. As noted in Section 1.1.2, split-brain patients differ 
considerably from one another in terms of their performance and their neurological 
status. Indeed in this respect, it is perhaps worth noting that it was subsequently 
found that VP had an incomplete section of her corpus callosum, with spared fibres 
in the rostrum and splenium. Factors such as this could account for the different 
patterns of performance observed in these patients. Nevertheless, notmithstanding 
the reasons for the variability, the discrepancies only serve to confirm the risks 
researchers run in generalizing from results of commissurotomized patients to the 
general population. 
Furthermore, on a purely methodological note, caution in generalizing from these 
results to localization in normal subjects is also dictated by the fact that the 
statistical techniques used to analyze the data may have been inappropriate. In all 
of the above studies data were analyzed by analysis of variance. However, one of 
the fundamental assumptions of this technique is that the observations must be 
independent from one another, an assumption which is clearly likely to be violated 
when all of the data are provided by a single subject. Unfortunately recent research 
suggests that even a relatively minor violation of this assumption can produce a 
substantial effect on the level of significance. Scarino and Davenport (1987), for 
example, demonstrated that a small amount of dependence among the observations 
116 
may cause the actual alpha to be considerably greater than the nominal alpha of . 05. 
Consequently a number of statisticians have argued strongly against the use of this 
technique when dependence of observations is present (e. g. Stevens, 1992). 
Thus, given all of the above considerations, it seems reasonable to exercise great 
caution in drawing any inferences from these results regarding the laterality of image 
generation in normal subjects. 
1.5.2.4 Behavioural Studies with Nonnal Subjects 
Unfortunately relatively few studies have examined the lateralized performance of 
normal subjects in image generation tasks. Farah (1986) asked subjects to use 
imagery as a prime in a task that required discriminating among various symbols. 
The imaged primes were more effective in the right visual field than the left visual 
field, and Farah interpreted this evidence as being consistent with the view that the 
LH is better able to generate images. However, as Sergent (1990) observed, the 
design of this study was actually inappropriate to test image generation per se as the 
subjects were presented at the beginning of each trial with the shape to be imaged. 
The representation of the mental image was, therefore, dependent on sensory 
stimulation rather than on activation of stored information in long term memory. 
Nevertheless, Cohen (1975) obtained very similar results to Farah in an experiment 
in which normal subjects were required to form an image from long-term memory 
in preparation for making a normal/mirror reversal judgement about letters 
presented at different orientations. The results revealed a LH superiority in the use 
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of images on those trials where mental rotation was not required. Cohen interpreted 
this finding in terms of hemispheric differences in the use of advance information, 
but Farah (1986) suggested that the finding may actually have reflected hemispheric 
differences in image generation ability. This claim could be correct, although it 
should be noted that a positive finding arising from a subset of trials in an 
experiment not specifically designed to investigate image generation cannot be 
regarded as providing strong evidence in support of the LH hypothesis. 
Two further studies of relevance to the hemispheric locus of image generation were 
reported by Lempert (1987,1989). In the first experiment in the 1987 study the 
effects of imaging, overtly rehearsing and silently rehearsing concrete sentences on 
unimanual hand-tapping rates were examined, and the results indicated that the 
imagery condition was associated with greater tapping decrement on the right side 
than on the left side. The effect, however, was only apparent in female subjects, but 
in a replication of this experiment the effect of imagery on right-sided tapping was 
found to be significant in both males and females (Lempert, 1989). Both of these 
experiments, however, employed a between-subjects design, and the evaluation of 
hemisphere asymmetry is of course better served by "ithin-subject designs. 
Moreover, a repeated measures design was employed in the second experiment in the 
1987 study to compare the effect of high and low imagery sentences on tapping rates, 
and in this case the interaction between hand and imagery failed to reach 
significance. 
One final study designed to investigate the cerebral locus of image generation using 
118 
normal subjects was reported by Sergent (1989). Subjects carried out a letter 
classification task with the decision being made either directly on a lowercase letter 
in one experiment (perceptual task) or on the generated image of a lowercase letter 
in the other experiment (imagery task). In addition the quality of the letters (clear 
or blurred) and the retinal eccentricity of stimulus presentation (small or large) were 
manipulated. The results revealed that whereas both hemispheres were equally 
efficient at performing the perceptual task with clear letters there was a significant 
advantage for the left visual field in the image generation condition, suggesting a 
superiority of the RH over the LH. 
However, as Sergent herself observed, performance in divided visual field studies is 
extremely sensitive to a multitude of variables, and a slight modification of the 
procedure may yield a different pattern of results. Thus, despite the RH superiority 
in the imagery condition, Sergent concluded that the most appropriate inference to 
draw from these results was that both hemispheres were equipped with the 
processing structures necessary for image generation. This was perhaps not an 
unreasonable conclusion, given that the RH appears to be at an advantage with 
degraded stimuli and large eccentricities (Sergent and Hellige, 1986; Christman, 
1987). 
Nevertheless, notmithstanding Sergent's conclusions, the conflicting findings arising 
from this area of research appear to provide little compelling support for the LH 
hypothesis. 
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1.5.2.5 Psychophysiological Studies 
Unfortunately psychophysiological studies also appear to have produced discrepant 
results. Mazziotta, Phelps, Carson and Kuhl (1982), for example, obtained 
information about regional cerebral metabolic activity associated with imagery in a 
study in which subjects had to judge two successive sequences of tones as "same" or 
"different". In a post-experiment interview subjects were questioned about the 
cognitive strategies they had used for retention of the tone sequence, and it was 
observed that all of the subjects who reported using a visual imagery strategy also 
displayed evidence of increased LH activity. The remaining subjects, on the other 
hand, showed greater RH than LH activation. However, it is important to note that 
the subjects who employed a visual imagery strategy actually displayed no increased 
activation in the temporo-occipital or occipital areas. Indeed the onlY significant 
asymmetry was located in auditory rather than visual areas of the cortex. 
Some of the regional cerebral blood flow studies described in Section 1.3.3.1 have 
also been cited in the literature as being of relevance to this issue. The experiment 
carried out by Roland and Friberg (1985), for example, comparing metabolic activity 
during verbal rehearsal, mental arithmetic and imaging, revealed that the highest 
mean increases in blood flow occurred in posterior areas of the LH during the 
imagery condition. However, given the absence of an appropriate control task in 
this design, it is not possible to unequivocally attribute this increase to the image 
generation component. 
The series of studies carried out by Goldenberg and his colleagues have also yielded 
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inconclusive findings. Goldenberg, Podreka, Steiner and Willmes (1987), for 
example, reported an experiment in which subjects had to memorize concrete words. 
One group of subjects was instructed to use imagery and the other was not, and the 
results revealed a marked shift in LH activity during the imagery condition relative 
to the resting condition. However, there was no significant difference in overall 
hemisphere activation between the two conditions, nor was there any significant 
difference between regions of the posterior LH and posterior RH. 
In a second experiment Goldenberg, Podreka, Steiner, Willmes, Suess and Deecke 
(1989) studied the blood flow correlates of verification of high and low imagery 
sentences. Once again there was no overall hemispheric asymmetry between the two 
conditions, but the LH did show higher inferior occipital activation in the imagery 
condition than the RH. However, this experiment employed a between-subjects 
design, and a second experiment using a repeated measures design in which subjects 
were required to count the number of corners of imaged letters (imagery condition) 
or to silently rehearse the alphabet (no-imagery condition) found no asymmetry in 
the activation of inferior occipital or indeed inferior temporal regions. 
In a third study Goldenberg, Podreka, Uhl, Steiner, Wilmes and Deecke (1989) 
attempted to investigate the blood flow correlates of different types of visual images, 
i. e. low-information images (single colours filling visual field), high-information 
images (static achromatic images of faces) and spatial images (contours between two 
points on memorized map). Only one task produced evidence of lateralization.. there 
being an association between the face task and higher left inferior occipital 
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activation. However, Goldenberg and his colleagues also reported that there was an 
overall rightward shift of hemispheric activity from the rest condition to imagery. 
Finally a fourth study compared the blood flow patterns which were elicited by the 
generation of either visual or acoustic images (Goldenberg, Podreka, Steiner, 
Franzen and Deecke, 1991). Unfortunately, contrary to instruction, twelve out of 
the fourteen subjects experienced visual images during the acoustic imagery 
condition. Increased activity in the left inferior occipital regions was found for both 
imagery conditions relative to the control condition, and as visual imagery had been 
experienced in both conditions Goldenberg and his colleagues concluded that this 
supported the claim that this area was important for modality specific components 
of visual mental imagery. 
Similar findings to the above have also arisen from electrophysiological studies. For 
example, Farah, Weisberg, Monheit and Peronnet (1990) studied the responses of 
subjects who were instructed to generate mental images of the meaning of either 
visually or auditorially presented words. In the control condition subjects merely 
listened to words. The findings indicated that the generation of visual mental images 
in both the visual and auditory conditions was accompanied by greater 
electrophysiological activity over the LH than the RH. Furthermore, the effect was 
greatest over modality-specific visual cortex. 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the positive findings reported in the latter two cases, 
the variability in the results would appear to preclude draw-ing any firm inferences 
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regarding the laterality of image generation. Furthermore, it is perhaps 
appropriate to note that the picture is further complicated by the fact that the 
designs of all the psychophysiological studies reported above are such that any 
observed asymmetries cannot be unequivocally attributed to the image generation 
component. 
1.5.3 Summary 
To summarize, it would appear that the evidence arising from single-case studies 
provides strong support for the claim that the LH has a direct role of some kind in 
the generation of visual images. However, as noted in Section 1.1.2, there are 
certain limitations associated with draming inferences regarding hemispheric function 
from observations of brain-damaged patients, and in order to draw definitive 
conclusions it is therefore necessary to look for converging evidence from other 
sources. Unfortunately, as is apparent from the above brief review, the findings 
arising from the alternative sources of evidence are at best equivocal. 
It is clear, however, that methodological difficulties beset much of the evidence 
arising from group studies of brain-damaged patients and normal subjects. The 
investigation of image generation is a complex process, and its isolation for 
experimental purposes requires an exhaustive and systematic examination of the 
various operations that underlie an image generation task. The computational 
approach to the experimental investigation of this process would allow such an 
isolation, but the power of this approach has not yet been used to its full potential. 
Indeed the experiments which have produced equivocal evidence are to a large extent 
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those whose designs prevented attribution of the observed asymmetry/deficit to the 
image generation component. 
Thus, while the absence of converging evidence from other sources is a matter for 
concern, it would appear inappropriate to disregard the positive findings arising 
from single-case reports given that much of the conflicting evidence arises from 
methodologically inadequate studies. Nevertheless, in this respect it should perhaps 
be acknowledged that there are a number of researchers who consider single-case 
reports an inappropriate paradigm for investigating the cerebral locus of a given 
process. 
Sergent (1990), for example, argues strongly against the use of single-case studies in 
investigations of the cerebral localization of cognitive processes. This is because in 
such an approach the anatomical locus of damage is initially relatively unimportant 
as subject selection is determined by the nature of the impairment rather than by the 
site of the lesion (see Caramazza, 1986; Caramazza and Badecker, 1989). This, 
Sergent feels, is inappropriate. Rather group studies in which patients with damage 
invading the specific locus under consideration are compared with patients suffering 
from lesions in other cerebral areas are deemed to be the most suitable approach. 
Thus, if Sergent is correct, it could be argued that it would be inappropriate to give 
any weight to the positive findings arising from single-case reports. 
Without -Aishing to enter into the general debate of single cases versus group studies, 
it does seem reasonable to question some of the above assertions. First, merely 
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because subjects are selected on the basis of impairment does not seem in any way 
to prevent investigators from attempting to establish the anatomical correlates of the 
deficits by examining consecutive cases. Second, grouping together subject's with 
damage invading the specific locus under consideration is only feasible if sufficient 
information exists to precisely specify where the cerebral locus is. Unfortunately 
phrases such as "posterior areas of the LH" would appear to be too broad to 
facilitate identification of precise neuroanatomical correlates. Finally, group studies 
represent a probabilistic approach, and given the rarity of patients displaying a 
selective loss of imagerýv it is questionable whether this type of approach is suitable 
for this area of research. Indeed the group studies reviewed previously could be 
interpreted as demonstrating nothing more than the relative infrequency of such 
deficits. Consequently, it would appear inappropriate to regard this criticism as 
casting serious doubt on the deterministic inferences drawn from single-case reports. 
Thus, although the lack of converging evidence is obviously a matter of concern, the 
prevailing consensus among researchers in this area appears to be that the evidence 
from single-case reports is sufficiently strong to support the view that the LH has a 
direct role of some kind in the generation of visual mental images. 
1.6 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1.6.1 Introducdon 
The above conclusions demonstrate that during the last decade there has been a 
125 
significant shift in beliefs regarding the involvement of the LH in imagery processes. 
Nevertheless, despite this consensus, there is still debate amongst researchers 
regarding the precise nature of the LH's contribution. For example, contrary to 
earlier claims, it is no longer the case that the sole view is that image generation is 
the exclusive domain of the LH. Indeed a number of prominent investigators have 
claimed that both hemispheres can generate visual images, but that they do so in 
different ways. These differing interpretations of the data have been primarily 
determined by the different theoretical perspectives adopted by these investigators. 
It is necessary, therefore, to briefly consider some of the major theoretical models 
of hemispheric specialization for imaginal processes which have been formulated in 
concert with the reporting of the above data. 
1.6.2 Kosslyn's Model 
Kosslyn (e. g. Kosslyn, 1987; 1988; Kosslyn, Flynn, Amsterdam, and Wang, 1990) 
in a series of reviews and articles has developed a far-reaching theory of 
lateralization based on neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and computational 
considerations regarding the functional organization of high level vision. His starting 
point was consideration of the way that information about the appearance of objects 
might be represented in long-term visual memory, and how such representations 
might function during recognition. 
Numerous theories of object recognition have been put forward over the years, but 
all of the various perspectives have been in agreement that in order to recognize an 
object there must be some form of match between the object and a stored 
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representation. Some objects, however, are subject to a near infinite number of 
transformations, and it seems unlikely that separate representations can be stored 
for all the possible configurations that mutable objects can adopt. It has been 
suggested, therefore, that there must be some form of stored representation that can 
match up mith such objects across a wide range of transformations. Accordingly, 
a number of theorists have proposed that recognition is achieved by decomposing the 
object to be recognized into simpler parts (Marr, 1982; Biederman, 1987). These 
parts are then said to be matched up mith a stored description in the brain detailing 
the component parts and the spatial relations among the parts, and it is the nature 
of these spatial relations which forms the crux of Kosslyn's theory. 
According to this theoretical formulation the brain is capable of computing two 
different types of representation. Categorical representations make use of abstract, 
generalized spatial relations which are said to capture what is stable across instances 
that may differ in terms of metric units. Thus, for example, the categorical spatial 
relation "connected to" could be used to describe the relationship between the human 
arm and shoulder since this remains constant under all of the different positions the 
arm can adopt. These spatial relations, therefore, would facilitate recognition of 
mutable objects. However, Kosslyn also observed that there are some objects that 
would not be usefully represented for recognition using these types of 
representations. Some objects, such as the human face for example, do not vary 
much from instance to instance, and generalized spatial relations such as "next to" 
or "above" would not facilitate recognition of particular exemplars of such objects. 
It is suggested, therefore, that there is a second type of representation which makes 
127 
use of coordinate spatial relations which specify the precise locations of objects or 
parts in space in terms of metric units. Such representations are said to be 
important when recognition is contingent on precise spatial relations, and they are 
also thought to facilitate navigation when it is necessary to know precisely where an 
obstacle is located. 
As regards lateralization, Kosslyn argues that the LH makes more effective use of 
categorical representations, whereas the RH makes more effective use of coordinate 
representations. These predictions are based on a number of assumptions about 
different innate predispositions of the left and right hemispheres for the control of 
speech output and search control respectively, and a "snowball" mechanism that 
biases the lateralization of specific processing subsystems to one side or the other. 
Specifically, it is claimed that categorical representations will be more easily labelled 
and interpreted by a system specialized for language. The innate predisposition of 
the LH, therefore, means that subsystems in this hemisphere that produce or use 
categorical representations will receive more effective feedback than subsystems in 
the RH because of the absence of transhemispheric degradation. Consequently, 
these subsystems will also become stronger and more effective in the LH. Similarly, 
these initially lateralized subsystems then serve as second-order "seeds" by providing 
more effective feedback to subsystems on the same side that send them input, and 
the effect is compounded. Precisely the same procedure is purported to occur in the 
RH, but here the innate predisposition for unilateral control of systematic visual 
search patterns over space is said to lead to more effective feedback for subsystems 
making use of coordinate representations. 
128 
These theoretical claims enabled Kosslyn to make predictions about the lateralization 
of specific components of the imagery system. For example, image generation that 
required access to coordinate representations should be more effective in the RH, 
whereas image generation that required access to categorical representations should 
be more effective in the LH. Similarly, image scanning should only require the use 
of coordinate representations and would be expected therefore to be lateralized to 
the RH. On the other hand, mental rotation of complex forms is claimed to require 
both categorical and coordinate information, which in consequence suggests bilateral 
involvement. It should perhaps also be noted that Kosslyn claims that relatively low- 
resolution patterns of overall shape can be encoded as a single perceptual unit. As 
the two hemispheres are deemed to be equivalent in this respect it is also possible to 
predict that no difference should be found between the hemispheres on image 
generation tasks which do not require the construction of multipart images, e. g. 
imaging the overall shape of an object. 
There are in fact numerous other hypotheses which can be generated, but the above 
examples perhaps serve to illustrate the innovative and comprehensive nature of the 
theory. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the theoretical formulations 
incorporate numerous assumptions, and it is obviously necessary, therefore., to 
consider whether or not any of the predictions generated by the theory have received 
empirical support. 
The first data of relevance to this issue were reported in an article by Kosslyn and 
his colleagues detailing a series of experiments carried out mith the split-brain 
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patient JW (Kosslyn, Holtzman, Gazzaniga and Farah, 1985). As noted in the 
previous section, it was established that JW was unable to generate detailed images 
in his RH. However, it was also discovered that both of JW's hemispheres could 
perform tasks requiring the imaging of the outline of objects. Kosslyn (1987) 
subsequently interpreted these results as indicating that JW's LH had a specialized 
role in the generation of categorical representations, whereas both hemispheres were 
equivalent in terms of generating "skeletal" images representing overall shape. 
Unfortunately, as detailed previously, the doubts relating to the validity of such 
evidence prevent any inferences being drawn from these findings. 
However, Kosslyn has also identified some studies of brain-damaged patients in the 
literature which he claims provide evidence in support of the purported lateralization 
of categorical and coordinate relations. Unfortunately, some of these cases are not 
entirely compelling as the evidence fails to address the basic premise regarding 
asymmetries in spatial relations (Farah, 1984; Levine, Warach and Farah, 1985; 
Farah, Levine and Calvanio, 1988). Nevertheless, there are some positive findings. 
Deleval, De Mol and Noterman (1983), for example, reported the case of a patient 
with LH damage who was able to generate images of parts of objects but not their 
respective places. Furthermore, the previously described case study reported by 
Grossi, Orsini, Modafferi and Liotti (1986) of a patient mith a left temporo-occipital 
lesion who produced pictures with elements in the wrong relation to each other also 
appears to be consistent Aith Kosslyn's claims. 
Studies with normal subjects have also provided some positive findings. Kosslyn 
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(1988), for example, reported evidence consistent with the view that the LH is 
specialized for generating images from categorically stored information, whereas 
both hemispheres are equally adept at generating images from information which has 
been globally stored. Nevertheless, it should perhaps be noted that this evidence was 
presented mithout detailed report of the procedures and analyses necessary for 
rigorous evaluation. More recently, however, similar findings have also been 
reported by Findlay, Ashton and McFarland (1994) in a study designed to assess 
hemispheric differences in image generation from categorical and global information 
input via the haptic modality. 
Finally, a number of studies have addressed the issue of asymmetries in spatial 
relations at a perceptual level. Kosslyn, Koenig, Barrett, Cave, Tang and Gabrieli 
(1989), for example, carried out a series of divided visual field studies Nvith normal 
subjects in which they were required to make categorical judgements (e. g. was a dot 
above or below a line) and metric distance judgements (e. g. was a dot within or 
beyond 3 mm from a line). The authors reported that the results indicated that 
subjects responded significantly faster on categorical judgements when they were 
presented in the right visual field, whereas they responded more quickly on 
coordinate judgements when they were presented in the left visual field. However, 
it should perhaps be noted that in three out of the four experiments onlY the RH 
advantages in the metric distance tasks were significant. Moreover, this pattern of 
results has been replicated in a number of other studies (Hellige and Michimata, 
1989; Koenig, Reiss and Kosslyn, 1990; Sergent, 1991; Rybash and Hoyer. 1992; 
Cowin and Hellige, 1994). Thus, while overall the evidence would appear to support 
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the claim that the RH is specialized for coordinate representations, the situation with 
regard to a LH specialization for categorical representations is somewhat equivocal. 
KosslYn, Chabris, Marsolek and Koenig (1992) have responded to these concerns by 
arguing that while a LH advantage for categorical relations is seldom significant in 
a single experiment, there is a trend towards such an advantage. Indeed the authors 
calculated that the probability of such a trend occurring by chance across seven of 
the experiments reported in four of the studies was . 06 (Hellige and Michimata, 
1989; Kosslyn, Koenig, Barrett, Cave, Tang and Gabrieli, 1989, Exp. 1,2,3,4; 
Koenig, Reiss and Kosslyn, 1990; Sergent, 1991, Exp. 4). 
It is of course possible that Kosslyn and his colleagues are correct and the effect is 
sufficiently small to only be detectable over a number of studies. Nevertheless, 
caution perhaps dictates that too much weight should not be placed on an 
explanation that proves to be only marginally significant over seven experiments. 
However, notwithstanding the quality of evidence in support of Kosslyn's ideas 
regarding LH specialization for categorical relations, it is undoubtedly the case that 
his work has stimulated a great deal of ongoing research. Moreover, his stance has 
led other investigators to consider the possibility of the two hemispheres being 
differentially specialized for the generation of images. 
1.6.3 Paivio's Model 
Paivio (1986,1989), for example, has given consideration to the respective 
contribution of the two hemispheres to image generation within the context of dual 
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coding theory. According to this formulation there are three distinct ways in which 
the representational units termed imagens can be activated. First, representational 
processing is said to occur during recognition when there is relatively direct 
activation of the imagen via a matching process between this stored information and 
a familiar external stimulus. Second, activation can occur via referential processing 
which is when there is cross-system activation between verbal and nonverbal 
representations, as for example when an image is generated in response to a word. 
Finally, associative processing refers to activation via units within each system. 
Thus, for example, the environmental nonverbal sound of an engine could, via the 
process of spreading activation, trigger the generation of an image of a car -. Aithin 
the nonverbal system. 
According to Paivio the representational units and processes necessary for 
recognition of visual objects are equally available in both hemispheres. The LH, 
however, is said to dominate on tasks which require referential processing, whereas 
the RH is thought to perhaps predominate on tasks involving associative processing. 
Consequently, Paivio claims that asymmetries found during visual imagery will relate 
to the verbal and/or nonverbal aspects of the task. Unfortunately the evidence 
presented in support of this view is not entirely compelling (e. g. Paivio and Ernest, 
1971; Luria, 1973; Curry, 1976). Nevertheless, the influence of this perspective is 
still apparent in contemporary research. Goldenberg (e. g. 1989), for example, who 
has been primarily influenced by the conceptual framework provided by dual coding 
theory, has suggested that a distinction should be drawn between verbal imagery 
tasks and visuospatial imagery tasks. 
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It must be acknowledged, however, that this theoretical perspective does not have 
widespread acceptance in the area of laterality research. One point of concern 
relates to the fact that dichotomous dimensions formulated in terms of task demands 
have proved to be singularly unsuccessful in the past. A second point of concern 
relates to the standard research paradigm of dual coding theory in which the 
concreteness of words is varied. Within this conceptual framework such a 
manipulation is, of course, regarded as valid since referential processing is thought 
to facilitate the generation of images in response to high imagery words. It is, 
however, possible to question whether the results of such studies are actually 
indicative of asymmetries in imaginal processing. As noted in Section 1.2.2, for 
example, concrete and abstract words do not only differ in image evoking potential, 
and it is not possible, therefore, to demonstrate unequivocally that differential 
hemispheric performance in such tasks is due to imagery. The differential 
asymmetry for high and low imagery words, for instance, could simply reflect the 
greater lexical complexity of some abstract words, or alternatively the differential 
availability of lexical representations in the two hemispheres. Thus, notwithstan ding 
the work of Goldenberg and his colleagues, this theoretical perspective has had 
relatively little impact. 
1.6.4 Corhaffis's Model 
Finally, an alternative approach has been put forward by Corballis (1989,1991). 
This theoretical formulation represents an attempt to develop a model of human 
laterality within an evolutionary contextI. and, as such, it primarily focuses on the 
marked human population bias in favour of right handedness and left cerebral 
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representation of language. The evolutionary link between these two has long been 
a matter of speculation, but a number of authors have suggested that the early 
manufacture and use of tools may have favoured the subsequent evolution of a hand 
skilled at sequential manipulations. The LH, therefore, is said to have established 
cerebral mechanisms specialized for fine motor control, and these adaptations are 
thought to have subsequently provided a platform for the mediation of speech (e. g. 
MacNeilage, Studdert-Kennedy and Lindblom, 1987). 
Furthermore, according to Corballis these adaptations also provided a basis for the 
subsequent emergence of a distinctively human mode of cognition which he terms 
Itgenerativity". Specifically, these early adaptations are said to subserve the ability 
to internally manipulate or generate sequentially organized actions. LH activity, 
therefore, is thought to be characterized by the ability to combine elements in 
accordance Aith a set of rules in order to generate novel assemblages. Moreover, 
the characteristic of generativity is said to underlie not only skilled manual actions 
and language, but also aspects of visual perception. 
As regards the latter, Corballis adopts a similar stance to Kosslyn in that he takes 
into consideration the theories of Marr (1982) and Biederman (1987) and argues for 
two distinct forms of representation: one that facilitates recognition of mutable 
objects and one that represents objects whose recognition is contingent on precise 
spatial relations. According to Corballis, however, the solution to the former is a 
mode of representation based on partwise analysis and storage, whereas the solution 
to the latter is a holistic, template-based mode of recognition. Specifically, it is 
135 
claimed that early in our evolutionary history visual perception was subserved by an 
analogue mode of representation which preserved the precise metric properties of 
objects. This mode of representation was initially represented bilaterally, but the 
subsequent evolution of the generative mode in the LH usurped some of the neural 
space that would otherwise be dedicated to analogue representation, thus creating 
a RH bias. Conversely, the LH characteristic of generativity facilitated the evolution 
of a mode of visual perception based on the segmentation of objects into simple 
geometric components. According to Corballis, stored representations of these 
primitive components can be assembled to form an infinite array of objects. Thus, 
given this analysis, it also follows that the LH will be specialized for the generation 
of multipart images, whereas the RH will be specialized for the generation of holistic 
images. 
Corballis's theory is noteworthy in that it attempts to integrate information from 
several domains. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the evidence presented 
in support of these claims is not particularly compelling. For example, in support 
of the theory Corballis cited a review of patterns of agnosia in brain-damaged 
individuals which was reported in the literature by Farah (1991). In this review 
Farah claimed that the failure to recognize objects which occurs in conjunction with 
alexia was due to the disruption of partwise representations of shape. Moreover, she 
argued that these cases resulted predominantly from LH damage. In contrast, the 
failure to recognize objects which occurs in conjunction with prosopagnosia was 
associated with RH damage and was due to the disruption of holistic or unified 
picture representations. It should perhaps be noted, however, that while this 
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evidence is consistent mith Corballis's hypothesis Farah did note in this article that 
there were a number of alternative explanations for this pattern of data. 
Furthermore, the data do not address the issue of whether or not the two cerebral 
hemispheres generate images in different ways. 
Corballis also cites evidence from some divided visual field studies with split-brain 
patients (e. g. Corballis and Sergent, 1988; Sergent and Corballis, 1990). The 
difficulties mith such evidence, however, have been well documented previously. 
Finally, Corballis observed that Kirk and Kertesz (1989) reported characteristic 
deficits in drawing from memory following unilateral injury. Patients with LH 
damage tended to oversimplify drawings by leaving out details, whereas patients with 
RH damage produced drawings that contained details but lacked spatial 
organization. According to Corballis this supports his theory about hemispheric 
specialization of image generation. However, no control task was included in this 
study and previous research suggests that the effect also occurs when subjects copy 
drawings (Gainotti and Tiacci, 1970). 
Thus, although the above evidence could be construed as being consistent mith 
Corballis's claims regarding two different modes of representation, it does not 
permit any inferences to be drawn about differential hemispheric involvement in 
image generation. 
1.6.5 New Dichotomies for Old? 
The above brief summary serves to highlight the different theoretical approaches and 
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methodologies adopted by the major contributors to this field. Furthermore, it also 
illustrates the degree of overlap in their respective positions in that, while they 
disagree about the nature of specialization of image generation in the two 
hemispheres, they all view imagery as a multicomponent process and the LH as 
having a role of some kind in the generation of images. What is perhaps most 
striking, however, is that all of the theorists have attempted to integrate the various 
findings into models which propose an all encompassing dichotomy that purportedly 
characterizes all manifestations of hemispheric specialization. 
Given the comments in the very first section of this chapter regarding the doubts 
relating to the validity of such global dichotomies, however, it seems reasonable to 
question whether replacing old dichotomies with new ones is necessarilY a fruitful 
exercise. In Section 1.1, for example, it was observed that many investigators feel 
that any attempt to subsume all the essential aspects of hemispheric functioning 
under some perfect dichotomy is a futile activity. Moreover, evidence was presented 
which appeared to suggest that it was unlikely on empirical grounds that there was 
a single processing dimension which could account for all hemispheric asymmetries. 
Perhaps a more pertinent question to ask, therefore, is why it is that we should 
expect hemispheric differences to be reducible to one single principle? One possible 
justification which has been advanced is the desirability of parsimonious theoretical 
constructs within which all of the various findings can be incorporated. However, 
in isolation mere conceptual tidiness is not sufficient reason to impose a global 
dichotomy, since such considerations must always ultimately defer to the need for 
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explanatory adequacy. 
A stronger justification in support of the need to seek some unifying principle is 
perhaps provided by the argument that it makes evolutionary sense to do so. 
According to this view evolutionary considerations suggest that there was a 
fundamental, antecedent mode of specialization which favoured evolution away from 
symmetrical organization and provided a platform for the subsequent evolution of 
other asymmetries. This is, of course, the argument advanced by Corballis. 
Moreover, Kosslyn's model also ultimately rests on the assumption that there is a 
fundamental innate duality underlying hemispheric specialization. 
Without wishing to enter into the general debate regarding the biological origins of 
hemispheric dissociation, it must be acknowledged that the concept of a 
fundamental, antecedent mode appears quite plausible and is in fact supported by 
a number of prominent investigators. What is perhaps more important, however, 
is that it is a moot point whether this fundamental mode would still be manifest 
today. As Bertelson (1981) observed, any new capacity which appears under a 
particular environmental pressure can then produce other effects which in turn can 
guide further evolution. Moreover, organs can change functions and also serve 
many at the same time. In other words, irrespective of whether or not there was 
some fundamental mode of specialization which acted as a precursor for all 
subsequent dissociations, the nature of hemispheric specialization today may be 
multifactorial. There seems to be no compelling reason, therefore, to assume that 
there must be some unifying principle underlying all manifestations of laterality. 
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Of course, if the empirical evidence strongly supported the theoretical claims made 
in the previous sections then many of the above comments would be redundant. 
However, it is clear that the evidence in support of Corballis's and Paivio's models 
is weak. Moreover, while the findings relating to Kosslyn's model appear to be 
more substantive, it is important to emphasize that even here there are problems. 
Kosslyn (1987) developed his theory to account for the evidence in the literature 
relating to the LH's role in image generation. Consequently, many of its 
explanatory successes are a posteriori. To justify itself, however, the proposed 
dichotomy should not only help to explain existing asymmetries, but also predict 
those as yet undiscovered. Unfortunately, the empirical consequences have proved 
hard to specify a priori, as evidenced by the somewhat ambiguous findings arising 
from the series of studies designed to investigate perceptual asymmetries in 
categorical and coordinate relations. 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory nature of Kosslyn's model of 
hemispheric specialization, it should perhaps be emphasized that these criticisms do 
not in any way detract from the validity of adopting a computational perspective. 
Many of the problems discussed above appear to derive primarily from the fact that 
these theoretical formulations have taken the hemisphere rather than smaller neural 
processing entities as the basic unit of analysis. Moreover, irrespective of 
theoretical considerations, it is still the case that a hemispheric advantage was shown 
for a specific processing subsystem that had been proposed independently of data on 
hemispheric asymmetry. 
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It is, however, also worth noting in this respect that all of the evidence discussed 
thus far relates to a single processing component within the imagery system. Thus, 
it seems somewhat premature to attempt to derive general principles that 
purportedly apply to all other imaginal processing components. Indeed it seems 
reasonable to argue that a more appropriate way to proceed is to explore the 
lateralization of other components within the system. For example, are other 
components of imagery performance lateralized to the LH? Alternatively are some 
components lateralized to the RH or perhaps bilaterally represented? Only by 
attempting to answer questions such as these will it be possible to make general 
statements regarding the neural distribution of the imagery system. 
As an initial step towards achieving the above goal, therefore, it was decided to carry 
out a series of studies investigating the possible lateralization of an additional 
component within the imagery system. Given the multifactorial nature of imagery 
performance there were obviously a number of possible candidates. However, one 
component, image scanning, had already been the subject of some preliminary 
investigations. It was decided, therefore, to explore the lateralization of this 
particular component in greater detail. 
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CHAVrER TWO 
2. EXPERIMENT ONE 
2.1 Introducdon 
In Section 1.2.3.2 it was noted that one aspect of imagery performance which has 
been extensively researched is that of image scanning, and it now appears to be 
firmly established that subjects are able to mentally scan from one location to 
another of an internally maintained image in much the same way as they would scan 
an external stimulus. The vast majority of this research, however, was carried out 
within the theoretical confines of the information processing approach, and, as such, 
little consideration was given to the neurological "hardware" underpinning this 
phenomena. There is one study to date, however, which has attempted to investigate 
image scanning in relation to hemisphere function. 
French and Brightwell (1989), using a modification of a technique employed by 
Finke and Pinker (1982), produced evidence suggesting a LH superiority for image 
scanning. Simple dot patterns were presented tachistoscopically for rive seconds in 
free vision, followed by a three second fixation field. Subsequently an arrow was 
presented briefly at an unpredictable location in either the RVF or the LVF and 
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subjects were required to indicate via a manual response whether or not the arrow 
pointed to a location previously occupied by a dot. As predicted, reaction times were 
found to be directly proportional to the distance between dot and arrow. Of more 
interest, however, was the finding that RVF presentation led to superior 
performance of the task, significantly so at longer dot-arrow separations, suggesting 
a LH superiority for image scanning. 
One possible confound, however, was that the task employed by French and 
Brightwell involved not only image scanning but also image maintenance and the 
extraction of spatial information from the image. It was not clear, therefore, which 
of these components was responsible for the LH advantage. In a follow-up study, 
however, French and Painter (1991) investigated whether or not these other aspects 
of imagery performance could have been responsible for the LH advantage found in 
the French and Brightwell study by modifying the task further in order to remove 
the scanning component. Once again simple dot patterns were presented for rive 
seconds in free vision, followed by a three second fixation field. However, a circle 
stimulus was then briefly presented at an unpredictable location in either the RVF 
or LVF, and subjects were required to indicate whether or not the circle surrounded 
a location previously occupied by a dot. A perceptual analogue of this task, in which 
each dot pattern remained on the screen throughout the trial, was also incorporated 
into the design. 
Although no performance asymmetry was found on the perceptual task, subjects 
responded faster on the imagery task when the stimulus circle was presented in the 
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LVF than when it was presented in the RVF. As the hemispheres performed 
equivalently on the perceptual task but demonstrated a visual field advantage on the 
imagery task, the asymmetry could not be attributed to the lateralization of cognitive 
processing components which were involved in both tasks. Therefore, the results 
suggested a RH superiority for either image maintenance or the extraction of spatial 
information from images, and provided support for the claim that the LH 
superiority found by French and Brightwell (1989) was due to the image scanning 
component. 
Unfortunately, however, the French and Painter study did not by itself allow 
inferences to be drawn regarding which of the components, image maintenance or 
the extraction of spatial information from images, was lateralized to the RH. Indeed 
the findings appeared to be consistent with at least three alternative explanations. 
First, the RH might simply be better at maintaining the visual image in terms of 
clarity and stability. Second, the RH might simply be more adept at extracting 
information of any kind from a degraded image. Finally, both hemispheres may be 
equally proficient at image maintenance but the RH may be better able to extract 
specific types of spatial information from an image. 
Unfortunately it was not possible to distinguish between these alternative accounts 
on the basis of past research. The first two interpretations, for example, are 
consistent with a great deal of evidence indicating more effective use of lower quality 
information by the RH than by the LH (e. g. Sergent and Hellige, 1986). On the 
other hand, the alternative view, that the LVF advantage reflected a RH superiority 
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for a spatial processing component specific to the imagery system, accords well with 
the established role of the RH in spatial processing (De Renzi, 1982). 
The primary aim of the current study, therefore, was to investigate whether or not 
the quality of the representation on which the evaluations were performed could 
have been responsible for the RH advantage found in the French and Painter (199 1) 
study. Precisely the same imagery task as employed by French and Painter was used 
in this study, but the quality of the image was manipulated by varying the delay 
between pattern offset and presentation of the circle stimulus. In the short-delay 
condition the circle stimulus was presented one second after pattern offset, whereas 
in the long-delay condition the circle stimulus was presented six seconds after pattern 
offset. The image begins to fade as soon as it is encoded into the visual buffer 
(Kosslyn, 1980), and, therefore, the longer the time the image is maintained the 
lower its degree of resolution. Thus, if the RH advantage found by French and 
Painter was simply due to the quality of the maintained image then one would expect 
hemisphere competence to vary as a function of image maintenance duration. It was 
predicted, therefore, that the long-delay condition would have a more detrimental 
effect on LH performance than RH performance. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Subjects 
Forty subjects, thirteen males and twenty-seven females, participated in the 
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experiment. They were all undergraduates aged between twenty and fifty years of 
age (mean age 28.9 years, SD 9.17), and all were right-handed by self-report with 
normal or corrected to normal vision. Data from an additional nine subjects were 
not analyzed as described below. 
2.2.2 Apparatus 
Stimuli were generated by an IBM XT286 microcomputer and presented on a 
24.5 cm x 17.5 cm visual display screen, Subjects viewed the display from a chin 
rest positioned 75 cm in front of the screen. The visual angle subtended at the eye 
by the viewing area at this distance was 18.7* horizontally and 13.4* vertically. 
Subjects responded to stimuli via two buttons of a mouse and a warning tone was 
emitted when an incorrect response was made. The computer was programmed to 
treat as errors any trials on which the reaction time exceeded three seconds. 
Exposure duration, recording of reaction times and response type, randomization of 
the trials and counterbalancing of the order of presentation of the conditions were 
all controlled by the computer. 
2.2.3 Stimuli 
The computer generated different dot patterns for each subject within the constraints 
outlined below. The patterns consisted of four black dots, 3 mm in diameter, on a 
white background. Each dot subtended a visual angle of 0.23*. Dot locations were 
restricted to an area between 3 cm and 8.25 cm from the centre of the screen. 
146 
Furthermore, dots never appeared within 2 cm of the vertical midline or within 
2 cm of the horizontal midline of the field. Within these constraints, one dot was 
located in each quadrant of the screen in a randomly determined position. 
On each trial the dot patterns were presented in free vision for rive seconds. A 
fixation point, which consisted of a black cross at the centre of the screen, was 
presented one second before pattern offset. In the short-delay condition the fixation 
point was presented for an additional one second after pattern offset, whereas in the 
long-delay condition it was presented for an additional six seconds after pattern 
offset. A black circle stimulus 12 mm in diameter, subtending a visual angle at the 
eye of approximately 0.9', was subsequently presented in the right or left visual 
field. The width of the outline comprising the circle stimulus was approximately 
I n-im. (A graphical illustration of the sequence of stimulus presentation is presented 
in Figure 2.2.3.1). 
Figure 2.2.3.1. Illustradon of the sequence of sdmulus presentadon on each trial. 










Each dot pattern was presented on sixteen trials, eight in the short-delay condition 
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and eight in the long-delay condition. Within these eight trials the circle was 
presented twice in each quadrant, once surrounding a location previously occupied 
by a dot and once clearly not doing so. In these latter trials the circle was always 
presented at least 4 cm away from the dot location in the quadrant. This distance 
corresponds to a visual angle of 3'. The program was so written that every dot 
pattern/circle combination presented had a mirror-image equivalent which was also 
presented. This ensured that any hemifield differences obtained could not simply be 
a reflection of unintentional biases in favour of one or other visual field. The order 
of presentation of the trials was randomized within each condition. 
2.2.4 Procedure 
Subjects were run individually. Prior to the commencement of each condition 
subjects read the instructions for the task which were presented on the display 
screen. Throughout the experiment subjects sat viewing the display screen from a 
chin rest positioned directly in front of the screen, with their response hand resting 
on two buttons of a mouse and their non-response hand resting on the space bar of 
the keyboard. Half of the subjects responded with their left hand and half with their 
right hand. Furthermore, within each response hand half of the subjects used their 
index ringer for a positive response and their middle ringer for a negative response, 
with this pattern being reversed for the other half of the subjects. Subjects initiated 
trials by pressing the space-bar with their non-response hand, and a warning tone 
was emitted when an incorrect response was made in order that subjects could 
monitor their performance. The order of presentation of the two conditions was 
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counterbalanced, and after completion of the first condition subjects were allowed 
to take a short rest if they so wished. The sessions lasted approximately forty 
minutes. 
Subjects were instructed that they were to try to remember the position of each dot 
by forming an image of the pattern exactly as it appeared on the screen. The 
pattern was presented for rive seconds in free vision. After four seconds of the 
presentation period had elapsed a black cross was presented at the centre of the 
field, and this was the cue for subjects to fixate centrally by staring directly at the 
centre of the black cross. The dot pattern then disappeared from the screen. In the 
short-delay condition the fixation cross was presented for an additional one second, 
whereas in the long delay condition it was presented for an additional six seconds. 
At the end of this period a circle stimulus was presented for 167 ms in either the 
right or left visual field. The circle either surrounded a location previously occupied 
by a dot or else clearly did not. Subjects were instructed to press the YES button 
if the circle was surrounding a location that was previously occupied by a dot, or the 
NO button if it was not. It was stressed in the instructions to the subjects that on 
those trials where the circle was not surrounding a location previously occupied by 
a dot this would be quite clear, as on such trials the circle would always appear well 
away from any dot location in the pattern. (See Appendix I for verbatim 
instructions to subjects). 
Thirty-two practice trials were given prior to the commencement of each condition. 
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The dot patterns used in the practice trials were not used in the experimental trials 
of which there were eighty in each condition. The same trials were used in the 
short-delay and long-delay conditions, the only difference being the timing of the 
onset of the circle stimulus. The trials, however, were presented in different random 
orders in each condition. 
For both conditions the subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and as 
accurately as possible. Furthermore, the importance of maintaining central fixation 
was emphasized not only in the initial instructions but throughout the trials 
themselves. At the end of the experiment subjects were debriefed and questioned 
concerning the strategies that they had employed. One subject who reported using 
an image generation strategy was excluded from the final analysis, as were eight 
subjects who responded correctly to less than 70% of the trials. All of these 
excluded subjects were replaced in order to ensure that complete counterbalancing, 
mith respect to order of presentation of the conditions, response hand and fingers, 
was maintained. 
2.3 Results 
Mean reaction times for correct responses and mean number of errors for each 
subject comprised the data upon which the statistical analyses reported below were 
performed. Trials on which reaction times exceeded three seconds were treated as 
errors. These data, averaged across subjects, are presented in Table 2.3.1 with 
standard deviations. 
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Table 2.3.1. Mean ATs (ms) and mean number of errors with standard deviadons, as 
a function of type of response for each visual fieldfor the short-delay and long-delay 
condifions. 
SHORT-DELAY RVF LVF 
YES NO YES NO 
Mean RTs 926 968 925 918 
SD 186 220 196 186 
ean r ors 1.65 1.45 1.65 1.02 
SD 1.58 1.48 1.76 1.19 
LONG-DELAY RVF LVF 
YES NO YES NO 
Mean RTs 1103 1090 1101 1049 
SD 277 249 322 249 
Mean r ors 2.65 2.70 2.35 2.02 
SD 1.80 1.73 2.17 1.72 
Reachon 7Ymes 
Initially data were analyzed using a three-way repeated measures ANOVA, with 
delay (long vs. short), visual field of circle presentation (RVF vs. LVF) and type of 
trial (positive vs. negative) as factors. A significant main effect was found for the 
short-delay and long-delay conditions, F(1,39) = 33.35, p<. 001, with subjects 
producing significantly longer RTs in the long-delay condition (mean RT 1085 ms) 
than in the short-delay condition (mean RT 934 ms). A significant main effect was 
also found for visual field, F(1,39) = 4.23, p<. 05, with subjects producing 
significantly slower RTs when the circle stimulus was presented in the RVF (mean 
RT 1021 ms) than when it was presented in the LVF (Imean RT 998 ms). 
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Thismaineffect, Figure 2.3.1. Graphical illustration of the signijicant 
however, was modiried by 
a significant interaction 
which was obtained 
between visual field and 
type of trial, F0,39) = 
5.18, P< . 05. 
(See Figure 
2.3.1 for graphical 
illustration). The mean 
RTs for positive trials in 
the RVF and LVF were 
10 14 ms and 10 13 ms respectively, whereas for negative trials in the RVF and LVF 
they were 1029 ms and 983 ms respectively. Simple effects analysis, with the 
criterion value for statistical significance set at . 0125 in order to control the 
familywise error rate', revealed that the RTs on the negative trials differed 
significantly between the visual fields, F(l, 39) = 17.29, p<. 00 1. No other simple 
main effects reached significance. 
A significant interaction was also obtained between positive and negative trials as a 
function of length of delay, F(1,39) = 3.51, p <. 025. (See Figure 2.3.2 for graphical 
illustration). The mean RTs for positive trials in the short-delay and long-delay 
'A Bonferroni adjustment, whereby the criterion value for statistical significance is set at 
alpha/number of comparisons, was applied in order to ensure that the familywise error rate for the 
set of comparisons was <. 05. This adjustment is used, when necessary, in all following analyses. 
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conditions were 925 ms and 1102 ms 
respectively, whereas those for negative 
trials in the short-delay and long-delay 
conditions were 943 ms and 1069 ms 
respectively. Simple effects analysis, 
with the criterion value for statistical 
significance set at . 0125, revealed that 
both positive trials, F(1,39) = 29.78, 
p <. 001, and negative trials, F(1,39) = 
28.52, p <. 001, differed significantly as 
f7gure 2.3.2. Graphical illustradon of the 
signiylcant interacdon between Delay and 







a function of the length of delay. No other simple main effects reached significance. 
A further analysis, however, contrasting the difference scores between the long-delay 
and short-delay condition for both types of trial revealed that these differed 
significantly, F(I, 39) = 5.55 1, p< . 025, with the difference between the long-delay 
and short-delay conditions being greater for positive trials (mean difference score 176 
ms) than negative trials (mean difference score 126 ms). 
No significant main effect was found for type of response and no other interactions 
reached significance. 
Errors 
Initially data were analyzed using a three-way repeated measures ANOVA, with 
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delay (long vs. short), visual field of circle presentation (RVF vs. LVF) and type of 
trial (positive vs. negative) as factors. A significant main effect was found for the 
short-delay and long-delay conditions, F0,39) = 43.16, p<. 001, with subjects 
making significantly more errors in the long-delay condition (mean number of errors 
2.43) than in the short-delay condition (mean number of errors 1.44). 
No other main effects or interactions reached significance. 
2.4 Discussion 
Initial analyses of the data revealed that mean reaction times and mean number of 
errors were significantly greater for the long-delay condition than for the short-delay 
condition, as would be expected on the basis of task difficulty. Furthermore, with 
respect to the reaction time data, it was found that type of trial interacted 
significantly with length of delay, with positive trials appearing to be more adversely 
affected by the length of delay than negative trials. Of most interest, however, was 
the finding of a significant main effect for visual field, Nvith subjects responding 
significantly faster when the stimulus circle was presented in the LVF than when it 
was presented in the RVF. Furthermore, the visual fields differed significantly as 
a function of type of trial. Although no performance asymmetry was found on 
positive trials, subjects made significantly faster responses on negative trials when 
the circle stimulus was presented in the LVF than when it was presented in the RVF. 
The principal aim of this study was to examine the respective competence of the two 
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hemispheres when operating upon representations of varying quality. One aspect 
of the results, therefore, which is of particular importance is the absence of a visual 
field asymmetry as a function of delay. If the RH advantage in the French and 
Painter study was in fact determined by the quality of the representations on which 
the evaluations were performed then one would have expected the reduced quality 
of the image in the long-delay condition to have a more detrimental effect on the LH 
than on the RH. However, while a LVF advantage prevailed overall, thus 
replicating the results found by French and Painter (1991), there was no evidence 
to support the view that hemisphere competence differs as a function of the quality 
of the image. 
The above evidence can also be viewed as providing support for the claim that the 
RH superiority in both this experiment and the previous study by French and 
Painter can be attributed to a spatial processing component specific to the imagery 
system. This leaves open, however, the question of the nature of the spatial 
processing component. The RH, for example, might simply be more adept at 
representing or processing all forms of spatial information in images. Alternatively, 
the RH may be better at representing or processing specific types of spatial 
information in images. 
One aspect of the data, however, which warrants further consideration in this 
respect is the interaction between visual field and type of response. As noted 
previously, although no performance asymmetry was found on positive trials, 
subjects made significantly faster responses on negative trials when the circle 
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stimulus was presented in the LVF than when it was presented in the RVF. 
Furthermore, it is perhaps worthy of note that a similar pattern was found in the 
error data in the French and Painter study, with subjects making significantly fewer 
errors on negative trials in the imagery task following LVF presentation than 
following RVF presentation. As it seems unlikelY that spatial processing was not 
required when making a positive judgement the most parsimonious explanation 
would appear to be that the RH was more adept at representing or processing some 
form of spatial information specific to the negative judgement. 
Unfortunately the current study does not permit inferences to be drawn regarding 
the possible nature of this spatial information, since consideration of the two 
responses suggests a number of potential computational differences between the two 
types of evaluation. For example, in linewith Kosslyn's (Kosslyn, 1987; Kosslyn et 
al., 1990) suggestions, it could perhaps be claimed that negative responses called for 
some evaluation of the distance separating the dots and the circle whereas positive 
judgements did not. On the other hand, in line with Corballis's (1989,1991) 
suggestions, it is also possible to claim that negative responses perhaps required some 
evaluation of the circle's position in relation to the pattern as a whole whereas 
positive judgements did not. However, these considerations are clearly somewhat 
speculative and it is, therefore, perhaps more appropriate to simply conclude that 
the evidence appears to support the view that the RH is specialized for representing 
or processing specific types of spatial information in images. 
On a methodological note, there is an additional aspect of the data which warrants 
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further consideration. It has frequently been pointed out that if tasks vary in 
difficulty, different patterns of results from them do not necessarily imply different 
processing components. A single processing subsystem, for example, could operate 
differently at different levels of difficulty. This point was of relevance in the French 
and Painter (1991) study as, not surprisingly, the perceptual task was considerably 
easier than the imagery task, and this raised the possibility that the difference in the 
pattern of lateralization between the two versions of the task was due to task 
difficulty rather than a shift to the use of imagery in one task. However, as noted 
earlier, both the reaction time and error data in the present study demonstrate that 
the long-delay condition was significantly more difficult than the short-delay 
condition. The absence of a visual field asymmetry as a function of delay, however, 
would appear to indicate that hemisphere performance was not differentially 
influenced by task difficulty. Nevertheless, it should perhaps be noted in this respect 
that it could still be argued that the level of difficulty associated Nvith the short-delay 
condition was sufficient to obscure any differences in the pattern of lateralization 
between the two versions of the task. 
In conclusion, the absence of a visual field asymmetry as a function of delay suggests 
that the RH superiority found in this study can be attributed to a spatial processing 
component specific to the imagery system. Furthermore, as the LVF advantage was 
specific to a particular type of evaluation, this can be taken as evidence in support 
of the view that the RH is specialized for the representation or processing of a 
specific form of spatial information in images. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. EYCPERINMNT TWO 
3.1 Introduction 
The findings reported in the previous chapter replicate and extend those in the 
French and Painter (1991) article, by demonstrating that differential hemispheric 
involvement on the experimental task appeared to be determined by a form of spatial 
processing specific to the imagery system. What is perhaps of more interest, 
however, is the implications of these findings for the French and Brightwell (1989) 
study. Specifically, the results appear to demonstrate that when the scanning 
component of the task is removed the effects of the remaining components summate 
to determine a RH superiority. This then would appear to provide further support 
for the claim that the LH superiority found by French and Brightwell was due to the 
image scanning component of the task. 
Such a conclusion would be noteworthy since it would appear to cast doubt on 
Kosslyn's (1987,1990) theoretical speculations regarding the neural distribution of 
the imagery system. As noted in Section 1.6.2, Kosslyn has argued that subsystems 
that make use of categorical representations mill be stronger and more effective in 
the LH, whereas subsystems that make use of coordinate representations will be 
stronger and more effective in the RH. Furthermore, Kosslyn also states that 
"scanning should not require use of categorical representations" (Kosslyn, 1987, 
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p. 167). Thus, according to this view, the image scanning component should be 
lateralized to the RH. Evidence supporting a LH superiority would, therefore, cast 
doubt on Kosslyn's claims regarding image scanning and perhaps also on the validity 
of particular aspects of the model. 
Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to conclude unequivocally that the image 
scanning component is lateralized to the LH as there are still two further alternative 
explanations which could account for the pattern of results obtained by French and 
Brightwell (1989). As noted previously, the task used in this study involved 
presenting simple dot patterns tachistoscopically for rive seconds in free vision 
followed by a three second fixation field. Subsequently an arrow stimulus was 
presented briefly in the RVF or LVF, and this was either pointing at one of the 
previous dot locations from a distance of 4 cm, 6 cm or 8 cm or else clearly not 
pointing at any. The results revealed that RVF presentation led to superior task 
performance, significantly so at longer dot-arrow separations, and this was 
interpreted as suggesting a LH superiority for image scanning. 
However, one possible confound with respect to this conclusion is that the restricted 
viewing area of the tachistoscope that was used meant that the distance from the 
central fixation point to the arrow increased in proportion to the distance between 
the dot and the arrow. Thus, it is possible that the findings may simply have 
reflected the extent to which the lateralized stimulus was offset from the central 
fixation point. 
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It should perhaps be noted that previous research suggests that this alternative 
account is unlikely since a number of studies have found no laterality effects relating 
to eccentricity (e. g. Beaton and Blakemore, 1981). Moreover, those which have 
found hemirield differences appear to demonstrate that it is the RH which is at an 
advantage with large eccentricities (Kitterle, 1991). Nevertheless, given Sergent's 
(1983) claims that the effects of certain stimulus parameters may vary as a function 
of task demands, this alternative explanation cannot be rejected unequivocally. 
Moreover, a further problem relates to the fact that the French and Brightwell study 
did not include a perceptual analogue of the scanning task. It is not possible, 
therefore, to conclude that the effect was specific to image scanning since it could 
perhaps be due to processes involved in scanning generally. 
The primary aim of the current study, therefore, was to attempt to determine 
whether either of the above two explanations could account for the pattern of results 
found in the French and Brightwell study. The imagery task used in this study was 
the same as that employed by French and Brightwell apart from the following two 
exceptions. First, the arrow was always either pointing at one of the previous dot 
locations from a distance of 6 cm or else clearly not pointing at any. Second, in 
order to investigate whether variations in eccentricity could have been responsible 
for the previous finding, the extent to which the arrow stimulus was offset from the 
central fixation point was manipulated. 
One problem with respect to this manipulation, however, is that previous research 
on image scanning has shown that when advance information regarding the arrow's 
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location is made available, reaction time is found to be uncorrelated mith distance 
(Finke and Pinker, 1983). In such circumstances it appears that subjects use a 
different strategy for making their judgements based on an internal comparison 
between anticipated correct directions and test directions specified by the arrow. 
Thus, in order to ensure that subjects used an image scanning as opposed to a 
vector-matching strategy, it was necessary to manipulate stimulus offset whilst at the 
same time maintaining unpredictability in arrow location. This was achieved by 
fixing the location of the arrow on the horizontal axis, but varying it on the vertical 
axis. In the small eccentricity condition the arrow was located 2 cm to the right or 
left of the vertical midline, whereas in the large eccentricity condition it was located 
10 cm to the right or left of the vertical midline. 
Finally, in order to assess whether performance asymmetries were specific to the 
imagery system, a perceptual analogue of the above task was also incorporated into 
the design in which the dot pattern was presented for two seconds in free vision and 
then continued to be presented through the presentation of the fixation stimulus and 
arrow stimulus. (It should perhaps be noted that it was necessary to present the dot 
pattern for different periods of time in the imagery and perceptual conditions, since 
previous research had indicated that if the dot pattern was presented for rive seconds 
in the perceptual condition subjects simply became bored with this unnecessarily 
lengthy exposure. ) 
In line with the reasoning underlying the claims made by French and Brightwell, it 




Forty subjects, 18 males and 22 females, took part in the experiment. They were 
all undergraduates who were right-handed by self-report with normal or corrected 
to normal vision, and they were aged between 19 and 43 years of age (mean age 35.1 
years, SD 6.935). Data from a further five subjects were not analyzed as detailed 
below. 
3.2.2 Apparatus 
Details for this section are identical to those reported in Chapter 2, apart from the 
following two exceptions. First, the stimuli in this study were generated using the 
Micro Experimental Laboratory software package. Second, subjects viewed the 
screen from a distance of 50 cm. This corresponds to a visual angle subtended at 
the eye by the viewing area of 28.1* horizontally and 20* vertically. 
3.2.3 Stimuli 
The computer generated different dot patterns for each subject within the follomring 
constraints. The patterns consisted of four black dots, 6 mm in diameter on a white 
background. Each dot subtended a visual angle of 0.7'. On the vertical axis dots 
never appeared within 2 cm of the top or bottom of the screen or within 2 em of the 
horizontal midline of the field. Within these constraints, one dot was located in each 
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quadrant of the screen in a randomly determined position on the vertical axis. Dot 
location on the horizontal axis, however, was fixed, with two dots appearing 4 cm 
to the left of the vertical midline and two dots appearing 4 cm to the right of the 
vertical midline. 
in the imagery condition the dot pattern disappeared from the screen one second 
after the presentation of the fixation point which consisted of a black cross at the 
centre of the screen. Subsequently the cross disappeared and a black arrow stimulus 
18 mm in length, subtending a visual angle of 2.1 ", was presented briefly in either 
the right visual field or left visual field. It was either pointing to one of the locations 
previously occupied by a dot, or else clearly not pointing at any of them. This 
sequence is graphically illustrated in Figure 3.2.3.1. 
Figure 3.2.3.1. filustration of the sequence of sdmulus presentadon on trials in the 









In the perceptual condition the dot patterns remained on the screen throughout the 
trial. This sequence is graphically illustrated in Figure 3.2.3.2. 
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Figure 3.2.3.2. Illustration of the sequence of stimulus presentalion on trials in the 







The location of the arrow was subject to the following 
Figure 3.2.3.3. 
constraints. On the positive trials in the small Illustration of positive 
(top) and negative 
eccentricity condition the arrow was pointing, from a (bottom) triah in the 
small eccentricity 
distance of 6 cm (6.7"), at a dot location in the opposite condition. (N. B. not 
drawn to scale). 
visual field. On the negative trials the arrow was 
pointing, from a distance of 6 cm, at a point not 
occupied by a dot in the opposite visual field 4 cm away 
from the vertical midline (henceforth, referred to as a 
"negative target location"). On such trials the arrow 
pointed at the midpoint of whichever of the following 
was the largest: the distance between the dot in the 
uppermost quadrant and the top of the screen; the 
distance between the dot in the lower quadrant and the 
bottom of the screen; the distance separating the two 
dots. A graphical illustration of a positive and negative 










On the positive trials in the large eccentricity 
condition the arrow was located on the periphery of 
the field and was pointing, from a distance of 6 cm, 
at a dot location in the same visual field. 
On the negative trials the arrow was again located on 
the periphery of the field and was pointing, from a 
distance of 6 cm, at a location in the same visual 
field 4 cm away from the vertical midline. In this 
instance, however, selection of the negative target 
location was restricted to points above the uppermost 
dot or below the lower dot. This ensured that on such 
trials the scan path clearly missed all dots in the 
pattern. A graphical illustration of a positive and 
negative trial in the large eccentricity condition are 
presented in Figure 3.2.3.4. 
Figure 3.2.3.4. Blustradon 
ofposidve (top) and negadve 
(bouom) trials in the large 
eccenuicity condidon. (N. B. 








Finally, the arrow never appeared within 2 cm of the top or bottom of the screen, 
or mithin I cm of a dot location. Within these constraints the angular orientation 
of the arrow was randomly determined from within a range of 70' to I 10' for RVF 
presentation and 250* to 290' for LVF presentation. The mean displacement of the 
arrow from the fixation point across subjects was 3.1 cm (3.4*) in the small 
eccentricity condition, and 10.3 cm (11.8') in the large eccentricity condition. 
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Each dot pattern was presented on sixty-four trials, thirty-two in the imagery 
condition and thirty-two in the perceptual condition. Each pattern was used in its 
original orientation on sixteen trials in each condition. Within these sixteen trials 
each dot location was pointed at twice, once from within the same visual field (large 
eccentricity) and once from the opposite visual field (small eccentricity). On the 
remaining eight trials the arrow pointed at a negative location in either the same 
(large eccentricity) or opposite (small eccentricity) visual field. The exact mirror 
image of each of these trials was also presented, thus ensuring that any hemifield 
differences could not be due to unintentional biases in favour of one or other visual 
field. Once the trials had been generated the order of presentation was randomized 
mrithin each condition. 
3.2.4 Procedure 
Viewing conditions, presentation of instructions, mode of response and 
counterbalancing of the order of presentation of the conditions and response hand 
and ringers were identical in all respects to the details reported in the first 
paragraph of the procedure section in Chapter 2. 
in the imagery condition subjects were instructed to try to remember the position 
of each dot by forming an image of the pattern exactly as it appeared on the screen. 
After four seconds of the presentation period had elapsed a black cross was 
presented at the centre of the field. This was the cue for subjects to fixate centrally 
by staring directly at the centre of the black cross. The dot pattern then 
166 
disappeared from the screen and the fixation point was presented for an additional 
three seconds. 
At the end of this period an arrow stimulus was presented for 183 ms in either 
the RVF or the LVF. The arrow either pointed at a location previously occupied by 
a dot, or else clearly did not. Subjects were instructed to press the YES button if 
the arrow was pointing at a location that was previously occupied by a dot, or the 
NO button if it was not. It was stressed in the instructions to the subjects that on 
those trials where the arrow was not pointing at a location previously occupied by 
a dot this would be quite clear, as on such trials the arrow would point well away 
from any dot location in the pattern. 
The perceptual condition differed in that each dot pattern remained on the screen 
throughout the trial. Each pattern was presented for a period of two seconds prior 
to the presentation of the black cross at the centre of the field, and subjects were 
instructed to fixate on the cross as soon as it appeared. The fixation cross was 
presented for two seconds and the arrow stimulus was presented for 183 ms in either 
the RVF or the LVF. The arrow either pointed at a dot, or else clearly did not. 
Subjects, therefore, had to press the YES button if the arrow was pointing at a dot, 
or the NO button if it was not. (See Appendix 11 for verbatim instructions to 
subjects). 
Feedback was given at the end of each trial to enable subjects to monitor their 
performance. When a correct response was made a display appeared informing the 
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subjects of their reaction time and their average percentage of correct trials for the 
block. When an incorrect response was made the subjects were informed of this 
visually and a warning tone was also emitted. Sixteen practice trials were also given 
prior to the commencement of the sixty-four experimental trials in each condition. 
One dot pattern was generated in both its original and mirror image orientation for 
the practice blocks, and sixteen trials were then randomly selected. 
For both conditions the subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and as 
accurately as possible, and the importance of maintaining central fixation was 
emphasized not only in the initial instructions but throughout the trials themselves. 
At the end of the experiment subjects were debriefed and questioned concerning the 
strategies that they had employed. All subjects reported using an image scanning 
strategy, but rive subjects who responded correctly to less than 70% of the trials 
were excluded from the analysis. These excluded subjects were replaced in order to 
ensure that the rinal subject pool was completely counterbalanced. 
3.3 Results 
Mean reaction times for correct responses and mean number of errors for each 
subject comprised the data upon which the statistical analyses reported below were 
performed. Trials on which reaction times exceeded three seconds were treated as 
errors. These data, averaged across subjects, are presented in Table 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 
with standard deviations. 
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Table 3.3.1. Mean RTs (ms) and mean number of errors with standard deviations in 
the Imagery condition, as a function of type of response for each visual field for the 
small eccentricity (SE) and large eccentricity (LE) conditions. 
IMAGERY- RVF LVF 
POSITIVE SE LE SE LE 
Mean RTs 944 949 939 950 
SD 350 329 355 351 
ean r ors 1.75 1.62 1.72 1.75 
SD 1.15 1.12 1.41 1.37 
IMAGERY - RVF LVF 
NEGATIVE SE LE SE LE 
Mean RTs 939 989 936 1017 
SD 265 284 279 277 
ean r ors 1.40 2.05 1.47 1.70 
SD 1 1.28 1.30 1 1.28 1 1.38 
Table 3.3.2. Mean RTs fms) and mean number of errors wilh standard deviations in 
the Perceptual condidon, as a function of type of response for each visualfieldfor the 
small eccenftivity (SE) and large eccentndty (LE) conditions. 
PERCEPTUAL RVF LVF 
POSITIVE SE LE SE LE 
Mean RTs 622 649 644 691 
SD 265 241 292 284 
ean rors 0.85 0.70 0.92 0.95 
SD 1.27 0.82 1.07 1.04 
PERCEPTUAL RVF LVF 
NEGATIVE SE LE SE LE 
Mean RTs 697 696 710 692 
SD 171 199 235 211 
Mean r ors 0.87 1.02 0.67 1.15 
SD 0.94 1.00 0.86 1.21 
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Reacdon 7Ymes 
Initially data were analyzed using a four-way repeated measures ANOVA, with 
condition (imagery vs. perceptual), visual field of arrow presentation (RVF vs. LVF), 
extent of eccentricity (small vs. large) and type of trial (positive vs. negative) as 
factors. A significant main effect was found for the imagery and perceptual 
conditions, F(1,39) = 52.02, p<. 001, with subjects producing significantly longer 
RTs in the imagery condition (mean RT 957 ms) than in the perceptual condition 
(mean RT 675 ms). 
In addition, a marginally significant main effect was found for the small eccentricity 
and large eccentricity conditions (F(1,39) = 3.87, p <. 06), with subjects producing 
shorter RTs in the small eccentricity condition (mean RT 803 ms) than in the large 
eccentricity condition (mean RT 829 ms). Finally, a marginally significant main 
effect was also found for the type of response factor 01,39) = 3.82, p <. 06), with 
subjects producing longer RTs in the negative response condition (mean RT 834 ms) 
than in the positive response condition (mean RT 798 ms). 
These main effects, however, were modified by a significant interaction which was 
obtained between condition, eccentricity and type of trial, (FO, 39) = 7.14, p< . 025). 
(See Figure 3.3.1 for graphical illustration). The mean RTs in the imagery condition 
for small eccentricity preseiitation were 941 ms for positive responses and 937 ms for 
negative responses, whereas for large eccentricity presentation the mean RT was 949 
ms for positive responses and 1003 ms for negative responses. In the perceptual 
condition for small eccentricity presentation the mean RTs were 633 ms for positive 
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Figure 3.3.1. Graphical illustration of the 
responses and 703 ms for negative significant interaction between type of 
response, eccentricity and condition. 
responses, wnereas i or jarge CCCeliti-ICILY 
presentation the mean RT was 670 ms 
for positive responses and 694 ms for 
negative responses. Simple effects 
analysis, mith the criterion value for 
statistical significance set at . 0125 in 
order to control the familymise error 
rate', revealed that only the RTs in the 
perceptual condition for small 
eccentricity presentations for positive 
and negative responses differed 













No significant main effect was found for visual field and no other interactions 
reached significance. 
Errors 
A four-way repeated measures ANOVA, with condition (imagery vs. perceptual), 
visual field of arrow presentation (RVF vs. LVF), extent of eccentricity (small vs. 
I For three-way interactions limiting the familywise error rate for the set of comparisons to 
< . 05 can result 
in a criterion value for statistical significance which is so stringent that none of the 
comparisons reach significance. Consequently, in this case the familywise error rate has been set at 
< . 10. 
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large) and type of trial (positive vs. negative) as factors, was applied to the data. A 
significant main effect was found for the imagery and perceptual conditions, W0,39) 
= 84.25, p <. 001), with subjects making significantly more errors in the imagery 
condition (mean no. of errors 1.68) than in the perceptual condition (mean no. of 
errors 0.89). 
A significant interaction Figure 3.3.2. Graphical illustration of the significant 
interaction between eccentricity and type of trial. 
was aiso ontainea tor 
positive and negative 
trials as a function of 
eccentricity 01,39) = 
4.97, p <. 05). (See 
Figure 3.3.2 for graphical 
illustration). The mean 
number of errors for 
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small and large eccentricity conditions were 1.31 and 1.25 respectively, whereas 
those for negative responses in the small and large eccentricity conditions were 1.10 
and 1.48 respectively. Simple effects analysis, vvith the criterion value for statistical 
significance set at . 0125 in order to control the familywise error rate, revealed that 
only the errors for negative trials in the small and large eccentricity conditions 
differed significantly, F(1,39) = 10.64, p< . 0L 
No other main effects or interactions reached significance. 
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3.4 Discussion 
Initial analyses of the data revealed that mean reaction times and mean number of 
errors were significantly greater for the imagery condition than the perceptual 
condition, as would be expected on the basis of task difficulty. The reaction time 
data also revealed two further marginally significant main effects which indicated 
that longer reaction times were associated with large (vs small) eccentricity 
presentations and negative (vs positive) responses. These effects perhaps reflect 
respectively the additional time it might have taken subjects to locate the more 
peripheral arrows, and the uncertainty associated with termination of the scan path 
on negative responses. 
As regards higher-order effects, the reaction time data also revealed a significant 
interaction between the imagery and perceptual condition as a function of 
eccentricity and type of trial. Further analysis revealed that subjects produced 
significantly faster reaction times on positive responses in the perceptual condition 
when the arrow was located towards the centre of the field. It is not entirely clear 
why this effect prevailed, but given the comments in the above paragraph it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the pattern of data is attributable to task difficulty since 
all of the task components associated with increased reaction times are absent on this 
particular subset of trials. Similar considerations also perhaps account for the 
significant interaction found for the error data, which revealed that subjects made 
significantly more errors in the large eccentricity condition on negative trials than 
positive trials. 
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The primary aim of the current study, however, was to establish whether laterality 
effects relating to eccentricity could have been responsible for the LH advantage 
found on the imagery task in the French and Brightwell (1989) study. The most 
noteworthy aspect of the results, therefore, is the complete absence of any visual 
field effect as a function of eccentricity, which suggests that the extent to which the 
lateralized stimulus was offset from the central fixation point was not responsible for 
the pattern of results obtained by French and Brightwell. Nevertheless, it must also 
be acknowledged that the absence of any visual field effect as a function of imaginal 
vs perceptual processing would also appear to cast doubt on the claim that the LH 
superiority was due to the image scanning component of the task. Indeed the 
present rindings would appear to suggest that the two cerebral hemispheres are 
equally adept at image scanning. 
Of course, discrepant findings such as these are not, as noted previously, uncommon 
in the area of laterality research since failures to replicate appear in the divided 
visual field literature relatively frequently. The results of the two studies, therefore, 
may simply reflect the pervasiveness of this instability. Nevertheless, it would be 
i inappropriate to simply attribute the discrepant findings to this instability without 
considering other possible alternative explanations for the contradictory results. In 
this respect, therefore, it would appear necessary to consider differences in design 
and procedure between the present and earlier study in order to assess whether these 
could account for the divergent findings. 
One aspect which warrants consideration in this respect relates to the positioning of 
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the arrow. In the French and Brightwell study the location of the arrow was totally 
unpredictable, whereas in the present study position on the horizontal axis was 
restricted to two specific points. Furthermore, when displacement of the lateralized 
stimulus from the central fixation point was small the arrow always pointed on the 
positive trials to one of the two dots in the opposite visual field. Similarly, when 
displacement was large the arrow always pointed on the positive trials to one of the 
two dots in the same visual field. It is possible, therefore, that these factors may 
have provided subjects with sufficient advance information to use a vector-matching 
strategy as opposed to an image scanning strategy. That is, when the dot pattern 
was presented subjects may have used their knowledge about possible reference 
locations to predetermine the correct directions to the dots. They could then simply 
compare the direction of the arrow directly to these anticipated directions. 
However, it must be acknowledged that the above explanation seems unlikely for two 
reasons. First, all of the subjects reported using an image scanning strategy. 
Second, although the location of the arrow was restricted within a certain range on 
the horizontal axis, there were no constraints on location on the vertical axis. Thus, 
in order to employ a vector-matching strategy it would be necessary for subjects to 
predetermine the correct directions for all possible locations on the vertical axis with 
respect to each point within the restricted range on the horizontal axis. Whilst such 
a strategy is presumably possible, it does seem somewhat implausible. 
Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to conclude unequivocally that an image 
scanning strategy was employed in the current study, since the distance between the 
dot and the arrow was constant. It is not possible, therefore, to demonstrate that 
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reaction times increased linearly mrith distance. 
To summarize, the current findings would appear to suggest that laterality effects 
relating to eccentricity were not responsible for the LH advantage found in the 
French and Brightwell (1989) study. However, the findings also cast doubt on the 
claim that the effect was attributable to the image scanning component of the task. 
Unfortunately doubts relating to the type of strategy employed by the subjects in the 
two studies mean that further investigation is required before any firm conclusions 
can be drawn. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. EXPERINMNT THREE 
4.1 Introducdon 
The inconclusive nature of the findings from the previous study clearly make it 
necessary to attempt to establish the robustness of the visual field effect reported by 
French and Brightwell (1989). It was decided, therefore, to replicate this 
experiment, the general procedure for which was described in the previous chapter. 
It was hypothesized that reaction times would be linearly related to the distances 
separating the dot and arrow locations, and that there would be a LH advantage on 
the task in terms of reaction times and/or errors. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Subjects 
Sixteen subjects participated in the experiment, thirteen females and three males. 
They were all undergraduates who were right-handed by self-report with normal or 
corrected to normal vision, and they were aged between 19 and 40 years of age 
(mean age 26.1 years, SD 7.16). Data from an additional fifteen subjects were 
excluded from the analysis as described below. 
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4.2.2 Apparatus 
Details for this section are identical to those reported in Chapter Three apart from 
the following exception. The viewing distance in the French and Brightwell 
experiment was 50 cm, which corresponds to a visual angle subtended at the eye by 
the viewing area of 16* horizontally (14.3 cm) and 10* vertically (8.9 cm). In order 
to ensure, as far as possible, consistency in viewing conditions the subjects in this 
study therefore viewed the visual display screen from the maximum possible distance 
of 75 cm. The visual angle subtended at the eye by the viewing area at this distance 
was 18.7' horizontally (24.5 cm) and 13.4" vertically (17.5 cm). 
4.2.3 Stimuli 
The follo-Aing stimuli replicate those described in French and Brightwell (1989). The 
actual size of the stimuli and the distance of the dots from the central fixation point, 
however, were adjusted in order to ensure that the visual angle subtended at the eye 
was the same for both studies. 
Two dot patterns and their mirror images were used Figure 4.2.3.1. Pattern A. 
(N. A Not drawn to scale). 
tor tne experimentai triais. hacn pattern consistea or 
four black dots 9 mm in diameter on a white 
background. At a viewing distance of 75 em each dot 
therefore subtended a visual angle of approximately 
0.70. The centres of the dots in Pattern A had the 
following polar coordinates with reference to the 
I I 
S S 
centre of the visual field (distance expressed in terms of visual angle in parenthesis): 
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i) 44 mm, 44* (3.4'); ii) 43 mm, 151* (3.3'); iii) 72 
Figure 4.2.3.2. Pattern B. 
mm, 222* (5.5"); 75 mm, 325* (5.7*). (A graphical (N. B. not drawn to scale). 
illustration of Pattern A is presented in Figure 
4.2.3.1). For Pattern B the centres of the dots were 
located as follows: i) 81 mm, 23" (6.2*); ii) 73 mm, 
160' (5.7<»; iii) 59 mm, 247' (4.5'); iv) 58 mm, 346' 
(A graphical illustration of Pattern B is 





consisted of a black cross located in the centre of the visual field on a white 
background. 
The lateralized stimulus was a black arrow 21 mm in length, subtending a visual 
angle of 1.6"'. In order to ensure consistency of stimulus presentation between the 
two studies arrow location was restricted to an area 21 cm x 13.5 cm, which is 
equivalent in terms of visual degrees (16' x 10*) to the viewing area used in the 
French and Brightwell study. Within this area no two arrows were ever presented 
at the same location, and the arrows were also distributed as evenly as possible 
within each hemifield. This ensured that, from the subjects' perspective, both the 
location and the angular direction of the arrow were unpredictable. Finally, in 
order to avoid confusion, no arrow was ever presented at a location at which a dot 
had just been presented or mithin 2 cm of the vertical midline. Within these 
constraints the arrow was either clearly not pointing at any of the dot locations in 
the pattern, or else pointing from a distance of 6 cm, 9 cm or 12 cm to one of the 
locations previously occupied by a dot. These distances correspond to visual angles 
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of 4.6*, 6.9* and 9.20 respectively. (In the French and Brightwell study the 
distances of 4 cm, 6 cm and 8 cm corresponded to visual angles of 4.5*, 6.7" and 
8.9* respectively). 
The experimental trials were constructed in the following manner. Each dot pattern 
was presented on 24 trials in its original orientation. On twelve of these trials every 
dot location was pointed at from every distance (i. e. 6 cm, 9 cm and 12 cm). On the 
remaining twelve trials the arrow clearly missed all dot locations. The exact mirror 
image of each trial was also presented ensuring that any hemifield differences 
obtained could not simply be due to unintentional biases in favour of one or other 
visual field. 
4.2.4 Procedure 
Procedural details are identical to those reported in Chapter Three, apart from the 
follo, wing exceptions. First, no perceptual analogue was used in this study, Second, 
the arrow either pointed to a location previously occupied by a dot from a distance 
of 6 cm, 9 cm or 12 cm, or else clearly did not. Finally, sixteen practice trials were 
given prior to the commencement of the ninety-six experimental trials. The dot 
pattern employed in the practice trials was not used in the experimental trials. 
Within the sixteen practice trials, each dot location was pointed at twice. On the 
remaining eight trials the arrow clearly missed all dot locations. The order of both 
the practice and the experimental trials was randomized. (See Appendix III for 
verbatim instructions to subjects). 
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At the end of the experiment subjects were thanked and fully debriefed. Fifteen 
subjects who responded correctly to less than 70% of the trials were excluded from 
the analysis. All of these excluded subjects, however, were replaced in order to 
ensure that the rinal subject pool was completely counterbalanced with respect to 
response hand and ringers used for positive and negative responses. 
4.3 Results 
Mean reaction times for correct responses and number of correct trials for each 
subject comprised the data upon which the statistical analyses reported below were 
performed. Trials in which reaction times exceeded three seconds were treated as 
errors. These data averaged across subjects are presented in Table 4.3.1 with 
standard deviations. 
Table 4.3.1. Mean RTs Ims) and number correct with standard deviations as a 
_/knedon qf 










Mean RTs 1098 1125 1137 1316 
SD 222 232 221 309 
No. orr et 17.94 6.81 5.87 6.69 
SD 0.71 0.91 1.02 1.25 
LVF 
NP 6 ein T9 cm 1 - 12 cm 
Mean RTs 1091 1114 1135 1344 
SD 215 199 234 347 
No. orr ct 18.42 6.44 6.12 6.25 
SD 0.64 1.41 1.20 0.93 
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Reacdon 7Ymes 
Initially data for correct positive responses were analyzed using a two-way ANOVA 
with distance (6 cm, 9 cm, 12 cm) and visual field (RVF and LVF) as repeated 
factors. A significant main effect was found for distance F(2,30) = 14.12, p <. 001. 
Moreover, the empirical F value still reached significance following adjustment of 
the degrees of freedom by the average of the Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon (. 87) and 
the Huynh-Feldt Epsilon (. 97) in order to control for possible violations of sphericity 
(F(2,28) = 14.12, p <. 01). ' The mean RTs at 6 cm, 9 cm and 12 cm were 
1119 ms, 1136 ms and 1330 ms respectively. 
A trend analysis was performed on this main 
effect, revealing a significant linear trend 
(Fli., 
a, 
(I, 15) = 17.38, p<. 0 1). This effect was 
modified, however, by a significant quadratic 
trend (Fq.,, dr,, tj, 
(1,15) = 7.90, p <. 025). (See 
Figure 4.3.1 for graphical illustration). No 
significant main effect was found for visual 
field and the interaction between distance and 
visual field did not reach significance. 
'A number of tests for violations of the sphericity assumption exist but problems, primarily 
involving the tests' oversensitivity, reduce their practical value (e. g. Kesselman, Rogan, Mendoza and 
Breen, 1980). Consequently, a number of statisticians have recently begun to recommend routine use 
of a correction factor applied to the degrees of freedom (e. g. Howell, 1992). This permits selection 
of a larger critical F value, thereby avoiding the positive bias which can result from violations of this 
assumption. Of the two correction factors available the Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon tends to be 
rather conservative and the Huynh-Feldt Epsilon somewhat optimistic. Stevens (1992), therefore, 
recommends using the average of the two, and this is the procedure used above and in all subsequent 
analyses. 
Figure 4.3.1. Graphical illustration 
of mean reaction times (ms) for 
correct positive responses at 6 cm, 9 
cm and 12 cm. 
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Mean RTs for correct negative responses were analyzed using a one-way ANOVA 
with visual field as a within-subjects factor. No significant effect was found. 
Accuracy 
It was necessary to analyze the reaction time data from the positive and negative 
trials separately in order to facilitate investigation of the possible linear trend 
relating RT to distance. No such constraints, however, applied to the analysis of the 
accuracy data, and the data were therefore analyzed using a two-way ANOVA with 
condition (not pointing and pointing from 6 em, 9 cm and 12 cm) and visual field as 
repeated measures. (It was necessary to scale down the number correct in the not 
pointing condition by a factor of three, as this condition involved a possible 
maximum score of twenty-four as opposed to eight in each of the pointing 
conditions). 
No main effects or higher-order interactions reached significance. 
4.4 Discussion 
The analyses revealed that, as predicted, mean reaction times increased significantly 
with increasing distance. There was, however, no evidence from either the reaction 
time or error data of any visual field asymmetry. Moreover, while the results 
clearly demonstrate that reaction times increase with increasing dot-arrow 
separation, the findings would appear initially to conflict somewhat with previous 
research in that the significant quadratic trend indicates that the increase in reaction 
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time is not directly proportional to the distance between the dot and the arrow. 
It is perhaps worthy of note in this respect, Figure 4.4.1. Blustration of Finke 
and Pinker's (1983) proposal 
however, that departures from linearity have regarding the effects of uncertainty 
in arrow orientation and dot 
been reported previously. For example, Finke location. 
and Pinker (1983), in an extension of their 
original study, found that subjects made far 
more errors for the shortest arrow-dot distance 
C 
than for the other distances. They explained this apparent anomaly by arguing that 
dot positions were unlikely to be recorded in memory with perfect accuracy. 
Therefore, each imagined dot mill fall into a circular region of uncertainty. Given 
a constant angular range within which the scanning process is directed, it is more 
likelY that the imagined dot will fall outside of this critical sector the closer it is to 
the arrow. (See Figure 4.4.1 for graphical illustration of this argument). Evidence 
in support of this explanation was subsequently provided by Pinker, Choate and 
Finke (1984). 
Of course in the present study the quadratic trend could have resulted from 
deviations of any of the three data points. Nevertheless, given the above, it is 
possible that the departure from linearity might have been due to elevated reaction 
times at the shortest dot-arrow separation, since at short distances even a small 
displacement in the remembered location of a dot can place it towards the periphery 
of the acceptable angular range. 
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The results of the present experiment, however, fail to support the view of a 
hemisphere asymmetry in image scanning. As this conflicts with previous evidence 
it would appear necessary, once again, to attempt to examine what factors may have 
accounted for these divergent findings. One obvious difficulty Nivith the current 
experiment was the excessively high error rate which resulted in the elimination of 
nearly half the subjects who were run. In fact, initially it was planned to run forty 
subjects, but as the experiment progressed it became clear that the task was far too 
difficult. The decision was, therefore, taken to terminate the experiment when 
usable data had been obtained from sixteen subjects. 
UnfortunatelY it is not clear what factors could have been responsible for the 
difference in subjects' performance between the current experiment and the French 
and Brightwell study. For example, in the current study 48% of the total subject 
pool responded correctly to less than 70% of trials, whereas in the French and 
Brightwell study only 17% of the subjects failed to reach this threshold. 
Consideration of potential sources of divergence between the experiments, however, 
appears initiallY to reveal few differences. The subject population was the same in 
both studies, as was the basic stimulus configuration. Furthermore, in as much as 
the task requirements were the same in both experiments, there appears to be no 
compelling reason to believe that this was the source of divergence. 
However, a number of potential differences are suggested by the fact that subjects 
responded much faster in the current study than in the French and Brightwell study. 
For example, the mean reaction times in the present study for scanning distances 
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corresponding to visual angles of 4.6*, 6.9' and 9.2' were 1119 ms, 1136 ms and 
1330 ms respectively. Conversely, in the French and Brightwell study mean reaction 
times for scanning distances corresponding to visual angles of 4.5", 6.7" and 8.9* 
were 1610 ms, 1749 ms and 1922 ms respectively. 
One possible explanation for the discrepancy between the two sets of results concerns 
factors related to viewing conditions. For example, while the task demands and the 
basic stimulus configuration were identical in both experiments, the stimuli were 
presented tachistoscopically in the French and Brightwell study and by a 
microcomputer in the present study. This may have resulted in differences in 
stimulus-presentation parameters, and there is evidence that such differences can 
affect response speed (Sergent, 1983). However, while such an explanation could 
perhaps explain the difference in response latencies between the two experiments, it 
is not clear whether such factors could account for the extremely high error rate 
found in the current study. 
An alternative explanation for the discrepancy concerns response mode. In the 
French and Brightwell study subjects responded with the index ringers of both 
hands, whereas in the current study subjects responded with the index and middle 
ringer of one hand. This perhaps could have contributed to the longer response 
latencies found in the previous study. However, again it is not clear whether such 
a factor could explain the divergence in error rates. One final explanation which 
could perhaps account for the divergence in both response latencies and errors 
concerns the feedback given to subjects. In the present study subjects were provided 
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-Arith feedback on their response speed after each correct trial. It is possible, 
therefore, that this may have encouraged them to attempt to respond more rapidly, 
and therefore perhaps less accurately. 
In conclusion, the results of the current study appear to provide no support for the 
claim that the scanning component of imagery is lateralized to the LH. However, 
the difficulties experienced by subjects in carrying out the task must cast doubt on 
the validity of these results, and it is probably inappropriate therefore to draw any 
firm conclusions regarding the lateralization of the image scanning component. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. EXPERINWNT FOUR 
5.1 Introducdon 
Clearly the difficulties experienced by subjects in the preceding study indicate the 
need for a simpler experimental task. It was decided, therefore, to modify the task 
as described below in order to facilitate firm conclusions finally being drawn 
regarding whether or not the effect found by French and Brightwell (1989) was due 
to the scanning component of the task. However, it is important to remember that 
it is also necessary to establish whether the putative effect is specific to the imagery 
task, since, as noted previously, it could perhaps be due to processes involved in 
scanning generally. Consequently, it was decided to initially investigate whether 
performance asymmetries were to be found on a perceptual version of the modified 
task. 
Patterns containing four simple geometric shapes were presented in free vision and 
continued to be presented throughout each trial. A fixation cross was presented two 
seconds after pattern onset, and two seconds after the presentation of the cross a 
geometric shape was brieflY presented in the RVF or LVF. The lateralized stimulus 
was either identical to one of the shapes contained in the pattern or else did not 
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match any of them. On those trials where the briefly presented stimulus was not 
identical to any of the shapes contained in the pattern the subjects were instructed 
to indicate this with a negative response. When the lateralized stimulus did match 
one of the shapes it was located at a distance of 6 cm, 9 cm or 12 cm from the 
corresponding shape, and subjects were instructed to mentally scan from the centre 
of the lateralized stimulus to the centre of the corresponding shape before 
responding. 
Obviously it would be expected that reaction times would be related to the distance 
between the lateralized stimulus and the target stimulus. However, performance on 
the scanning task would onlY be expected to vary as a function of visual field if there 
were asymmetries in the processes involved in scanning generally. Consequently, it 
was simply hypothesized that there would be a significant linear relationship between 
reaction times and the distances separating the lateralized and target stimuli. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Subjects 
Forty subjects participated in the experiment, 31 females and 9 males. They were 
all undergraduates who were right-handed by self-report with normal or corrected 
to normal vision, and they were aged between nineteen and fifty years of age (mean 
age 26.85 years, SD 8.09). 
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5.2.2 Apparatus 
Stimuli in this study were generated using the Micro Experimental Laboratory 
software package. All other details for this section are identical to those reported 
in Chapter Two. 
5.2.3 Stimuli 
Two patterns and their mirror images were used in the experimental trials. Each 
pattern consisted of a configuration of four black geometric shapes on a white 
background. The maximum visual angle subtended at the eye by any one of the 
shapes contained in the patterns was 0.91* horizontally (12 mm) and 0.76* vertically 
(lomm). 
Pattern A contained a 
Figure 5.2.3.1. PaUern A. Figure 5.2.3.2. Pattern B. 
triangle, a circle, a (N. B. not drawn to scale). (N. B. not drawn to scale). 
rectangle and a 
"diamond" shape at 
the following polar 
coordinates with 
reference to the centre 
I 
I 
of the visual field (distance expressed in terms of visual angle in parenthesis): i) 63 
mm, 72" (4.7'); ii) 50 mm, 127" (3.8"); iii) 94 mm, 216' (6.8'); iv) 70 mm, 325* 
(4.9"). (See Figure 5.2.3.1 for illustration of Pattern A). Pattern B contained a 
square, a "bow-tie" shape, an arc and an ellipse at the following locations: i) 81 mm, 
23' (6.2'); ii) 73 mm, 160' (5.7); iii) 59 mm, 247' (4.5'); iv) 58 mm, 346' (4.4<». 
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(See Figure 5.2.3.2 for illustration of Pattern B). The fixation field consisted of a 
black cross located in the centre of the visual field. 
Each of the geometric shapes depicted in Figures 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 were also 
presented on twelve trials as the lateralized stimulus. On six of these trials the 
lateralized stimulus did not match any of the shapes contained in the pattern. On 
the remaining six trials the lateralized stimulus was identical to one of the shapes in 
the pattern. Restrictions on the location of the lateralized stimulus were identical 
to those reported in Chapter Four, with the exception that on positive trials the 
lateralized stimulus was located at a distance of either 6 cm (4.6'), 9 cm (6.9") or 
12 cm (9.2') from the corresponding shape in the pattern. 
The experimental trials were constructed in the following manner. Each pattern was 
presented on 24 trials in its original orientation. On twelve of these trials the 
lateralized stimulus matched one of the shapes contained in the pattern, and was 
located at a distance of either 6 cm, 9 cm or 12 cm from the corresponding shape. 
On the remaining twelve trials the lateralized stimulus did not match any of the 
shapes contained in the pattern. The exact mirror image of each trial was also 
presented, thus avoiding unintentional hemifield biases. 
5.2.4 Procedure 
Viewing conditions, presentation of instructions, mode of response and 
counterbalancing of response hand and ringers were identical in all respects to the 
191 
details reported in the first paragraph of the procedure section in Chapter Two. 
Each pattern remained on the screen throughout each trial. At the beginning of 
each trial the pattern was presented in free vision for two seconds prior to the 
presentation of the fixation cross. The cross, which served as the cue for subjects 
to fixate centrally, was presented for two seconds. At the end of this period the 
lateralized stimulus was presented for 183 ms in either the RVF or LVF. This 
sequence is graphically illustrated in Figure 5.2.4.1. 







Subjects were instructed to respond in the following manner. If the lateralized 
stimulus did not match any of the shapes contained in the pattern they were to press 
the NO button. If the lateralized stimulus did match one of the shapes in the pattern 
subjects were instructed to scan from the centre of the briefly presented shape to the 
centre of the corresponding shape in the pattern. On reaching the target stimulus 
they were to press the YES button. (See Appendix IV for verbatim instructions to 
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subjects). Sixteen practice trials, eight positive and eight negative, were given using 
a pattern (and its mirror image) not employed on the experimental trials. The order 
of both the practice and experimental trials was randomized. 
Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible, and the 
importance of maintaining central fixation whenever the fixation cross was on the 
screen was stressed both in the initial instructions and throughout the trials 
themselves. If an incorrect response was made a warning tone was emitted and the 
words "wrong response" were visually displayed. No feedback was given on correct 
responses. Response latencies exceeding three seconds were treated as errors. 
At the end of the experiment subjects were thanked for their participation and fully 
debriefed. As in the preceding studies, it was decided to exclude any subjects who 
responded correctly to less than 70% of the trials. However, none of the subjects' 
performances fell below this threshold. 
5.3 Results 
Mean reaction times for correct responses and number of correct trials for each 
subject comprised the data upon which the statistical analyses reported below were 
performed. Trials in which reaction times exceeded three seconds were treated as 
errors. These data averaged across subjects are presented in Table 5.3.1 with 
standard deviations. 
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Table 5.3.1. Mean RTs (ms) and number correct with standard deviations as a 










Mean RTs 1239 1189 1229 1246 
SD 277 272 282 302 
No. orr ct 22.47 7.25 7.32 7.40 











Mean RTs 1228 1191 1197 1244 
SD 297 289 285 282 
No. orr ct 22.82 7.42 7.47 7.52 
SD 1 0.34 1 0.84 1 0.71 1 0.71 
Reaction Umes 
Initially data for correct positive responses were analyzed using a two-way ANOVA 
mith distance (6 cm, 9 cm, 12 cm) and visual field (RVF and LVF) as repeated 
factors. A significant main effect was found for distance (F(2,78) = 5.48, p <. 01). 
Moreover, the empirical F value still reached significance following adjustment of 
the degrees of freedom by the average of the Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon (. 88) and 
the Huynh-Feldt Epsilon (. 92) in order to control for possible violations of sphericity 
(F(2,70) = 5.48, p <. 01). The mean RTs at 6 cm, 9 cm and 12 cm were 1190 ms, 
1213 ms and 1245 ms respectively. 
A trend analysis was performed on this main effect, revealing a significant linear 
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trend (Fli .. ý., 
(1,39) = 7.99, p <. 01), but no significant quadratic trend. No significant 
main effect was found for visual field and the interaction between distance and visual 
field did not reach significance. 
Mean RTs for correct negative responses were analyzed using a one-way ANOVA 
with visual field as a within-subjects factor. No significant effect was found. 
Accuracy 
The accuracy data were analyzed using a two-way ANOVA with condition (not 
matching and matching from 6 cm, 9 cm and 12 cm) and visual field as repeated 
measures. (Once again it was necessary to scale down the number correct in the not 
matching condition by a factor of three, as this condition involved a possible 
maximum score of twenty-four as opposed to eight in each of the matching 
conditions). 
No main effects or interactions reached significance. 
5.4 Discussion 
The analyses revealed that, as predicted, mean reaction times increased linearly with 
increasing distance. Moreover, no significant quadratic trend was found, as perhaps 
would be expected given that performance on this task would not be affected by the 
accuracy of remembered locations of the shapes contained in the pattern. 
195 
There was, however, no evidence from either the reaction time or error data of any 
visual field asymmetry. Thus, it would appear that the putative effect found by 
French and Brightwell is not due to processes involved in scanning generally,, It 
simply remains, therefore, to establish whether performance asymmetries are evident 
on the imaginal version of the task. 
196 
CHAPTER SIX 
6. EXPERIMENT FIVE 
6.1 Introduedon 
The task used in this study was precisely the same as that described in the previous 
chapter, with the exception of the timing of the presentation of the stimuli. 
Specifically, for the imaginal version of the task the patterns were presented in free 
vision for rive seconds, followed by a three second fixation field. The lateralized 
stimulus was then presented briefly in the RVF or LVF. 
It was hypothesized that reaction times would be linearly related to the distance 
separating the lateralized stimulus and the target stimulus, and that reaction times 
and/or errors would vary as a function of visual field. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Subjects 
Forty subjects participated in the experiment, 29 females and II males. They were 
all undergraduates who were right-handed by self-report with normal or corrected 
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to normal vision, and they were aged between eighteen and fifty-one years of age 
(mean age 27.7 years, SD 8.64). 
6.2.2 Apparatus 
The stimuli in this study were generated using the Micro Experimental Laboratory 
software package. All other details for this section are identical to those reported 
in Chapter Two. 
16.2.3 Stimuli 
Details for this section are identical to those reported in Chapter Five. 
6.2.4 Procedure 
On each trial the pattern was presented in free vision for rive seconds, and subjects 
were instructed that they were to try to remember the position of each shape by 
forming an image of the pattern exactly as it appeared on the screen. After four 
seconds of the presentation period had elapsed a black cross was presented at the 
centre of the field, and this was the cue for subjects to fixate centrally by staring 
directly at the centre of the black cross. The pattern then disappeared from the 
screen, and the fixation cross was presented for an additional three seconds. At the 
end of this period a geometric shape was presented for 183 ms in either the RVF or 
LVF. (This sequence of events is graphically illustrated overleaf in Figure 6.2.4.1). 
Subjects were instructed to respond in the following manner, If the lateralized 
stimulus did not match any of the shapes contained in the pattern they were to press 
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the NO button. If the lateralized stimulus did match one of the shapes in the pattern 
subjects were instructed to mentally scan across the image from the centre of the 
briefly presented shape to the corresponding shape in the pattern. On reaching the 
target stimulus they were to press the YES button. (See Appendix V for verbatim 
instructions to subjects). 






Three subjects who responded correctlY to less than 70% of the trials were excluded 
from the analYsis. Once again, however, the excluded subjects were replaced in 
order to ensure complete counterbalancing. All other details for this section are 
identical to those reported in Chapter Five. 
6.3 Results 
Mean reaction times for correct responses and number of correct trials for each 
subject comprised the data upon which the statistical analYses reported below were 
performed. Trials in which reaction times exceeded three seconds were treated as 
errors. These data averaged across subjects are presented in Table 6.3.1 with 
standard deviations. 
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Table 6.3.1. Mean RTs (ms) and number correct with standard deviations as a 









Mean RTs 1388 1558 1525 1580 
SD 267 352 348 385 
No. orr ct 21.66 7.05 6.87 6.67 











Mean RTs 1352 1486 1551 1573 
SD 247 384 375 336 
No. Corr ct 21.75 7.32 6.97 6.92 
SD 0.79 0.76 1.14 1 1.11 
Reacdon lYmes 
Initially data for correct positive responses were analyzed using a two-way ANOVA 
, with distance (6 cm, 9 cm, 12 cm) and visual field (RVF and LVF) as repeated 
factors. A marginally significant main effect was found for distance 02,78) = 2.93, 
p< . 06). 
(Following adjustment of the degrees of freedom by the average of the 
Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon (. 89) and the Huynh-Feldt Epsilon (. 93) the relevant 
values were F(2,71) = 2.93, p <. 07). The mean RTs at 6 cm, 9 cm and 12 cm were 
1521 ms, 1538 ms and 1576 ms respectively. 
A trend analysis was performed on this marginally significant main effect, revealing 
a significant linear trend (Fli.,,,, (1,39) = 4.15, p <. 05) but no significant quadratic 
trend. No significant main effect was found for visual field and there was no 
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significant interaction between distance and visual rield. 
Mean RTs for correct negative responses were analyzed using a one-way ANOVA 
with visual field as a within-subjects factor. A significant difference was found 
(F(1,39) = 4.65, p< . 05), with subjects responding significantly faster when the 
lateralized stimulus was presented in the LVF (mean RT 1352 ms) than in the RVF 
(mean RT 1388 ms). 
Accuracy 
The accuracy data were analyzed using a two-way ANOVA with condition (not 
matching and matching from 6 cm, 9 cm and 12 cm) and visual field as repeated 
measures. (Once again it was necessary to scale down the number correct in the not 
matching condition by a factor of three, as this condition involved a possible 
maximum score of twenty-four as opposed to eight in each of the matching 
conditions). 
A significant main effect was found for condition W3,117) = 3.07, p< ý05). 
Moreover, the empirical F value still reached significance following adjustment of 
the degrees of freedom by the average of the Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon (. 91) and 
the Huynh-Feldt Epsilon (. 98), 03,110) = 3.07, p< . 05). A modified version of the 
Tukey test appropriate for use with repeated measure factors revealed that only the 
difference between the Not Matching condition and the 12 cm condition was 
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significant. ' The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 6.3.2. 
Table 6.3. Z Mean no. correct and pairwise diTerences between means for the Not 
Matching, 6 cm, 9 cm and 12 cm condidons. (7he observed FT. *,, value for each 












7.23 7.18 6.92 6.80 
6 cm 0.05 (0.10) 
9 cm 0.3l(2.43) 0.26 (2.82) 
12 cm 0.43 (6.81)* 0.38 (6.10) 0.12 (0.56) 
<. 05, JFTukey(4,117) = 6.771 
A marginally significant main effect was also found for visual field 01,39) = 3.54, 
< . 07), with subjects responding more accurately 
following LVF presentation (mean 
no. correct 7.11) than RVF presentation (mean no. correct 6.95). 
The interaction between visual field and condition did not reach significance. 
6.4 Discussion 
The analyses revealed that, as predicted, mean reaction times increased linearly mith 
increasing distance. Moreover, the absence of a significant quadratic trend 
replicates the findings of the previous study, and provides further support for the 
'The majority of multiple comparison tests Use the MSerror from the overall analysis as the 
error term. Numerous researchers, however, have observed that this procedure is inappropriate with 
repeated measures factors (e. g. Keppel, 1982), since in this instance the error term should be based 
on only those conditions involved in a particular comparison. The above procedure, recommended 
by Lehman 0 99 1, pp. 385-388), limits the error rate according to the rules for the Tukey procedure, 
but the error estimate for each contrast is based only on the conditions involved in the comparison. 
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view that the quadratic trend reported in Chapter Four was determined by the 
uncertainty associated with the angular orientation of the arrow stimulus. A 
significant main effect for distance was also found for the error data, with subjects 
responding significantly less accurately in the 12 cm condition than in the Not 
Matching condition. This would perhaps be expected on the basis of task difficulty. 
Of most interest, however, were the findings relating to visual field. For the 
reaction time data, for example, a significant difference was found for visual field 
on the negative responses, with subjects responding significantly faster when the 
lateralized stimulus was presented in the LVF than when it was presented in the 
RVF. Furthermore, the error data also revealed a marginally significant main effect 
for visual field, with subjects responding more accurately on LVF presentations than 
on RVF presentations. Thus, in contrast to the French and Brightwell (1989) 
experiment, the results of the current study appear to indicate a RH superiority for 
task performance. 
More detailed consideration of the visual field effects, however, would appear to cast 
doubt on the possibility that the scanning component of the task was responsible for 
this superiority. The LVF advantage on the reaction time data, for example, was 
specific to negative responses, and given that on this type of trial there was no 
requirement to scan across the image this appears to indicate that the effect is 
related to some other aspect of the task. SimilarlY, on the error data the absence 
of a significant interaction indicates that the visual field advantage did not vary as 
a function of whether the trial was positive or negative, again suggesting that the 
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scanning component was not responsible for the RH superiority. 
Unfortunately this study does not by itself allow inferences to be drawn regarding 
which aspect of the task the asymmetry is related to. Nevertheless, in this respect 
it is relevant to note that the previous experiment reported in Chapter Five revealed 
no asymmetries on the perceptual version of the task. This suggests, therefore, that 
the effect is associated mith task components specific to the imagery system. For 
example, the RH may simply be better at maintaining a more accurate imaginal 
representation of the relative positions of the different shapes in the pattern, thereby w 
facilitating faster and more accurate performance of the matching procedure. 
Alternatively, the RH may simply be more adept at maintaining an accurate 
imaginal representation of each of the component shapes comprising the pattern. 
Irrespective of the possible components responsible for the RH advantage, however, 
it is apparent that these results provide no support whatsoever for French and 
Brightwell's (1989) claims regarding the lateralization of the scanning component. 
Nevertheless, it should perhaps be noted that one possible argument that could be 
advanced against this conclusion relates to the absence of a visual field advantage on 
the reaction time data for positive trials. Given that the computational approach 
regards the performance of any one hemisphere as reflecting the product of the 
component asymmetries, it could perhaps be argued that the putative LH advantage 
on the scanning component in effect cancelled out the RH advantage on other aspects 
of the task. Consequently there was no observable asymmetry on the trials involving 
scanning, but a RH superiority prevailed on the negative trials when scanning was 
204 
not required. This argument, however, is clearly somewhat speculative.. and it fails 
to provide an explanation of why a LH advantage was found in the French and 
Brightwell (1989) study but was not evident on the image scanning tasks reported in 
Chapter Three, Chapter Four and the current study. Indeed given the consistency 
of the findings overall, it would seem that the most parsimonious conclusion to draw 
is that image scanning is bilaterally represented. 
On a theoretical note, however, it is important to stress that these findings do not 
in any way detract from the validity of the computational approach to cerebral 
asymmetry. As noted in Section 1.1.5, for instance, it is possible that mrithin any one 
cognitive system some processing subsystems may be lateralized to the LH, some to 
the RH and some bilaterally represented. Thus the findings perhaps best serve to 
illustrate the danger of attempting to derive general principles that purportedly 
apply to all subprocessors from studies confined to a single processing component. 
Indeed in this respect it should perhaps be noted that whilst these results can be 
accommodated within a computational perspective, they do appear to cast doubt on 
certain aspects of Kosslyn's theoretical speculations regarding the neural distribution 
of the imagery system (Kosslyn, 1987; Kosslyn, Flynn, Amsterdam and Wang, 1990). 
As noted previously, for example, Kosslyn has argued that subsystems that make use 
of categorical representations will be stronger and more effective in the LH, whereas 
subsystems that make use of coordinate representations will be stronger and more 
effective in the RH. Furthermore, Kosslyn, also states that "scanning should not 
require use of categorical representations" (Kosslyn, 1987, p. 167). Thus according 
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to this view the image scanning component should be lateralized to the RH. The 
absence of any evidence to support this claim, therefore, would appear to indicate 
that contrary to Kosslyn's proposals it is not possible to predict the laterality of a 
particular processing component from knowledge of the type of representation that 
is supposedly being utilized. Moreover, this inconsistency necessarily raises a 
question mark over the validity of other aspects of Kosslyn's model. 
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CRAPTER SEVEN 
7. EXPERIMENT SIX 
ZI Introduction 
As noted in Section 1.6.2, Kosslyn's theoretical model of hemispheric specialization 
has stimulated a great deal of ongoing research. The vast majority of this work, 
however, has addressed the issue of whether or not there are asymmetries in spatial 
relations at the perceptual level. Less attention has been paid to the claim that 
comparable laterality effects will prevail at the imaginal level. There are, of course, 
some single case studies of patients with unilateral brain damage which appear to 
provide evidence in support of this claim (Deleval, De Mol and Noterman, 1983; 
Grossi, Orsini, Modafferi and Liotti, 1986), but relatively few studies have addressed 
this issue using normal subjects and those that have are not without problems. 
For example, as noted previously, Kosslyn (1988) and Findlay, Ashton and 
MacFarland (1994) reported evidence consistent with the view that the LH is 
specialized for generating images from categorically stored information, whereas 
both hemispheres are equally adept at generating images from information which has 
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been globally stored. However, Kosslyn's findings were presented without detailed 
report of the procedures and analyses necessary for evaluation. Conversely, the 
study carried out by Findlay and his colleagues involved information input via the 
haptic modality, and it is a moot point whether representations derived tactually can 
be regarded as being identical to those stored in long-term visual memory (e. g. 
Farah, 1988). Overall, therefore, despite the fact that the proposed asymmetry in 
spatial relations forms the crux of KosslYn's theory regarding imaginal processes, the 
evidence in support of this view is less than robust. 
Given the above considerations and the doubts raised in the preceding chapter it 
was, therefore, decided to attempt to assess whether the proposed lateralization of 
categorical and coordinate spatial relations was evident at the image generational 
level. Prior to describing the current study, however, it might perhaps be helpful 
at this stage to reiterate the major points of Kosslyn's theoretical formulations. 
According to this model both hemispheres have access to stored descriptions in the 
brain detailing the component parts of objects, and both hemispheres can generate 
multipart images from these component parts. They differ, however, in terms of the 
type of spatial relations which are used to depict the relationships between the 
component parts. Specifically, the LH is thought to be specialized for categorical 
spatial relations which capture what is stable across instances that may differ in 
terms of metric units, thereby facilitating recognition of mutable objects. 
Conversely, the RH is thought to be specialized for coordinate spatial relations which 
specify the precise locations of the component parts in terms of metric units, and are 
thought to be important when recognition is contingent on precise spatial relations. 
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Kosslyn (e. g. 1987,1988) has argued strongly that letters of the alphabet, which 
obviously can come in many different fonts, will normally be represented 
categorically, thereby facilitating recognition of novel variants. Thus it follows that 
image generation letter classification tasks which require no evaluation of the precise 
spatial relations between the component parts of letters should be carried out most 
effectively by the LH. For letter classification tasks which do require such an 
evaluation, however, a RH superiority would be expected since in this instance 
coordinate images should be most effective. 
In order to test this hypothesis two imagery tasks were used. In the categorical task 
a lowercase letter was presented briefly in either the RVF or LVF and subjects were 
required to respond as to whether the uppercase version of this letter contained any 
curved segments or only had straight lines. In the coordinate task the procedure was 
exactly the same but the subjects were required to respond as to whether the 
uppercase version of the letter was symmetrical or asymmetrical along the vertical 
midline axis. In order to enable assessment of whether any observed asymmetries 
were specific to the image generation component, perceptual analogues of the two 
tasks, in which the subjects were presented directly with the uppercase versions of 
the letters, were also incorporated into the design. 
In line with Kosslyn's theoretical formulations it was hypothesized that performance 




Forty-eight subjects, 16 males and 32 females, took part in the experiment. They 
were all right-handed by self-report with normal or corrected to normal vision, and 
they were aged between 17 and 48 years of age (mean age 25.5 years, SD 8.98). 
Data from a further four subjects were not analyzed as detailed below. 
Z2.2 Apparatus 
The stimuli in this study were generated using the Micro Experimental Laboratory 
software package. Viewing distance was 55 cm from a chin-rest positioned in front 
of the screen. The visual angle subtended at the eye by the screen at this distance 
was 25.3* (24.5 cm) horizontally and 18.1* (17.5 cm) vertically. All other details for 
this section are identical to those reported in Chapter Two. 
7.2.3 Stimuli 
Twelve letters were selected for use in the categorical task. Six had uppercase 
versions containing only straight lines (E, F, H, N, T, A) and six had uppercase 
versions containing some curved lines (G, R, Q, B, J, U). For the coordinate task 
twelve letters were selected the uppercase versions of which were either symmetrical 
along the vertical midline axis (A, H, M, T, W, X) or asymmetrical (J, E, R, D, F, 
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G). 
Each letter was presented in black on a white background at a distance of P from 
the central fixation point along the horizontal meridian. The height of each letter 
was approximately I cm, and at a viewing distance of 55 cm each letter therefore 
subtended a visual angle of 1'. The fixation field consisted of a black cross located 
in the centre of the visual field on a white background. 
7.2.4 Procedure 
Vieming conditions, presentation of instructions, mode of response and 
counterbalancing of response hand and ringers were identical in all respects to the 
details reported in the first paragraph of the procedure section in Chapter Two. 
The trials were constructed as follows. Each subject carried out two blocks of trials 
corresponding to the imagery and perceptual conditions. The order of presentation 
of the two conditions was counterbalanced. Furthermore, within each block the 
order of two sub-blocks of trials corresponding to the categorical task and the 
coordinate task were also counterbalanced. At the beginning of each sub-block of 
trials the experimental instructions for the task were presented on the display screen 
for the subjects to read, and they were encouraged to ask the experimenter if they 
required any clarification. Within each sub-block eight practice trials were given 
prior to the commencement of forty-eight experimental trials. Each letter was 
presented on eight experimental trials, four in the imagery condition and four in the 
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perceptual condition. Within these four trials there were two LVF presentations and 
two RVF presentations. The order of both the practice and experimental trials was 
randomized. 
The procedure in the imagery-coordinate sub-block was as follows. At the beginning 
of each trial the fixation cross was presented, and this served as the cue for subjects 
to fixate centrally. 1500 ms after the onset of the fixation cross a lowercase letter 
was presented for 150 ms in either the RVF or LVF. Subjects were instructed to 
press the YES button if the uppercase version of this letter was symmetrical along 
the vertical midline axis. and the NO button if it was not. The procedure in the 
imagery-categorical sub-block was exactly the same as in the imagery-coordinate sub- 
block apart from the fact that subjects were instructed to press the YES button if 
the uppercase version of the letter contained any curved lines, and the NO button 
if it did not. In the perceptual condition the procedure differed only in so far as the 
uppercase versions of the letters were presented in place of the lowercase versions. 
(See Appendix VI for verbatim instructions to subjects). 
Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. If an 
incorrect response was made a warning tone was emitted and the words "Wrong 
Response" were visually displayed. As in previous studies, the importance of 
maintaining central fixation whenever the fixation cross was on the screen was 
stressed both in the initial instructions and throughout the trials themselves. At the 
end of the experiment the subjects were thanked and fully debriefed. Four subjects 
who responded correctly to less than 80% of the trials were excluded from the 
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analysis. Once again, however, these excluded subjects were replaced in order to 
ensure complete counterbalancing. 
Z3 Remlls 
Mean reaction times for correct responses and mean number correct for each subject 
comprised the data upon which the statistical analyses reported below were 
performed. Trials on which reaction times exceeded three seconds were treated as 
errors. These data, averaged across subjects, are presented in Tables 7.3.1 and 
7.3.2 with standard deviations. 
Table Z 3.1. Mean RTs fms) and number correct with standard deviafions in the 
.y condition, 
as a function of type of response for each visual field for the Imager 
cate--orical task and the coordinate task. 
IMAGERY - RVF LVF 
CATEGORICAL YES NO YES NO 
Mean RTs 794 815 817 810 
SD 280 246 281 254 
No. orr ct 11.04 10.31 11.21 10.77 
SD 1.25 1.96 1.03 1.70 
IMAGERY - RVF LVF 
COORDINATE YES NO YES NO 
Mean RTs 714 770 685 748 
SD 169 172 159 151 
No. orr ct 10.90 10.87 11.17 10.87 
SD 1.64 1.42 1.43 1.79 
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Table Z3.2. Mean RTs (Ms) and number correct )alh standard deviadons in the 
Perceptual condidon, as a funcdon of type of response for each visual field for the 
catezorical task and the coordinate task. 
PERCEPMAL - RVF LVF 
CATEGORICAL YES NO YES NO 
Mean RTs 505 515 507 528 
SD 149 158 175 158 
No. orr et 11.31 11.40 11.08 11.27 
SD 0.90 0.84 1.05 1.09 
PERCEPTUAL- RVF LVF 
COORDINATE YES NO YES NO 
Mean RTs 521 567 536 586 
SD 133 137 126 158 
No. orr ct 11.27 10.98 11.33 11.02 
SD 0.96 1.06 1 1.02 1 1.21 
Reacdon 7Ymes 
Initially data were analyzed using a four-way repeated measures ANOVA, with 
condition (imagery vs. perceptual), visual field (RVF vs. LVF), type of task 
(categorical vs. coordinate) and type of response (positive vs. negative) as factors. 
A significant main effect was found for condition M1,47) = 186.35, p <. 001), with 
subjects producing significantly longer RTs in the imagery condition (mean RT 
769 ms) than in the perceptual condition (mean RT 533 ms). In addition a 
significant main effect was found for type of response (F(1,47) = 18.10, p<. 00 1), 
with subjects producing significantly faster responses on positive trials (mean RT 
634 ms) than on negative trials (mean RT 667 ms). 
A significant interaction was obtained between condition and type of task, F(1,47) 
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15.01, p <. 001. (See Figure 7.3.1 for 
Figure Z 3.1. Graphical illustration of the 
significant interaction between condition 
and type of task. 
grapnicai inustrationi. ine mean imis 
in the imagery condition for the 
categorical task and the coordinate task 
were 809 ms and 729 ms respectively, 
whereas in the perceptual condition the 
mean RTs for the categorical task and 
the coordinate task were 513 ms and 






analYsis, mith the criterion value for 
statistical significance set at .0 125, revealed that the RTs for the categorical task and 
the coordinate task in the imagery condition differed significantly (F(1,47) = 9.69, 
p< . 005), whereas those 
in the Perceptual condition did not. 
A significant interaction was also Figure Z3.2. Graphical illustration of the 
significant interaction between type of task 
obtained between type of task and tYPe and type of response. 
of response, F(1,47) = 10.16, p< . 005. 
(See Figure 7.3.2 for graphical 
illustration). The mean RTs on the 
coordinate task for positive and negative 
response were 614 ms and 667 ms 
respectively, whereas on the categorical 
task the mean RTs for positive and 
negative responses were 655 ms and 667 
7001 






ms respectively. Simple effects analysis, with the criteriOn value for statistical 
significance set at . 0125, revealed that only the 
RTS for positive and negative 
responses on the coordinate task differed significantly 01,47) = 29.29, p< . 001). 
No other main effects or interactions reached significance. 
Accuracy 
Initially data were analyzed using a four-way repeated measures ANOVA, with 
condition (imagery vs. perceptual), visual field (RVF vs. LVF), type of task 
(categorical vs. coordinate) and type of response (positive vs. negative) as factors. 
A significant main effect was found for condition, F(1,47) = 5.91, p <. 025, with 
subjects responding significantly more accurately in the perceptual condition (mean 
no. correct 11.20) than in the imagery condition (mean no. correct 10.89). In 
addition a significant main effect was found for type of response, F0,47) = 4.90, 
p< . 05, with subjects responding significantly more accurately on positive responses 
(mean no. correct 11.16) than on negative responses (mean no. correct 10.93). 
A significant interaction was obtained between condition and visual field, F(1,47) = 
4.84, p< . 05. 
(See Figure 7.3.3 for graphical illustration). The mean no. correct on 
RVF presentations in the imagery and perceptual condition were 10.78 and 11.24 
respectively, whereas for LVF presentations in the imagery and perceptual conditions 
the mean no. correct were 11.00 and 11.17 respectively. Simple effect analysis, with 
216 
the criterion value for statistical 
Figure Z3.3. Graphical illustration of the 
significant interaction between condition 
significance set at . 0125, revealed that 
and visualfield. 
F-- I 
only the mean no. correct for the 
imagery and perceptual conditions on 
RVF presentations differed significantly 
(F(1,47) = 11.11, p<. 01. 
Finally, a significant interaction was 
also obtained between condition. type of 
task and type of response, (F(1,47) = 
9.27, p <. 01. (See Figure 7.3.4 for graphical illustration). The mean no. correct in 
the imagery condition for the categorical task were It. 12 for positive responses and 
10.54 for negative responses, whereas 
for the coordinate task the mean no. Figure Z 3.4. Graphical illustration of the 
signijicant interaction between condition, 
correct were 11.03 for positive type of task and type of response. 
responses and 10.87 for negative 
responses. In the perceptual condition 
the mean no. correct for the categorical 
task were 11.19 for positive responses 
and 11.33 for negative responses, 
whereas for the coordinate task the 
mean no. correct were 11.30 for positive 
responses and 11.00 for negative 






the criterion value for statistical significance set at . 0125, revealed that only the 
mean no. correct for positive and negative responses on the categorical task in the 
imagery condition differed significantly, F(1,47) = 6.55, p <. 0125. 
No other main effects or interactions reached significance. 
Z4 Discussion 
Initial analyses of the data revealed that mean reaction times and number of errors 
were significantly greater for the imagery condition than for the perceptual 
condition, as would be expected on the basis of task difficulty. Furthermore, the 
reaction time and accuracy data also revealed a significant main effect for type of 
trial, mith subjects responding faster and more accurately on positive trials than on 
negative. As regards interactions, the reaction time data revealed that the 
coordinate task and the categorical task differed significantly as a function of both 
condition and type of trial. Moreover, with respect to the accuracy data, a 
significant interaction was revealed between condition, type of task and type of trial. 
Of most interest, however, was the significant interaction obtained on the accuracy 
data which indicated that responses in the imagery condition and the perceptual 
condition differed as a function of visual field. 
Further analysis of this latter interaction revealed that whilst there was no difference 
in accuracy on LVF presentations between the imagery and perceptual conditions, 
subjects responded significantly more accuratelY on RVF presentations in the 
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perceptual condition than in the imagery condition. The tasks in the perceptual 
condition required all of the cognitive processing components required by the tasks 
in the imagery condition, apart from image generation. Thus, given that the 
observed effect cannot be attributed to differences in cognitive processing 
components which are involved in both conditions, it would appear that the 
decrement in LH performance in the imagery condition is associated with the 
introduction of the image generation processing component. 
It is important to stress, however, that demonstrating that the LH is less adept at 
performing the imagery tasks than the perceptual tasks is not evidence of a RH 
specialization for image generational processes. In order to demonstrate RH 
superiority it would be necessary to show that the RH performed better than the LH 
in the imagery condition, and no such evidence was obtained. Nevertheless, it is still 
noteworthy that the introduction of the image generation processing component had 
a deleterious effect on LH performance but not on RH performance. Moreover, 
what is perhaps of more interest, is that this visual field effect prevailed irrespective 
of the type of task being performed. Thus, contrary to Kosslyn's claims there would 
appear to be no evidence in support of the view that the two cerebral hemispheres 
are specialized for the generation of different types of visual images. 
However, whilst type of task did not interact significantly with visual field it was 
found to vary as a function of other factors in the analysis. With respect to the 
reaction time data, for instance, it was found that type of task interacted 
significantly with condition. Although no difference was found between the two 
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tasks in the perceptual condition, subjects responded significantly faster on the 
coordinate task than on the categorical task in the imagery condition. It is not clear 
why this effect prevailed. It may, for instance, simply be more difficult to generate 
the type of representations utilized in categorical judgements than in coordinate 
judgements. Alternatively it may reflect the fact that the type of information 
required in order to perform a coordinate evaluation is more readily accessed from 
an imaginal representation than the type of information required to perform a 
categorical evaluation. Irrespective of which, if either, of these two accounts is 
correct, however, the important point to stress is that there was no evidence to 
suggest that the two hemispheres were differentially influenced by these factors. 
Similar considerations apply to the remaining two significant interactions revealed 
by the analysis. It was found, for instance, that type of task interacted significantly 
with type of trial. Although no difference was found between positive and negative 
responses for the categorical task, subjects responded significantly faster on positive 
trials than on negative trials on the coordinate task. Similarly, the accuracy data 
revealed that subjects were significantly less accurate on negative trials than on 
positive trials on the categorical task. In this instance, however, the effect was 
confined to the imagery condition since no difference was found between the positive 
and negative responses for perceptual-categorical, perceptual -coordinate or imagery- 
coordinate trials. Unfortunately it is not clear why these effects prevailed. No 
simple interpretation suggests itself and it is questionable whether lengthy 
speculations regarding possible explanations for this pattern of results would 
contribute anything meaningful to the discussion. Suffice to say, therefore, that once 
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again there was no evidence to suggest that the two hemispheres were differentially 
influenced by these factors. 
To summarize, it would appear that there is no evidence to support the view that the 
two cerebral hemispheres are differentially specialized for the generation of different 
types of visual images. Indeed the findings appear to indicate that, irrespective of 
the type of task being performed, LH performance was adversely affected by the 
introduction of the image generation processing component whereas RH performance 
was not. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, this finding cannot be regarded as evidence 
in support of the view of a RH specialization for image generation. Moreover, given 
the labile nature of the results of divided visual field studies, it is perhaps 





8. EXPERIMENT SEVEN 
8.1 Introducdon 
The previous study failed to provide any evidence consistent with Kosslyn's claims 
regarding asymmetries in spatial relations at the image generational level. 
Nevertheless, it should perhaps be noted in this respect that the studies which have 
focused on asymmetries in spatial relations at the perceptual level have only really 
provided support for the claim that the RH is specialized for coordinate 
representations (see Section 1.6.2). The situation with regard to a LH specialization 
for categorical representations, however, is somewhat more equivocal, and Kosslyn 
and his colleagues have argued that this is because the LH effect is sufficiently small 
to only be detectable over a number of experiments (Kosslyn, Chabris, Marsolek and 
Koenig, 1992). 
Moreover, the studies which have demonstrated a RH effect have used experimental 
paradigms in which subjects are required to make metric judgements. Forexample, 
in one of the studies reported by Kosslyn, Koenig, Barrett, Cave, Tang and Gabrieli 
0 989) subjects were required to make a categorical judgement by deciding whether 
a dot was above or below a line, and a metric distance judgement in which they had 
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to decide whether the dot was less than or more than 3 mm from the line. The 
results revealed a RH advantage on the coordinate task, and, as detailed previously, 
this effect has been replicated in a number of other studies. 
The above suggests, therefore, that perhaps evidence which is consistent with 
Kosslyn's claims will be more readily available from image generational tasks which 
require metric judgements. In this respect, a study carried out by Grossi and his 
colleagues with a patient (AP) who had a left occipital lesion would appear to be of 
relevance (Grossi, Modafferi, Pelosi and Trojano, 1989). AP was required to 
imagine what two times presented verbally would look like on a pair of clock faces, 
and then judge which of the times had the larger angle between the hands. In 
addition, AP carried out a perceptual control task in which he was presented directly 
with pairs of clock faces and again had to judge in which of these stimuli the hands 
formed the larger angle. The results revealed that although he performed well on 
the control task, on the imagery task his performance was below chance level, and 
this was interpreted as evidence in support of a LH specialization for image 
generation. However, given that simply being asked to indicate which of two angles 
is the larger can be construed as a categorical judgement, it could be argued that the 
findings support Kosslyn's claims that the LH is specialized for the generation of 
categorical images. Furthermore, if this argument is valid then it also follows that 
if the task was modified so that it required a metric rather than a categorical 
judgement then a RH advantage would be predicted. 
In order to test this hypothesis a modified version of the clock test was employed. 
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In the imagery condition subjects were presented briefly with a time in digital form 
in either the RVF or LVF, and were required to judge whether the angle formed by 
the hands of a clock at this time was greater than or less than 90'. The perceptual 
condition differed only in so far as that a schematic clock face was presented in place 
of the digital time. 
There were two initial hypotheses. First, as a metric judgement is required on both 
the imaginal and the perceptual task, it was hypothesized that a RH advantage 
would prevail overall. Second, performance on the imagery and perceptual tasks 
would be expected to vary as a function of visual field, since if the RH is specialized 
for the generation of coordinate images then the LH should be more adversely 




Forty subjects, 21 males and 19 females, took part in the experiment. They were 
all right-handed by self-report with normal or corrected to normal vision, and they 
were aged between 18 and 42 years of age (mean age 25.2 years, SD 5.86). Data 
from a further rive subjects were not analyzed as detailed below. 
224 
8.2.2 Apparatus 
Details for this section are identical to those reported in Chapter Seven, with the 
exception that in the current study reaction times which exceeded four seconds were 
treated as errors. 
8.2.3 Stimuli 
In the imagery condition subjects were presented at the beginning of each trial with 
a fixation field which consisted of a black cross in the centre of the screen on a white 
background. Subsequently a time was presented briefly in digital form in either the 
RVF or LVF. All of the numbers comprising the time were presented in black and 
were positioned approximately 3 cm to the right or left of the fixation cross. This 
corresponds at a viewing distance of 55 cm to a visual angle of 3". The height of 
each number was approximately I cm 
The digital times involved only three positions of the hour hand, namely 3,6 and 9. 
The minutes were always multiples of 5 and on trials in which the angle formed by 
the hands was less than 90" were located either 5 or 10 minutes clockwise or 
counter-clock, %ise from the location of the hour hand. On trials in which the angle 
formed by the hands was greater than 90* the minutes were located either 20 or 25 
minutes clockwise or counter-clockwise from the location of the hour hand. All of 
the times, therefore, involved only three digits, -Aith the hour digit separated from 
the minute digits by a full stop. Each time was approximately 2.3 cm in width, 
subtending a visual angle of 2.5". 
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In the perceptual condition subjects Figure 8.2.3.1. Graphical illustration of 
the schematic clock face used in the 
were again presented at the beginning perceptual condition. (Not drawn to scale). 
of each trial with the fixation field, but 
subsequently a schematic clock face was 
presented briefly in either the RVF or 
LVF. This was positioned 
approximately 3 cm (3*) to the right or 
left of the fixation cross and was 3 cm 
(31') in diameter. The hour hand was 
10 mm in length whereas the minute 
hand was 14 mm in length. These distances correspond to visual angles of V and 
respectively. (See Figure 8.2.3.1 for graphical illustration of the clock face). 
The times presented in analogue form were precisely the same as those presented in 
digital form. 
8.2.4 Procedure 
Viewing conditions, presentation of instructions, mode of response and 
counterbalancing of response hand and ringers were identical in all respects to the 
details reported in the first paragraph of the procedure section in Chapter Two. 
Each subject carried out both the perceptual and imagery conditions, the order of 
which were counterbalanced. At the beginning of each condition the experimental 
instructions for the task were presented on the display screen for the subjects to 
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read, and they were encouraged to ask the experimenter if they required any 
clarification. Within each condition 12 practice trials were given prior to the 
commencement of 48 experimental trials. The order of both the practice and 
experimental trials was randomized. 
The procedure in the imagery condition was as follows. At the beginning of each 
trial the fixation cross was presented, and this served as the cue for subjects to fixate 
centrally. 2000 ms after the onset of the fixation cross a time was presented in 
digital form for 167 ms in either the RVF or LVF. Subjects were instructed to press 
the YES button if the angle formed by the hands of a clock at this time was greater 
than 90', and the NO button if it was less than 90'. In the perceptual condition the 
procedure differed only in so far as the schematic clock face was presented in place 
of the digital time. (See Appendix VII for verbatim instructions to subjects). 
Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. If an 
incorrect response was made a warning tone was emitted and the words "Wrong 
Response" were visually displayed. As in previous studies, the importance of 
maintaining central fixation was stressed both in the initial instructions and 
throughout the trials themselves. At the end of the experiment the subjects were 
debriefed and questioned concerning the strategies that they had employed in the 
imagery condition. Five subjects who responded correctly to less than 70% of the 
trials were excluded from the analysis. Once again, however, these excluded subjects 
were replaced in order to ensure complete counterbalancing. 
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8.3 Results 
Mean reaction times for correct responses and number correct for each subject 
comprised the data upon which the statistical analyses reported below were 
performed. Trials on which reaction times exceeded four seconds were treated as 
errors. These data, averaged across subjects, are presented in Table 8.3.1 m6th 
standard deviations. 
Table 8.3.1. Mean RTs fms) and number corTect with standard deviations as a 
function of type of response for each visual field for the imagery and perceptual 
condidons. (GT = Greater Than and LT = Less Tkan). 
IMAGERY RVF LVF 
CONDITION GT LT GT LT 
Mean RTs 3657 3636 3638 3569 
SD 312 343 359 303 
No. orr ct 8.07 8.40 8.17 8.07 
SD 1 2.54 2.35 1 2.80 2.37 
PERCEPMAL RVF LVF 
CONDITION GT LT GT LT 
Mean RTs 2892 2862 2900 2846 
SD 208 177 281 146 
No. orrect 11.37 11.45 11.30 11.55 
SD 1.03 0.74 0.99 0.71 
Re"don 7Ymes 
Data were analyzed using a three-way repeated measures ANOVA, with condition 
(imagery vs. perceptual), visual field (RVF vs. LVF) and type of response (greater 
than vs. less than) as factors. A significant main effect was found for condition, 
F(1,39) = 232.66, p< . 001, with subjects responding significantly faster in the 
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perceptual condition (mean RT 2875 ms) than in the imagery condition (mean RT 
3625 ms). A significant main effect was also found for visual field, F(1,39) = 5.28, 
p<. 05, with subjects responding significantly faster in the LVF (mean RT 3238 ms) 
than in the RVF (mean RT 3261 ms). Finally, a significant main effect was found 
for type of response, F(1,39) = 6.48, p <. 025, with subjects producing significantly 
longer latencies on "greater than" responses (mean RT 3271 ms) than on "less than" 
responses (mean RT 3250 ms). 
No interactions reached significance. 
Accuracy 
Data were analyzed using a three-way repeated measures ANOVA, with condition 
(imagery vs. perceptual), visual field (RVF vs. LVF) and type of response (greater 
than vs. less than) as factors. A significant main effect was found for condition, 
F(1,39) = 96.26, p <. 001, with subjects responding significantly more accurately in 
the perceptual condition (mean no. correct 11.41) than in the imagery condition 
(mean no. correct 8.17). 
No other main effects or interactions reached significance. 
8.4 Discussion 
Analyses of the data revealed that mean reaction times and number of errors were 
significantly greater for the imagery condition than for the perceptual condition, as 
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would be expected on the basis of task difficulty. Furthermore, the reaction time 
data also revealed a significant main effect for type of response, with subjects 
producing significantly longer latencies on "greater than" responses than on "less 
than" responses. Of most interest, however, was the significant main effect for 
visual field which revealed that, as predicted, subjects responded significantly faster 
on LVF presentations than on RVF presentations. This result, therefore, replicates 
the findings of previous studies, and provides further support for the view that the 
RH is specialized for tasks involving metric judgements. Nevertheless, the absence 
of a significant interaction between condition and visual field appears to demonstrate 
that the RH is not specialized for the generation of coordinate images. 
Before drawing any firm conclusions, however, it is important to consider possible 
alternative explanations for these results. One potential problem, for example, is the 
possibility that the subjects did not use images on which to make the required 
judgement in the imagery condition, but some alternative strategy. This seems 
unlikely, however, given that all but one of the subjects reported that they had used 
images. Moreover. the subject who did use an alternative strategy was one of those 
whose data had to be excluded from the analysis because of unacceptably high error 
rates. Another possible problem is that the imagery task involves several additional 
steps prior to the image generational stage, and it could be argued that asymmetries 
on these additional aspects may have obscured the asymmetry associated Nvith the 
image generation component. Such an argument is difficult to refute unequivocally, 
but it is perhaps relevant to note in this respect that the preceding study also failed 
to provide evidence in support of the claim that asymmetries in spatial relations exist 
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at the image generational level. 
Thus, given the consistency of the findings overall, it would seem that the most 
parsimonious conclusion to dram, is that the RH is not specialized for the generation 
of coordinate images. There does, however, appear to be support for the view that 
the RH is specialized for tasks involving metric judgements. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that there would appear to be at least two alternative explanations 
as to why this effect prevailed. First, in accordance with Kosslyn's model, it could 
be argued that while there is no support for the view that the two hemispheres are 
differentially specialized for the generation of coordinate images, the RH advantage 
indicates that coordinate representations containing the requisite information were 
used at both the perceptual and imaginal level. Alternatively, it could be argued 
that there is in fact no difference between the hemispheres at the representational 
level, rather the pattern of results simply reflects a RH specialization for the 
extraction of metric information from both imaginal and perceptual representations. 
It would appear, therefore, that it is perhaps appropriate to carry out one final 
study in order to attempt to discriminate between these two alternative accounts. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
9. EXPERINWNT EIGHT 
9.1 Introducdon 
The studies reported in the preceding two chapters failed to provide any evidence 
consistent with Kosslyn's claims regarding asymmetries in spatial relations at the 
image generational level. Nevertheless, the LVF advantage reported in Chapter 
Eight indicates that the RH is specialized for tasks involving metric judgements, and 
this could perhaps also be regarded as evidence in support of the view that the RH 
is specialized for the representation of coordinate information. Conversely, the 
finding may simply reflect a RH specialization for the extraction of metric 
information from any form of representation. 
In this respect, a way of evaluating whether or not the asymmetry exists at the 
representational level is suggested by an experimental paradigm which has been 
utilized by Farah in a series of studies (Farah, 1985,1986; Farah, Peronnet, Gonon 
and Giard, 1988). It has been demonstrated on a number of occasions that a visual 
image can facilitate visual discrimination of a perceptual stimulus (e. g. Peterson and 
Graham, 1974). Furthermore, and perhaps more interestingly, the facilitation is 
content-specific, in that a matching image leads to better discrimination of the 
perceptual stimulus than a non-matching image (Farah, 1985. ). According to Farah, 
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this interaction between imagery and perception suggests a common locus of activity, 
and the content-specific nature of the interaction implies that the common locus 
consists of representational structures. Evidence in support of this view was 
provided by a study carried out by Farah, Peronnet, Gonon and Giard (1988). They 
used precisely the same task as Farah (1985) while recording ERP's to stimuli, and 
the results indicated that imagery had a content-specific effect on the visual evoked 
potential which was maximal at the occipital recording sites. The authors concluded, 
therefore, that the findings supported the claim that image-mediated facilitation 
occurs because visual imagery activates the same representational structures as visual 
perception. 
Farah (1986) also employed this basic paradigm in an experiment designed to test 
the laterality of image generation. In this study subjects performed a lateralized 
tachistoscopic discrimination task, in which they had to decide whether the presented 
stimulus was or was not a pre-designated target, under two conditions. In the 
imagery condition they were presented centrally with one of the target stimuli at the 
beginning of each trial and instructed to retain the stimulus in the form of an image 
in a precued visual field. A lateralized stimulus was then presented briefly in the 
designated visual field and subjects had to decide whether it was a target stimulus 
or not. The baseline condition was identical to the imagery condition apart from the 
fact that no target was presented at the beginning of each trial. 
The results revealed a RVF advantage in the imagery condition when the image and 
the stimulus were similar, and Farah interpreted this as evidence of LH 
233 
specialization for image generation. However, as noted previously, this inference 
was challenged by Sergent (1989) who observed that the design of this study was 
inappropriate to test image generation as the representation of the mental image was 
dependent on sensory stimulation rather than on activation of stored information in 
long-term memory. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the validity of the inferences 
drawn by Farah, the basic experimental paradigm does suggest a way of evaluating 
Kosslyn's claims. 
The above evidence appears to demonstrate that the greater the visual similarity 
between the image and the percept, the greater the effect of image-mediated 
facilitation. According to Kosslyn's formulations, however, the LH is specialized for 
categorical representations which capture what is stable across instances that may 
differ in terms of metric units. Therefore, as noted in Chapter Seven, such 
representations will facilitate recognition of letters of the alphabet depicted in various 
fonts. Consequently, it follows that if the image and percept represent different 
forms of the same stimulus the facilitating effect on RVF presentations should be as 
great as when the image and the percept represent the same form, since the same 
representational structure should be activated in both instances. On the other hand, 
the RH is specialized for coordinate representations which specify the precise 
locations of the component parts of an object. The facilitating effect on LVF 
presentations, therefore, should be greater when there is a perfect match between 
the image and the percept. 
In order to test this hypothesis a modified version of the task employed by Farah 
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(1986) was utilized. Two target letters and four non-target letters were used in the 
study. Non-target letters were selected on the basis of their visual similarity to one 
of the two target letters in order to reduce the confounding effect of visual 
dissimilarity between different letters on non-target trials. In the imagery condition 
one of the target letters was presented centrally at the beginning of each trial and 
subjects were required to retain the letter in the form of an image in a precued 
visual field. Subsequently a letter was presented briefly in either the RVF or LVF 
and subjects had to decide whether it was a target letter or a non-target letter. 
Visual similarity was manipulated by presenting the lateralized letter in different 
fonts. On half of the trials the lateralized letter was depicted in precisely the same 
font as the target letter, whereas on the remaining trials it was drawn in italic. The 
baseline condition was identical to the imagery condition, apart from the fact that 
no target letter was presented at the beginning of each trial. 
The initial hypotheses of the experiment were: i) that the presence of an image would 
facilitate visual discrimination between targets and non-targets and ii) that in the 
imagery condition RH performance would be more adversely affected by image- 
percept font disparity than the LH. 
9.2 Method 
9.2.1 Subjects 
Forty subjects, 18 males and 22 females, took part in the experiment. They were 
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all right-handed by self-report with normal or corrected to normal vision, and they 
were aged between 19 and 51 years of age (mean age 27.5 years, SD 8.08). Data 
from a further two subjects were not analyzed as detailed below. 
9.2.2 Apparatus 
Details for this section are identical to those reported in Chapter Seven. 
9.2.3 Stimuli 
The letters B and E were selected as the two target stimuli. The non-target stimuli 
were P, R, F and L. All of the letters were presented in black on a white 
background and in uppercase. The height of each letter was approximately I cm, 
and at a vieming distance of 53 cm each letter therefore subtended a visual angle of 
o, 
In the imagery condition subjects were presented at the beginning of each trial with 
one of the target letters positioned I em W) above a black fixation cross in the 
centre of the screen. A thin black line, which served as the cue for the position of 
the upcoming stimulus, was also presented. This was positioned 3 cm (P. ) to the 
right or left of the fixation cross. This display was presented until the subjects 
pressed the space bar, at which point the target letter and the position cue 
disappeared. Subsequently a lateralized letter stimulus was presented briefly in the 
designated visual field followed by a solid black mask 2 cm x2 cm (2* x 2). This 
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sequence of events is graphically illustrated in Figure 9.2.3.1. 
FIgure 9.2.3.1. Illustration of the sequence of stimulus presentation on each trial in 
the imagery condition. (N. B. not drawn to scale). 
E 
+ + 
The trials in the imagery condition were constructed as follows. Each target letter 
was presented centrally on 64 trials. On half of these trials the lateralized stimulus 
was presented in the RVF and half in the LVF. Furthermore, within each visual 
field the lateralized letter stimulus was presented in the same font as the target letter 
on half of the trials, whereas on the remaining trials the lateralized letter stimulus 
was presented in italic. Finally, within each visual field and type of font the 
lateralized stimulus was the same letter as the target stimulus on half of the trials, 
whereas on the remaining trials it was a non-target. On non-target trials the 
centrally presented target stimulus B was always paired with the non-target 
lateralized stimuli P and R, and the target stimulus E was always paired with the 
non-target lateralized stimuli F and L. 
The sequence of events and the construction of the trials in the baseline condition 
were identical to those described for the imagery condition, apart from the fact that 
a target letter was not displayed centrally at the beginning of each trial. 
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9.2.4 Procedure 
Viewing conditions, presentation of instructions, mode of response and 
counterbalancing of response hand and ringers were identical in all respects to the 
details reported in the first paragraph of the procedure section in Chapter Two. 
Each subject carried out both the baseline and imagery conditions. In order to 
control for possible carry-over effects, however, the order of the two conditions was 
not counterbalanced. Rather every subject ran the baseline condition first and the 
imagery condition second, At the beginning of each condition the experimental 
instructions from the task were presented on the display screen for the subjects to 
read, and they were encouraged to ask the experimenter if they required any 
clarification. Within each condition, 24 practice trials were given prior to the 
commencement of 128 experimental trials. The order of both the practice and 
experimental trials were randomized. 
The procedure in the baseline condition was as follows. At the beginning of each 
trial the fixation cross and position cue were presented, and subjects were instructed 
to stare directly at the cross while directing their attention to the side indicated by 
the position cue. Once they had achieved central fixation and prepared to see a 
stimulus in the designated visual field they were instructed to press the space bar. 
At this point the position cue disappeared and the fixation cross was displayed for 
an additional 1250 ms. A lateralized letter stimulus was then displayed for 50 ms 
in either the RVF or LVF,, followed by a solid black mask which was presented for 
500 ms. Subjects were instructed to press the YES button if the letter was a target 
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stimulus and the NO button if it was not. In the imagery condition the procedure 
differed only in so far as that at the beginning of each trial one of the target letters 
was also presented centrally, and subjects were instructed to retain an image of the 
letter exactly as it appeared on the screen at the position of the upcoming stimulus. 
(See Appendix VIII for verbatim instructions to subjects). 
Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. If an 
incorrect response was made a warning tone was emitted and the words "Wrong 
Response" were visually displayed. As in previous studies, the importance of 
maintaining central fixation was stressed both in the initial instructions and 
throughout the trials themselves. At the end of the experiment the subjects were 
thanked and fully debriefed. Two subjects who responded correctly to less than 80% 
of the trials were excluded from the analysis. Once again, however, these excluded 
subjects were replaced in order to ensure complete counterbalancing. 
9.3 Results 
Mean reaction times for correct responses and number correct for each subject 
comprised the data upon which the statistical analyses reported below were 
performed. Trials on which reaction times exceeded three seconds were treated as 
errors. These data, averaged across subjects, are presented in Table 9.3.1 and 9.3.2 
with standard deviations. (Please note that the terms "same font" and "different 
font" refer to the similarity of image to percept in the imagery condition and to the 
identical partitioning of trials in the baseline condition). 
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Table 9.3.1. Mean RTs (ms) and number correct with standard deviations in the 
baseline condition, as afunction of type of responsefor each visualfieldforsamefont 
and dolerentfont trials. 
BASELINE - RVF LVF 
SAME FONT YES NO YES NO 
Mean RTs 1878 1899 1891 1897 
SD 142 117 147 118 
No. orr ct 14.76 15.05 14.23 15.05 
SD 1 1.32 1.13 1 1.55 1.24 
BASELINE - RVF LVF 
DIFFERENT FONT YES7 NO YES NO 
Mean RTs 1898 1917 1896 1906 
SD 140 137 158 128 
No. orrect 14.05 1 15.10 1 15.02 1 14.80 
SD 2.11 1.15 1 1.60 
Table 9.3. Z Mean RTs (hu) and number correct mith standard deviations in the 
imagery condition, as afuncdon of type of responsefor each vivualfieldfor samefont 
and do'erentfont trials. 
IMAGERY - RVF LVF 
SAME FONT YES NO YES NO 
Mean RTs 1812 1863 1825 1858 
SD 176 144 176 152 
No. orrect 15.10 15.35 14.46 15.40 
SD 1 0.98 0.73 1 1.68 0.81 
IMAGERY - RVF 
- 
LVF 
DIFFERENT FONT YES 
TNO 
YES NO 
Mean RTs 1850 1855 1845 1863 
SD 175 148 168 153 
No. orr ct 14.1 0 15.37 14.80 15.22 
SD 2.03 0.77 1.09 1.02 
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Reaction 71mes 
Initially data were analyzed using a four-way repeated measures ANOVA, with 
condition (baseline vs. imagery), visual field (RVF vs. LVF), similarity (same font 
vs. different font) and type of response (positive vs. negative) as factors. A 
significant main effect was found for condition 01,39) = 10.22, p<. 01), with 
subjects responding significantly faster in the imagery condition (mean RT 1846 ms) 
than in the baseline condition (mean RT 1897 ms). A significant main effect was 
also obtained for similarity M1,39) = 8.20, p<. 01), with subjects producing 
significantly longer RTs in the different font condition (mean RT 1878 ms) than in 
the same font condition (mean RT 1865 ms). Finally a significant main effect was 
found for type of response 01,39) = 6.88, p<. 025), with subjects responding 
significantly faster on positive responses (mean RT 1861 ms) than on negative 
responses (mean RT 1882 ms). 
A significant interaction was also Figure9.3.1. Graphical illustration of the 
interaction between similarity and type of 
obtained between similarity and type of response. 
response (F(1,39) = 5.39, p <. 05). (See 
Figure 9.3.1 for graphical illustration). 
The mean RTs for positive responses in 
the same font condition and different 
font condition were 1851 ms and 1872 
ms respectively, whereas for negative 
responses the mean RTs in the same 












condition were 1879 ms and 1885 ms respectively. Simple effects analysis, with the 
criterion value for statistical significance set at . 0125, revealed that the RTs for 
positive responses in the same font and different font conditions differed significantly 
01,39) = 11.81, p< . 01), whereas those for negative responses did not. 
Finally, a significant interaction was Figure 9.3.2. Graphical illustration of the 
interaction between condition, similarity 
obtained between condition, similarity and type of response. 
and type of response, F(1,39) = 4.49, 
p<. 05. (See Figure 9.3.2 for graphical 
illustration). The mean RTs in the 
baseline condition for same font trials 
were 1884 ms for positive responses and 
1898 ms for negative responses, whereas 
for different font trials the mean RTs 
were 1897 ms for positive responses and 
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1911 ms for negative responses. In the imagery condition the mean RTs for same 
font trials were 1818 ms for positive responses and 1860 ms for negative responses, 
whereas for different font trials the mean RTs were 1847 ms for positive responses 
and 1854 ms for negative responses. Simple effects analysis, Nvith the criterion value 
for statistical significance set at . 0125, revealed that only the positive and negative 
responses on same font trials in the imagery condition differed significantly, F0,39) 
= 14.82, p<. 00 1. 
No other main effects or interactions reached significance. 
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Accuracy 
Initially data were analyzed using a four-way repeated measures ANOVA, with 
condition (baseline vs. imagery), visual field (RVF vs. LVF), similarity (same font 
vs. different font) and type of response (positive vs. negative) as factors. A 
significant main effect was found for type of response 01,39) = 21.50, p <. 001), 
with subjects responding significantly more accurately on positive responses (mean 
no. correct 15.16) than on negative responses (mean no. correct 14.56). 
marginally significant main effect was also obtained for condition M1,30) = 3.86, 
p <. 06), with subjects responding less accurately in the baseline condition (mean no. 
correct 14.75) than in the imagery condition (mean no. correct 14.97). 
A significant interaction was also Figure 9.3.3. Graphical illustration of the 
interaction between similarity and visual 
obtained between visual field and flem. 
similarity, F(1,39) = 13.60, p <. Ol. 
(See Figure 9.3.3 for graphical 
illustration). The mean no. correct on 
RVF presentations for same font and 
different font trials were 15.06 and 
14.65 respectively, whereas for LVF 
presentations the mean no. correct for 











14.78 and 14.96 respectively. Simple effects analysis, Nvith the criterion value for 
statistical significance set at . 0125, revealed that the same font and different font 
trials differed significantly on RVF presentations (F(1,39) = 9.16, p <. 01), whereas 
'IAI 
there was no difference on LVF presentations. 
Finally, a significant interaction was Figure 9.3.4. Graphical illustration of the 
interaction between visualfield, similarity 
obtained between visual field, similarity and One of response. 
and type of response, F(1,39) = 22.09, 
p <. 001. (See Figure 9.3.4 for 
graphical illustration). The mean no. 
correct in the same font condition for 
positive responses were 14.34 in the 
LVF and 14.93 in the RVF, whereas for 
negative responses the mean no. correct 
were 15.22 in the LVF and 15.20 in the 
RVF. In the different font condition 

















the mean no. correct for positive 
responses were 14.91 in the LVF and 14.07 in the RVF, whereas for negative 
responses the mean no. correct were 15.01 in the LVF and 15.23 in the RVF. 
Simple effects analysis, mith the criterion value for statistical significance set at 
. 0125, revealed that the visual fields differed significantly on positive trials in both 
the same font condition (F(1,39) = 11.67, p <. Ol) and the different font condition 
(F(l, 39) = 10.8 1, p<. 0 1). There was, however, no difference on negative responses. 
No other main effects or interactions reached significance. 
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9.4 Discussion 
Initial analyses of the data revealed that mean reaction times were significantly 
greater for the baseline condition than for the imagery condition. Similarly, a 
marginally significant main effect on the accuracy data revealed that subjects also 
responded more accurately in the imagery condition than in the baseline condition. 
Thus it would appear that, as predicted, the presence of an image facilitated 
discrimination between targets and non-targets. Furthermore, a significant main 
effect on the reaction time data indicated that responses to same font trials were 
significantly faster than responses to different font trials. Moreover, both mean 
reaction times and mean number of errors were found to be significantly greater for 
negative responses than positive responses. These main effects, however, were 
modified by a number of significant interactions, the results of which appear to 
demonstrate content-specific image-mediated facilitation. 
As regards the reaction time data, for instance, a significant interaction was obtained 
between similarity and type of response, with subjects responding significantly faster 
on positive responses in the same font condition than in the different font condition. 
The negative responses, however, did not differ. Moreover, this effect was further 
modified by a significant three-way interaction between condition, similarity and 
type of response, which revealed that the faster responding of subjects on positive 
responses on same font trials was confined to the imagery condition. Given that 
image-percept overlap was greatest on this particular subset of trials, this would 
appear to indicate that image-mediated facilitation is most effective when there is a 
perfect, template-style, match between the image and the percept. 
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The above results are obviously consistent mith previous research and presumably, 
therefore, provide further support for the view that the facilitation effect occurs 
because the image and percept activate common representational structures. It is 
noteworthy, therefore, that the reaction time data provides no evidence whatsoever 
in support of the prediction that visual field performance in the imagery condition 
would vary as a function of the fonts in which the image and the percept were 
depicted. According to Kosslyn's theoretical formulations the RH should have been 
more adversely affected by a disparity between the fonts than the LH, since on RVF 
presentations it would be expected for the same representational structures to be 
activated irrespective of the font in which the letter was displayed. Thus it would 
appear, at least with respect to the reaction time data, that there is no evidence to 
support Kosslyn's claims regarding asymmetries in spatial relations at the 
representational level. 
Furthermore, the results arising from the accuracy data also conflict mith Kosslyn's 
claims, although there were some visual field effects. A significant interaction, for 
example, was obtained between visual field and similarity, with subjects responding 
significantly more accurately on RVF presentations in the same font condition than 
in the different font condition. There was no difference between the two conditions, 
however, on LVF presentations. Moreover, once again this effect was modified by 
a significant three-way interaction between visual field, similarity and type of 
response, which revealed that there was a LH advantage on positive responses in the 
same font condition whereas there was a RH advantage on positive responses in the 
different font condition. 
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Since the above effect was not specific to the imagery condition it obviously cannot 
be due to image-mediated facilitation. Presumably, therefore, it is simply related to 
visual discrimination performance, and generally if stimuli such as single letters are 
presented for identification or matching a LH advantage is normally found 
(Beaumont, 1982b). It is not entirely clear, therefore, why a RH advantage 
prevailed on the positive italic-trials, but one could perhaps speculate that the use 
of the less common format placed greater demands on aspects of visual processing. 
In fact there would appear to be some evidence in support of this proposal as 
previous research suggests that the LH superiority for verbal materials is reduced 
for stimuli printed in less "natural" type (e. g. Bryden and Allard, 1976; Bruyer and 
Van Laethem, 1986). Notwithstanding possible explanations for the pattern of 
results, however, it is clear that the findings again provide no support for Kosslyn's 
claims. 
To summarize, the results of the present study replicate previous findings by 
demonstrating that the presence of an image facilitates visual discrimination. 
Moreover, image-mediated facilitation is most effective when the image and the 
stimulus are visually identical. There was no evidence, however, to support the 
prediction that RH performance in the imagery condition would be more adversely 
affected by image-percept font disparity than the LH. Thus, the findings would 




10. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The preceding series of studies was motivated by the recent development of 
computational models of cerebral lateralization. In particular, given the evidence 
indicating that the LH has a direct role of some kind in the generation of images, the 
aim was to explore whether or not other components of the imagery system were 
lateratized to the LH or whether both hemispheres were involved in different aspects 
of imagery performance. In this respect, therefore, the findings arising from the 
first five experiments are noteworthy, since they appear to support the claim that it 
is unreasonable to expect cognitive systems to be lateralized en masse to one 
hemisphere or the other. Rather the cerebral locus appears to vary as a function of 
which particular processing component is under consideration. 
For instance, the first experiment reported in Chapter Two replicated and extended 
the work of French and Painter (1991) by providing evidence in support of the view 
that the RH is specialized for the representation or processing of a specific form of 
spatial information in images. Conversely, the subsequent studies reported in 
Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six which were designed to explore the laterality of 
the image scanning component appeared to indicate bilateral representation. Thus, 
in accordance with Allen's (1983) proposals, this evidence would appear to support 
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the claim that the processing modules comprising a particular cognitive system may 
be differentially lateralized to one or other hemisphere. 
However, whilst these findings were consistent with the computational approach to 
cerebral lateralization, they did appear to cast doubt on certain aspects of Kosslyn's 
theoretical speculations regarding the neural distribution of the imagery system 
(Kosslyn, 1987; Kosslyn, Flynn, Amsterdam and Wang, 1990). As noted previously, 
for example, according to Kosslyn's model the image scanning component should be 
lateralized to the RH, but no evidence which was consistent with this claim was 
found. Furthermore, the studies reported in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight also 
failed to support the view that the LH and RH were specialized for the generation 
of categorical images and coordinate images respectively. 
Nevertheless, the experiment reported in Chapter Eight did reveal an overall RH 
advantage for tasks involving metric judgements, and it was apparent that this could 
perhaps be construed as providing evidence in support of the view that the RH is 
specialized for the representation of coordinate information. However, an 
alternative view was that the finding simply reflected a RH specialization for the 
processing of metric information. The final study reported in Chapter Nine, 
therefore, attempted to assess whether the asymmetry proposed by Kosslyn's model 
was evident at the representational level. Once again, however, there was no 
evidence to support the prediction derived from the model. Thus, while Kosslyn's 
claims regarding a RH advantage for the processing of metric information appear 
to be valid, there would appear to be little support for the view that this effect 
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ultimately depends on asymmetries in spatial relations at the representational level. 
Obviously the above brief summary raises a number of theoretical issues which 
warrant further consideration. Initially, however, it is perhaps appropriate to give 
more detailed consideration to any general methodological problems which could 
perhaps have acted as potential confounds in the current series of experiments, and 
in this respect the excessively high error rate reported in Chapter Four which 
resulted in the elimination of nearly half the subjects who were run would appear 
to warrant further consideration. As noted in this chapter, it was not clear what 
factors could have been responsible for the difficulties experienced by subjects in 
carrying out the task. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth noting that Yuille (1986) has 
observed that generally individuals often find scanning mental images an onerous 
task, and consequently such studies frequently involve elimination of relatively large 
numbers of subjects. Indeed Yuille noted that in one of Kosslyn's image scanning 
studies 25% of the subjects tested were rejected, and he observed that this obviously 
raises concerns regarding the selective nature of inclusion of data in the final 
analysis. 
Of course, the elimination of subjects in the study reported in Chapter Four was so 
extreme that the results of this experiment were completely disregarded. 
Nevertheless, the above comments do suggest that it is important to consider whether 
selective inclusion of data was a problem in any of the other experiments involving 
image scanning. In this respect, there are two studies of relevance: the experiment 
reported in Chapter Three in which rive subjects were eliminated and the study 
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reported in Chapter Six in which three subjects were eliminated. These figures 
correspond to an eliminatioii rate of I I% and 7% of the total number of subjects run 
in each experiment respectively, and as such, although a little higher than would 
perhaps be hoped for ideally, do not appear to be so extreme as to cause serious 
concern. 
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that concerns regarding selective inclusion of 
data are not specific to image scanning experiments, and it should be noted in this 
respect that of the remaining studies there was one in which the elimination of 
subjects was relatively high. In the first experiment reported in Chapter Two, for 
instance, eight subjects were excluded and this corresponds to an elimination rate 
of 17% of the total number of subjects run. Clearly this is unfortunate as it 
introduces an element of doubt regarding the generalizability of the left visual 
advantage reported in this study. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth noting that this 
study replicated the effect found in the French and Painter (1991) experiment in 
which the elimination of subjects was lower (I I%). The consistency in the pattern 
of results reported in the two studies, therefore, could perhaps be regarded as 
suggesting that the relatively high exclusion rate in the current study did not bias the 
results in any significant way. 
A further methodological issue related to task difficulty concerns the use of 
perceptual analogues. Experimental designs formulated mithin the computational 
perspective are based upon the premise that it is only possible to infer that a visual 
field advantage on a particular task reflects a specialization for a specific processing 
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component if the influence of this component has been isolated from all other 
components in the task. In the preceding studies this was achieved by incorporating 
into the designs a perceptual analogue of the imagery task which required all of the 
same cognitive components as the imagery task apart from the imaginal component 
under consideration. Thus if the hemispheres performed equivalently on the 
perceptual analogue but demonstrated a visual field asymmetry on the imagery task 
the failure could not be attributed to cognitive processing components involved in 
both tasks, and was assumed therefore to be specific to the imaginal processing 
component under consideration. 
In fact, the pattern of results reported in the preceding studies only permitted such 
an inference to be drawn on two occasions. First, in the image scanning experiment 
reported in Chapter Six a LVF advantage was found for both reaction time and 
error data. Since no asymmetries had been found in the experiment reported in 
Chapter Five on a perceptual version of this task, it was inferred that the effect was 
associated with task components specific to the imagery system. Second, in the 
image generation classification task reported in Chapter Seven it was found that 
whilst there was no difference in accuracy on LVF presentations between the 
imagery and perceptual conditions, subjects responded significantly more accurately 
on RVF presentations in the perceptual condition than in the imagery condition. It 
was inferred, therefore, that the decrement in LH performance in the imagery 
condition was associated with the introduction of the image generation processing 
component. 
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One potential problem with the above inferences, however, is that if two tasks are 
identical as possible apart from the fact that one is imagery based and the other is 
perceptually based, the latter is likely to be easier, This then raises the possibility 
that the difference in the pattern of lateralization between the two versions of the 
task is due to task difficulty rather than a shift to the use of imagery. There are, 
however, reasons to doubt this alternative account. 
For example, if the effect on the image scanning task documented in Chapter Six 
was simply due to task difficulty then it is somewhat difficult to account for the fact 
that a LVF advantage specific to the imagery task was not found in the image 
scanning experiment reported in Chapter Three even though the analyses reported 
in this chapter revealed that the imagery condition was significantly more difficult 
than the perceptual condition. Similar considerations apply to the inference drawn 
in Chapter Seven, since the image generation experiment reported in Chapter Eight 
also revealed a significant difference between the imagery condition and the 
perceptual condition, but there were no visual field effects specific to the imagery 
task. Thus, since the asymmetries that were documented do not appear to have 
varied systematically in relation to task difficulty, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that this methodological issue does not impinge upon the major conclusions of this 
investigation. 
However, notwithstanding the validity of the inferences drawn from the reported 
results, it is perhaps appropriate to give some consideration to the general 
application of computational models within the area of laterality research, since a 
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number of investigators have expressed reservations in this respect. Some, for 
example, have questioned whether formal computational models are an appropriate 
way of conceptualizing the processes involved in imagery. Conversely, others have 
focused on the issue of whether or not computational models are based on principles 
that are compatible with the properties of the brain. It would seem appropriate, 
therefore, to consider the validity of these concerns in a little more detail. 
The issue of whether formal models based on computer analogies of cognitive 
processes represent accurate accounts of cognitive functioning has, of course, long 
been a matter for debate. Finke (1989), however, has questioned their use 
specifically in relation to imaginal processes. He argues, for example, that whilst 
models such as Kosslyn's 0980,1981,1987) have much explanatory power, this is 
gained at the expense of predictive power since any new predictions which are 
generated tend to be ones which yield refinements to the theory rather than basic 
understanding. Indeed, as such, Finke believes that these models may be 
conceptually inhibiting and argues instead for a research strategy based on the 
premise of searching for general, unifying principles. According to Finke such an 
approach is facilitated by allowing intuitions to spread without artificially restricting 
them in any way. By so doing, he believes that it should then become possible to 
discover broad principles that unify knowledge within a relatively large research 
domain. 
Finke's criticisms, although specifically directed toward computational models of 
imagery, can perhaps be regarded as being representative of the objections raised 
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by others against the general use of formal models of cognitive processes. However, 
notwithstanding this consensus amongst critics, it should be noted that many 
psychologists would argue strongly against such views. Johnson-Laird (1987), for 
example, believes that psychologists have no right to feel alienated by demands for 
rigorous explanations in place of intuition-bound predictions. Predictions based on 
intuitions, for instance, rarely yield solutions to problems other than those which 
they were designed to solve. Moreover, they seldom can be shown to lead to absurd 
consequences since hypotheses are derived inductively rather than deductively. 
Indeed the post-hoc inductive reasoning which inevitably follows from Finke's 
research strategy seems more likely to lead to inappropriate generalizations than the 
identification of broad, unifying principles. This is not to say, of course, that 
computational models are entirely problem-free, but it does suggest that the fact that 
the perspective demands that theories be precise, explicit and interpretable without 
recourse to intuition should not perhaps be regarded as a deficiency. 
Nevertheless, the second concern relating to computational models which was raised 
earlier, regarding whether the principles on which the models are based are 
compatible mith the properties of the brain, is clearly more problematic. Sergent 
(1989,1990), for example, observes that formal models of cognitive functioning are 
usually conceived independently of the structural and dynamic properties of the 
system implementing the computations. It is necessary to consider therefore the 
possibility that the formalisms of cognitive psychology do not represent an accurate 
account of how the component operations of a given function are instantiated in 
cerebral structures. As Sergent (1990, p. 124) observes, "the brain is not organized 
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as a serial computer and may not divide its operations according to our psychological 
concepts". 
Nevertheless, it must also be acknowledged that if we are to explain how the brain 
organizes behaviour, we need not only a model which is valid in terms of the 
physiological operation of the brain, but a model of behaviour at the purely 
psychological level to which to relate brain events. Indeed Beaumont (1983b) has 
observed that it is difficult to think that there might be a valid neuropsychological 
description of some ability without it being related to a sound psychological 
understanding of that ability. Thus, whilst accepting that there may be some 
incompatibility between such models and the systems they purport to describe and 
explain, it is perhaps appropriate to focus on how these theories of cognition can, 
by providing powerful techniques for the decomposition of complex cognitive 
functions, inform iieuropsychological description. Such an approach would perhaps 
be more fruitful than concentrating exclusively on potential areas of conflict. 
Indeed the computational perspective does appear to have provided a much needed 
analytic focus to research in hemispheric specialization. It is, for example, apparent 
that it is unreasonable to expect neurological correlates of "language" or "spatial 
processing". Rather the approach suggests that it A01 prove more fruitful to look 
for the neurological correlates of the processing subsystems suggested by 
contemporary computational approaches to human cognition. 
Of course, it must be acknowledged that the instantiation of the computational 
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perspective in Kosslyn's model of cerebral lateralization appears, at least with 
respect to imaginal processes, to have been somewhat unsuccessful. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that while this theory views imagery as a multicomponent 
process, hemispheric specialization is still conceptualized in terms of a global 
processing dichotomy. Thus, whilst the computational perspective prevails at the 
cognitive level, it would appear that in terms of cerebral lateralization the theory 
simply represents yet another attempt to reduce the multiple specializations of each 
hemisphere to a single more encompassing function. 
The successful application of the computational perspective, however, requires that 
theoretical formulations regarding cerebral organization eschew the temptation to 
regard the hemisphere as the basic unit of analysis. Functional considerations need 
to operate at the level of the subprocessors in order to avoid the identification of 
opposing conglomerates of only partly related components. Of course any theory 
developed along these lines would undoubtedly be extremely complex. This 
complexity, however, would appear to be necessary in order to reflect the true 
multifactorial nature of the underlying processes. 
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APPENDIX I 
17VS7WUC77ONS. - EXPERIMENT ONE 
In the first (second) part of the study we are going to present you with patterns of 
four dots to study for rive seconds. During this period you should inspect the dot 
pattern and try to remember the position of each dot by forming an image of the 
pattern exactly as it appears on the screen. Towards the end of this period a cross 
will appear at the centre of the screen. When this occurs, you must look directly at 
the cross and keep looking at it until you have made your response. The cross will 
be displayed for six seconds (one second) and at the end of this period a circle will 
be very briefly presented somewhere on the screen. Your task is to indicate AS 
QUICKLY AND AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE whether or not the circle is 
surrounding a location that was previously occupied by a dot. If it is, press the YES 
button. If it is not, press the NO button. 
Please note that on those trials when the circle is not surrounding a location that was 
previously occupied by a dot, this will be quite clear. That is to say, on such trials 
the circle will appear well away from a location occupied by a dot in the pattern. 
The task does not include trials designed to catch You out. 
Please use your Right (Left) hand to press the YES and NO buttons on the mouse 
throughout the experiment. Press the YES button with your Index (Middle) ringer 
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and the NO button with your Middle (Index) ringer. If you make an error you will 
hear a warning tone from the computer. Use your Left (Right) hand to press the 
SPACE BAR to begin each trial. Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any 
clarification. 
Place your chin on the chin rest and press the SPACE BAR when you are ready to 
begin the practice trials. 
I)qo 6.. 7 ý 
APPENDIX H 
INSMUCTIONS. - LXPERIMENT IWO 
hgggea Condidon 
In the first (second) part of the study dot patterns will be presented to you to study 
for rive seconds. During this period you should inspect the dot pattern and try to 
remember the position of each dot by forming an image of the pattern exactly as it 
appears on the screen. Towards the end of this period a cross will appear at the 
centre of the screen. When this occurs you must look directly at the cross and keep 
looking at it until you have made your response. An arrow will be presented very 
briefly somewhere on the screen. Your task is to indicate AS QUICKLY AND AS 
ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE whether or not the arrow is pointing at a location 
that was previously occupied by a dot. 
Please note that on those trials when the arrow is not pointing at a location that was 
previously occupied by a dot, this will be quite clear. That is to say, on such trials 
the arrow will point well away from a location occupied by a dot in the pattern. The 
task does not include trials designed to catch you out. 
Please use your Right (Left) hand to press the YES and NO buttons on the mouse 
throughout the experiment. Press the YES button with your Index (Middle) ringer 
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and the NO button with your Middle (Index) ringer. If you make an error you will 
hear a warning tone from the computer and the words "Wrong Response" will be 
displayed on the screen. Use your Left (Right) hand to press the space bar to begin 
each trial. Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any clarification. 
Place your chin on the chin rest and press the Fl. key when you are ready to begin 
the practice trials. 
EgnpWtual Condidon 
In the second (Ifirst) part of the study we are going to present you with patterns of 
four dots to study for three seconds. Towards the end of this period a small cross 
will appear at the centre of the screen. When this occurs you must look directly at 
the cross and keep looking at it until you have made your response. An arrow will 
be presented very briefly somewhere on the screen. Your task is to indicate AS 
QUICKLY AND AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE whether or not the arrow is 
pointing at a dot. 
Please use your Right (Left) hand to press the YES and NO buttons on the mouse 
throughout the experiment. Press the YES button with your Index (Middle) ringer 
and the NO button with your Middle (Index) ringer. If you make an error you will 
hear a warning tone from the computer and the words "Wrong Response" will be 
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displayed on the screen. Use your Left (Right) hand to press the space bar to begin 
each trial. Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any clarification. 
Place your chin on the chin rest and press the F1 key when you are ready to begin 
the practice trials. 
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17VS7WUC77ONS. - EXPERMENT 771REE 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. On each trial in the study 
a pattern of four dots will be presented to you to study for rive seconds. During this 
period you should inspect the dot pattern and try to remember the position of each 
dot by forming an image of the pattern exactly as it appears on the screen. Towards 
the end of this period a cross will appear at the centre of the screen. When this 
occurs you must look directly at the cross and keep looking at it until you have made 
your response. An arrow will be presented very briefly somewhere on the screen. 
Your task is to indicate AS QUICKLY AND AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE 
whether or not the arrow is pointing at a location that was previously occupied by 
a dot. 
Please note that on those trials when the arrow is not pointing at a location that was 
previously occupied by a dot, this will be quite clear. That is to say, on such trials 
the arrow mill point well away from a location occupied by a dot in the pattern. The 
task does not include trials designed to catch you out. 
Please use your Right (Left) hand to press the YES and NO buttons on the mouse 
throughout the experiment. Press the YES button with your Index (Middle) ringer 
and the NO button with your Middle (Index) ringer. If you make an error you will 
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hear a warning tone from the computer and the words "Wrong Response" will be 
displayed on the screen. Use your Left (Right) hand to press the space bar to begin 
each trial. Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any clarification. 
Place your chin on the chin rest and press the F1 key when you are ready to begin 
the practice trials. 
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APPENDIX IV 
VVSTRUCTIONS. - EXPERMENT FO 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. On each trial in the study 
a pattern containing four geometric shapes will be presented to you for four seconds. 
Towards the end of this period a small cross will appear at the centre of the screen. 
When this occurs you must look directly at the cross and keep looking at it until you 
have made your response. 
At the end of the above sequence a shape will be presented very briefly somewhere 
on the screen. Your task is to respond AS QUICKLY AND AS ACCURATELY AS 
POSSIBLE in the following manner. If the shape is not present in the pattern you 
should press the NO button on the mouse with the Index (Middle) ringer of your 
Right (Left) hand. If the shape is present in the pattern you should mentally scan 
from the centre of the briefly presented shape across the pattern to the centre of the 
matching shape. As soon as you arrive at the centre of the matching shape you 
should press the YES button with the Middle (Index) ringer of your Right (Left) 
hand. If you make an error you will hear a warning tone from the computer and 
the words "Wrong Response" will be displayed on the screen. Use your Left (Right) 
hand to press the space bar to begin each trial. 
Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any clarification. Place your chin on 
the chin rest and press the F1 key when you are ready to begin the practice trials. 
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17VSTRUC77ONS. - EXPERMENT FIVE 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. On each trial in the study 
a pattern containing four geometric shapes will be presented to you for rive seconds. 
During this period you should inspect the pattern and try to remember the position 
of each shape by forming an image of the pattern exactly as it appears on the screen. 
Towards the end of this period a small cross will appear at the centre of the screen. 
When this occurs you must look directly at the cross and keep looking at it until you 
have made your response. 
At the end of the above sequence a shape will be presented very briefly somewhere 
on the screen. Your task is to respond AS QUICKLY AND AS ACCURATELY AS 
POSSIBLE in the following manner. If the shape is not present in the pattern you 
should press the NO button on the mouse with the Index (Middle) ringer of your 
Right (Left) hand. If the shape is present in the pattern you should mentally scan 
from the centre of the briefly presented shape across the image to the centre of the 
matching shape in the pattern. As soon as you arrive at the centre of the matching 
shape you should press the YES button with the Middle (Index) ringer of your Right 
(Left) hand. If you make an error you will hear a warning tone from the computer 
and the words "Wrong Response" will be displayed on the screen. Use your Left 
(Right) hand to press the space bar to begin each trial. 
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Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any clarification. Place your chin on 
the chin rest and press the F1 key when you are ready to begin the practice trials. 
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4P - PENDIX 
VI 
VVSTRUCTIONS. - EXPERMENT SIX 
hm@Zea Condidon 
The experimental procedure for the first (second) block of trials in this condition is 
as follows. At the beginning of each trial a black cross will appear at the centre of 
the screen. When this occurs you must look directly at the cross and keep looking 
at it until you have made your response. A lowercase letter will then be presented 
very briefly somewhere on the screen. Your task is to indicate AS QUICKLY AND 
AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE whether the uppercase version of this letter is 
symmetrical along the vertical axis. 
Please use your Right (Left) hand to respond. Press the Left (Right) button of the 
mouse with your Index (Middle) ringer to respond YES, and the Right (Left) button 
with your Middle (Index) ringer to respond NO. If you make an error you mill hear 
a warning tone from the computer and the words "Wrong Response" will be 
displayed on the screen. Use your Left (Right) hand to press the space bar to begin 
each trial. Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any clarification. 
Place your chin on the chin rest and press the F1 key when you are ready to begin 
the practice trials. 
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In the second block of trials in this condition the experimental procedure is precisely 
the same as before, apart from the fact that you are required to make a different 
judgement. 
As previously, at the beginning of each trial a black cross will appear at the centre 
of the screen and when this occurs you must look directly at the cross and keep 
looking at it until you have made your response. A lowercase letter will then be 
presented very briefly somewhere on the screen. This time, however, you are 
required to indicate AS QUICKLY AND AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE whether 
the uppercase version of this letter contains any curved lines. 
As before, use your Right (Left) hand to respond. Press the Left (Right) button of 
the mouse with your Index (Middle) ringer to respond YES, and the Right (Left) 
button with your Middle (Index) ringer to respond NO. If You make an error you 
will hear a warning from the computer and the words "Wrong Response" will be 
displayed on the screen. Use your Left (Right) hand to press the space bar to begin 
each trial. Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any clarification. 
Place your chin on the chin rest and press the FI key when you are ready to begin 
the practice trials. 
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Effee plual Condidon 
The experimental procedure for the first(second) block of trials in this condition is 
as follows. At the beginning of each trial a black cross will appear at the centre of 
the screen. When this occurs you must look directly at the cross and keep looking 
at it until you have made your response. An uppercase letter will then be presented 
very briefly somewhere on the screen. Your task is to indicate AS QUICKLY AND 
AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE whether this letter is symmetrical along the 
vertical axis. 
Please use your Right (Left) hand to respond. Press the Left (Right) button of the 
mouse with your Index (Middle) ringer to respond YES, and the Right (Left) button 
with your Middle (Index) ringer to respond NO. If you make an error you will hear 
a warning from the computer and the words "Wrong Response" will be displayed on 
the screen. Use your Left (Right) hand to press the space bar to begin each trial. 
Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any clarification. 
Place your chin on the chin rest and press the F1 key when you are ready to begin 
the practice trials. 
In the second block of trials in this condition the experimental procedure is precisely 
the same as before, apart from the fact that you are required to make a different 
judgement. 
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As previously, at the beginning of each trial a black cross will appear at the centre 
of the screen and when this occurs you must look directly at the cross and keep 
looking at it until you have made your response. An uppercase letter mill then be 
presented very briefly somewhere on the screen. This time, however, you are 
required to indicate AS QUICKLY AND AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE whether 
this letter contains any curved lines. 
As before, use your Right (Left) hand to respond. Press the Left (Right) button of 
the mouse with your Index (Middle) ringer to respond YES, and the Right (Left) 
button with your Middle (Index) ringer to respond NO. If you make an error you 
will hear a warning from the computer and the words "Wrong Response" will be 
displayed on the screen. Use your Left (Right) hand to press the space bar to begin 
each trial. Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any clarification. 
Place your chin on the chin rest and press the F1 key when you are ready to begin 
the practice trials. 
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INSMUCHONS. - EXPERIMENT SEVEN 
hmager y Condidon 
The experimental procedure for the first (second) block of trials is as follows. 
At the beginning of each trial a black cross will be presented in the centre of the 
screen. When this occurs you must look directly at the cross and keep looking at it 
until you have made your response. A time in digital form will then be presented 
very briefly on the screen, e. g. 6.20, and your task is to indicate AS QUICKLY AND 
AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE whether or not the angle which would be formed 
by the hands of a clock at this time would be greater than or less than ninety 
degrees. 
Please use your Right (Left) hand to respond. Press the Left (Right) button of the 
mouse with your Index (Middle) ringer to respond GREATER THAN and the Right 
(Left) button with your Middle (Index) ringer to respond LESS THAN. If you make 
an error you will hear a warning tone from the computer and the words "Wrong 
Response" will be displayed on the screen. Use your Left (Right) hand to press the 
SPACE BAR to begin each trial. Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any 
clarification. 
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Place your chin on the chin rest and press the F1 key when you are ready to begin 
the practice trials. 
&Lcatual Condidon 
The experimental procedure for the first (second) block of trials is as follows. At the 
beginning of each trial a black cross mill be presented in the centre of the screen. 
When this occurs you must look directly at the cross and keep looking at it until you 
have made your response. A clock face will then be presented very briefly on the 
screen, and your task is to indicate AS QUICKLY AND AS ACCURATELY AS 
POSSIBLE whether or not the angle formed by the hands of the clock is greater 
than or less than ninety degrees. 
Please use your Right (Left) hand to respond. Press the Left (Right) button of the 
mouse with your Index (Middle) ringer to respond GREATER THAN and the Right 
(Left) button with your Middle (Index) finger to respond LESS THAN. If you make 
an error you will hear a warning tone from the computer and the words "Wrong 
Response" will be displayed on the screen. Use your Left (Right) hand to press the 
SPACE BAR to begin each trial. Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any 
clarification. 
Place your chin on the chin rest and press the FI key when you are ready to begin 
the practice trials. 
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INSMUCTIONS. - EXPERIMENT EIGHT 
Baseline Condidon 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Your task in the experiment is 
to decide whether a letter presented very briefly on the screen is or is not a 
predesignated target. The two target letters are B and E. The four nontarget letters 
are P, R, F and L. 
At the beginning of each trial a black cross will appear at the centre of the screen. 
A horizontal line indicating where the upcoming letter will be positioned will also be 
presented either to the left or right of the cross. You are required to look directly 
at the cross while directing your attention to the side indicated by the position cue. 
It is important that you maintain central fixation until you have made your response. 
Once you have achieved central fixation and prepared to see a stimulus on the side 
indicated by the position cue, you should press the space bar. A letter will then be 
presented very briefly in the cued position, followed by a solid black mask. Your 
task is to indicate AS QUICKLY AND AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE whether 
or not the letter is a target or a nontarget. 
Please use your Right (Left) hand to respond. Press the Left (Right) button of the 
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mouse with your Index (Middle) to respond TARGET and the Right (Left) button 
with your Middle (Index) ringer to respond NONTARGET. If you make an error 
you will hear a warning tone from the computer, and the words "Wrong Response" 
will be displayed on the screen. Use your Left (Right) hand to press the space bar 
to begin each trial. Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any clarification. 
Place your chin on the chin rest and press the F1 key when you are ready to begin 
the practice trials. 
hmggery Condidon 
In the second block of trials you are still required to decide whether a letter 
presented very briefly on the screen is one of the target or nontarget letters. 
At the beginning of each trial, however, one of the target letters mill be presented 
just above the fixation cross. You are required to form an image of this letter 
exactly as it appears on the screen at the position of the upcoming stimulus. Once 
you have formed the image you should look directly at the fixation cross and keep 
looking at it until you have made your response. 
Once you have formed the image and achieved central fixation you should press the 
space bar. A letter will then be presented very briefly in the cued position, followed 
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by a solid black mask. Your task is to indicate AS QUICKLY AND AS 
ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE whether or not the letter is a target or a nontarget. 
Please use your Right (Left) hand to respond. Press the Left (Right) button of the 
mouse with your Index (Middle) to respond TARGET and the Right (Left) button 
with your Middle (index) ringer to respond NONTARGET. If you make an error 
you will hear a warning tone from the computer, and the words "Wrong Response" 
will be displayed on the screen. Use your Left (Right) hand to press the space bar 
to begin each trial. Feel free to ask the experimenter if you need any clarification. 
Place your chin on the chin rest and press the F1 key when you are ready to begin 
the practice trials. 
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